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
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
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

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THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AS DIVIDED BY THE TREATY OF SÈVRES

TURKEY

A World Problem of To-day

BY

TALCOTT WILLIAMS

PROFESSOR EMERITUS OF JOURNALISM
DIRECTOR OF THE
SCHOOL OF JOURNALISM, 1912-1919,
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

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PREFACE

AT THE invitation of the Lowell Institute of Boston, Mass., I delivered in January and February of 1920 six lectures on Turkey. As the other Lowell courses on the Near East in the same season dealt for the most part with current conditions, I confined myself to the present of Asiatic Turkey. These lectures, re-written, make up these pages. They present a direct plea for the acceptance by the United States of a mandatory from the League of Peace for Asiatic Turkey and Constantinople, or as much of it as could be saved from other powers. In the lectures I made no secret of my own opinion, but I did not deem it seemly to be an advocate on the impartial platform of the Lowell Institute. For the direct argument as it now stands no one is responsible but myself in assent, dissent, or silence.

Accurate transliteration is the abiding temptation of him who writes on Asian lands. I have, with reluctance, deemed it wiser to follow the familiar path of a much-used book of reference, the "Statesman's Yearbook."

I desire to express my appreciation of an invitation to speak in what is the most important series of courses delivered in this country, an invitation in itself both honour and opportunity.

For the very accurate reports of the lectures printed in the Boston *Evening Transcript* I feel a sincere obligation. I have reported many lectures myself and know the difficulties of the task so well discharged by Mr. Forrest P. Hull.

TALCOTT WILLIAMS.

Columbia University
June, 1921.

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TURKEY

A World Problem of To-day

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I

WHY?

I WAS sitting in the smoking compartment of a Pullman sleeper when a question was asked, in the air, about Turkey. I answered it. A keen, wide-wandering salesman, who had visited more cities than Ulysses ever dreamed of entering, took a silent cigar from his mouth—the only silent thing about him—to say, also, in the air, "What the Hell is Turkey, anyhow?"

The question seemed to me to summarize a long procession of interrogations which had challenged me for fifty-five years since I landed in the United States, an American missionary's son, born in Turkey, living there for sixteen years, the years that begin and stamp a man for life. My first article on Turkey I wrote in *Philo*, the school magazine of Phillips Academy, Andover, in 1867. Therein I pointed out that the "Arabian Nights"

were Persian rather than Arab, a natural, inevitable view for a lad who had heard them from market-place and muleteer on the border between Arab and Persian, between the Desert of austere Arab and the Sown of Iranic imagination.

When the Bulgarian massacres came in 1876, I addressed a wider audience from the editorial page of the New York *World*, when Marble, Hurlbert, Chamberlain, and Schuyler—fading figures now, once names to conjure with—made together perhaps the most brilliantly written "page" in American journalism. I have been writing and, more lately, speaking on Turkey ever since—newspaper, magazine, encyclopedia, hundreds of articles. Through all these years I have been meeting inhabitants of the Turkish Empire, Arab, Syrian, Assyrian, Nestorian, Kurd, Armenian, Greek, Albanian, Turk old and new; and all these I knew in childhood in that distant land.

Suddenly, out of the cleared sky of national fate, the challenge came to the American people to assume the responsibility of a receivership for Constantinople, its little Thracian block of 11,000 square miles—New Jersey and Delaware in area, let us say—and Asiatic Turkey, a quarter as large as the United States between the oceans, a direct "Mandatory" finally, reduced to "Armenia," big as Colorado.

"Mandatory" is practically a European legal phrase for a receivership. Put as a receivership, perhaps the American would not have recoiled. "Mandatory" was fatal, a hold-up. But I have never known a man who knew both the United States and Turkey who had any doubt that the only escape for all the world from the perils of the present and the terrors of the future lay in the United States doing for Constantinople and Turkey in Asia what the American people alone of all on earth can do, becoming its guardian, maintaining order, restoring civilization, creating self-government, and saving the connecting land of three continents, Asia, Europe, and Africa, from long strife over its possession.

If this be not done, the wars of three thousand years over this key area will continue. The dwellers on the great Russian plains and in the westering lands of Europe, as well as the overlord of Egypt and the Suez Canal, whosoever it may be, and the Vast of Asia will continue the struggle of centuries for the path and gate of them all. Only one remedy exists which can prevent this conflict and bring surcease to the long wrestle who shall control the Suez Canal, the path to the Persian Gulf, and the shores of five waters, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, the East Mediterranean, and the Black Sea. This one remedy

is the control for peace and for a fiduciary purpose and policy alone, by a distant land like the United States, without regional ambition, free from desire or temptation to annex land anywhere or to possess the world's strategic straits and highways. Such a land as Turkey and such command as it has over the very centre of the world's inter-continental traffic, unless it be in neutral and distant hands, will breed war and create new jealousies and rivalries.

England emerges from a war, which has wasted other lands, having "joined up" its African Empire from the Cape to Cairo with its Indian Empire through control of Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Persia, with Beluchistan, the last already acquired. The Menam River is the boundary between Siam under an English Protectorate and the French "protectorate" over Indo China. From this river westward, across Burma and Assam, all India, Beluchistan, Persia, Mesopotamia, to Egypt, England holds all south Asia. Its African Empire is rounded out by German East Africa from Cairo to the Cape. If in some sort, whether by an American receivership or through direct governance by the League of Peace, Asiatic Turkey be not held by a neutral-international administration, the day is sure to come when Russia, central Europe, and Scandinavia will unite to protect their path to the south across the waterways and landways that lie

between the North Sea, the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Indian Ocean.

Into some such conflict the United States is certain to be drawn twoscore years hence. As the report of the American Commission, headed by Major General Harbord, justly says, the choice of the American people is "millions for a mandate 'now' or billions for future wars."

Why it is that no local authority, large or small, can be organized by all or by the parts of Asiatic Turkey, I shall show in the succeeding pages. The United States can let the matter alone. It is our habit, bred in the ninety-eight years since in the Monroe Doctrine we declared we would be alone in the guardianship of the Western Hemisphere.

Duty can be evaded by man or nation; but the penalty of evading a duty neither man nor nation can avoid. The American people has refused now; but, be assured, it will pay an inevitable penalty sharing in the horrors and destruction of a war greater than the Great War. It could have stopped Germany at the gate, in 1906, by decisive action at the Algeciras Conference over Morocco and saved the last war. Already, the mere delay of our Senate in advising the ratification of the Covenant of Peace and the Treaty closing the war has cost at least a million lives by famine and by massacre, in central Asia and Siberia, in Russia, in

central Europe, and in Asiatic Turkey. This has been the penalty of delay; what will be the penalty of the refusal altogether to act?

By an overwhelming majority, the American people and its Congress has decided against any action in Turkey save by way of relief, missions, and education. The challenge of this distant land will remain. President Harding must deal with it. So must Congress. Perpetually this issue will return. I write these pages that it may be understood the better in the future, the long future in which it will come before America.

What the United States was asked to do was not wrecking, and plundering the wreck into the bargain, but salvage; it is not charity; it is insurance. As I show in the chapter on the Bankruptcy of Asia, the conditions which have ruined Turkey exist over that continent. They exist also in parts of Latin America. It is not possible any longer to hold colonies or people permanently under absolute rule. As with religious freedom, representative government, the abolition of slavery, so the removal of alien rule from any race or any national integer which feels the thrills and throes of national existence, is inevitable. It is summed in the phrase "self-determination." You can no more weaken the great utterance which this phrase first recorded than Rufus Choate was able to weaken the effect of

the Declaration of Independence by calling it a string of "glittering generalities."

The United States discovered in Cuba that its health and safety depended on giving this island her rights and the act was, as I have already said, not charity but insurance. This duty, by whomsoever it is discharged, solves the problem because it proposes to substitute development for despotism, education for force, and pledges the honour of a great nation before the world that when self-government is feasible its soldiers, its flag, and its authority will be withdrawn, exactly as the authority of parent or trustee is withdrawn when a ward reaches majority. There will be no more permanent colonies, and any nation which attempts to have them in the name of progress is trying to light the fire of civilization with dynamite. Above all, the use of permanent colonies to furnish savage or semi-savage auxiliary forces to hold down and prevent the independence of another land is out of the question. If Frenchmen cannot be found to do the work of their government in Syria or Cilicia, and Senegalese and Moors have to be sent (in the former case practically certain to break away from discipline), the practice must end. Every man knows this. Whether the evil has been long continued, has countless precedents, or is accepted by international law, makes no difference. It must go.

II

WHY IS THE DISPOSAL OF TURKEY SLOW?

SO FAR as treaties go, the disposition of the other Central Powers lately at war is settled. What halts settling Turkey? Two opposing conditions still delay the final disposition of the Asiatic territory of the Ottoman Empire, two years after the Armistice. The first was that the world of Europe and America was in general agreed that a Turkish government at Constantinople should not again be permitted to govern the Christian, subject populations of Turkey. This was unfair to the better part of the governing forces of the Turkish Government; but the worse had been the stronger. Both must go. The massacres of Marash in February and March, 1920, but deepened this conviction.

When the Allies acted on this conclusion in the treaty of Sèvres between the Entente Powers and the Ottoman Empire, England, France, and Italy believed that they bore the sword of justice. It has been struck from their hands by resistance and protest at home, principally by the English

Labour party in England and in France by the owners of shares and bonds in the various "concessions" granted by the Ottoman Government to French subjects and corporations. It is a clear case of Pilate and Herod becoming friends over a martyred Christian state. For a season, the Greek army seemed likely to be used and was used instead of an Anglo-French force. This has failed. The plain people of Greece proved, when an election came around November 14, 1920, and a plebiscite summoned back King Constantine December 11, to be as overwhelmingly opposed to "sending our boys abroad" as were the American voters, men and women, in our election. The Turkish peasant and town-folk, half-clad, ill-armed, unfed, unorganized, proved true the opinion of Foch as to the force it would take to occupy Anatolia and deprive the Turk of the privilege of self-government. Greece has finally been drawn into war, whose final results none can predict.

The refusal of Congress and the American people to protect the Armenian and other Christian races in Turkey has not merely shifted the duty of stopping fiendish massacre to others; it has left a great crime unpunished, opened the path to new massacres in the future, and to the extermination of Armenians, Greeks, and other Christian races.

These Christian populations will for long be in

peril of massacre, if some authority, trusted on both sides, is not present to keep the peace by moral and economic weight rather than armaments.

It is now perfectly clear that in a country like Turkey a Christian minority cannot, with safety to itself or to the public order, be placed in control of the government of a Moslem majority, superior in the past, armed and warlike, unless an army from the leading allied powers is on hand, ready to suppress revolt and prevent massacre. A little less than seven eighths of all Asiatic Turkey (Asia Minor, "Armenia," Syria, and Mesopotamia) is Moslem, and a little over one eighth Christian. The Marash massacre is a warning of the perils to this Christian minority in attempting to govern a Moslem majority with an insufficient force. The portion of Asiatic Turkey north of the Taurus or of a line running east from Alexandretta has an area of 272,172 square miles (the area of New England, the Middle States, Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Ohio, and Indiana). The usual estimate of population is 13,657,500. Not over one third is Christian, probably less, including Armenian, Greek, and other sects; and two thirds at least is Moslem. To keep order, military experts say, a European army of at least 250,000 men would be needed, costing $250,000,000 a year in active service. This army is nowhere available. The

matter is rendered more difficult and perilous because in only one fifth of the area—not more, probably less—are the Christians in a majority. Add the "Republic of Armenia" (part of Russian Trans-Caucasia, including a portion of Kars) and it would be possible to gather about 3,000,000 of population with the Armenians wholly in the majority. In the city of Smyrna the Greeks are in a probable majority. As to claims that they are in a majority outside of the city Sir William M. Ramsay, the leading living authority on the population of Asia Minor, said at the close of a lecture in London on the subject: "The Greeks of Asia (not the Greeks of Europe, a people with different traditions and different character) had definite and good claims to bring forward; but there must be a good deal of allowance on both sides. The Greeks of Asia had been very well off under Abdul Hamid (as they now knew): they would not be so well off under a perfectly fair and equal administration as they were under Hamid's despotic rule. For one thing he would like to see the Greek claims based on trustworthy maps. He believed that M. Venizelos had been misled by statistics of population, which were falsified through the enthusiasm of extremists, who saw a Greek town wherever there was even a small minority of Greek residents. Enthusiasts saw the

Greeks of towns thronging in full numbers to meet them; but they did not see the much greater number of Turks, who did not come to welcome them. Aidin had been called a Greek city; but there were only about 8,000 Greeks in it out of a total population of 30,000. It had been occupied by the Greek troops, and was now a heap of ashes. Moreover, the rustic population in the fields was almost wholly Turks, except close to Smyrna, Fokia, and Aivali. Further, the mountain districts between the valleys were purely Turk in population. Endless war would be the consequence of bringing in European Greek soldiers. These soldiers would meet half-armed Turks in all the mountain regions; but the mountains, which were the larger part of the coast regions, were admirably suited to guerilla warfare, and very difficult for regular military operations. The strain on the finances of European Greece would soon prove unendurable; and the mass of the Asiatic Greeks would prefer, and would soon openly show their preference for, Asian home rule with general equality of rights. This was the true and only solution of the problem."

Lord Curzon this year gave figures in the House of Lords showing that four fifths of Cilicia was Moslem.

If Syria and Mesopotamia are added to Turkey,

north of the line indicated above, the Christian population of the Turkish Empire in Asia is only one seventh of the whole. The Moslems would unite as a whole to prevent local Christian rule. They feel about this precisely as the White South felt about the Coloured South in our Reconstruction period. What a blessing it would have been if white and black could have agreed on some one authority in which each had confidence to guide both to mutual peace. Had any such authority refused to act, how wicked and selfish it would have seemed to us all. The United States is still such an authority for Turkey to-day. It has refused to act.

Moslem rule is so convicted of massacre that it cannot be accepted by the world of civilization; no European army is available to subdue and hold the entire region; continued disorder in Turkey is certain in time to bring on a world war as did continued disorder in the Balkans. Only one course is open: action by some country and people which will be accepted by both Moslem and Christian. The United States and the American people hold this place. No other does. The Harbord Commission, sent to Turkey to examine conditions as to a mandatory for this country, gives eloquent and convincing evidence of this. On this, no one can have any doubt. No argument is made against the United States taking a mandatory save selfish

pleas. This is the condition, the necessity, the duty of the hour as far as the Ottoman Empire is concerned. Delay has lessened the position of the United States, but it would still command confidence.

How this has come about through the centuries, what the result is and the final cause has brought disaster and crime, I propose to show, not by argument or plea, but from experience, observation, and history. I hold no brief for any of these peoples. I am a partisan of none. No one of the contestants will accept or be satisfied with what I say, Moslem or Christian. The fact, is the only side I propose to take.

In the midst of the just hate and justifiable bitterness which infamous and unparalleled crimes have created, should create and must create, I appeal to all who read to remember and be mindful that all concerned in the hideous catastrophe and unutterable calamity which have marked the Ottoman Empire are, Moslem and Christian, human beings, made of God, created in His image. Of the mass, it is true of all that none are without some good, though individuals have been satanic in their crimes and should be executed. I have patiently endeavoured in the pages that follow to unravel, explain, and show how these awful crimes came about, what causes led to them, what con-

ditions preceded these tragedies of cruelty, deep-dyed and inconceivable. I do this not in apology or in extenuation; but because I believe in human nature, in its reform and redemption, and am firm in the conviction that though individuals are blood-guilty, this monstrous evil in the world is not deliberately willed by any people, but is caused by circumstances. I believe that justice, law, order, mercy, education, unselfish acts, impartially administered by a great people, like the United States, moved by the divine wisdom and patience the Most High chose in His dealing with the sons of men, will, in the end, bring peace, reconciliation, and a mutual desire of all who are involved in the present condition of Turkey to be right and to do right, let human frailty be what it may, now or in the past.

Above all, may the great nation of which we are all a part, in this hour of opportunity, know its duty and discharge it to the end that it shall prove that its principles, its practice, its justice, and its long-suffering belief in the rights and the possibilities of all men, all peoples, and all races shall solve the long problem of civilization in this region whose crimes through all history are without example from the Assyrian to the Turk, but whose gift to the world has also been Jesus of Nazareth and His teaching.

The Asiatic possessions of the Turkish Empire are part of the new problem presented by the countries which cannot keep order and are instead lands in which their own inhabitants do not find peace. Such are a perpetual peril to the peace of other lands and of the world at large. Turkey is in the newspapers every day. The massacre of Armenians stops and begins, after twenty-five years of massacre. From time to time, there is fighting in northeastern Turkey. The Moslems who have made the Azerbaijan Republic, originally Tartars, but now speaking Turkish, and hold Baku on the Caspian, are at war with the Christians about them. There is fighting between the Greek army in Smyrna, where the Christians are in a majority, and the Moslems in the interior, where the Moslems are in a majority. The French forces, which had begun by occupying eastern Syria, went outside of Syria, leaving an Arabic-speaking population, and occupied Aintab and Marash, two adjacent towns, a majority of whose inhabitants speak Turkish and are Moslems. A large minority in these cities is Armenian. The Moslems are opposed to the rule of a foreigner, French or otherwise, and attacked the French force, part of it Algerian cavalry and part from the "Foreign Legion," composed of men drawn from every land in Europe. The Armenians welcomed the French, as is natural, for they

have been foully, brutally oppressed by the Ottoman Government and the Moslems about them. The French force was too small for the task set it to do, and after a fortnight's siege retreated. The Armenians were massacred by thousands, with savage cruelty unspeakable. The French were on the road to copper mines at Arghana, and north of that place, where lies one of the greatest deposits of the metal to be had anywhere. It has been worked for centuries in rude fashion. The Germans obtained a large part of their copper in the last two years of the war from these mines. In order to place the large and profitable possibilities of these mines in French hands, the line drawn by France and England known as the "Sykes-Picot line," delimiting what France is to have, has a sharp indentation in it to include these copper mines. This is one of the "irregularities" not yet explained to which President Wilson alluded in the despatch to the Allied powers on Turkey. The French march toward this upper deposit brought on the conflict which has cost from five thousand to eight thousand human lives. Constantinople has been occupied by the Allied fleet to stop this. The English line in south Mesopotamia has been pushed to the north so as to include a valuable oil-field and Mosul. This brought on fighting with the Kurds of this region who, being savages, prefer

their own government, a barbarous rule which in the past eighty years has meant sporadic massacre for the few Christians in these mountains. Arabs on the Euphrates fight, preferring an Arab to an English rule.

This was the record in the first three months of 1920. In no one of these regions are life and property safe. In all of them a Moslem majority prefers Moslem rule and accepts or passes by occasional massacre as one of the necessary incidents in dealing with a subject race. It is their form of "lynching," but it slays thousands instead of one hundred to two hundred a year. Both are savage breaches of law and civilization which should be suppressed with the iron hand of impartial justice. The remedy for this kind of disorder in other parts of Asia and in Africa in the past hundred years has been simple, direct, and effectual. England or France or Russia or Germany or Austria stepped in and seized the region and governed it as a colony. Peace, order and, in general, prosperity and an increasing population followed. We brought this remedy to a halt for Latin America in 1823 by the Monroe Doctrine.

The Great War has brought this remedy to a halt for the world. A people may be brutal, tyrannical, and guilty of untold crimes in the past; but where it is in a majority and has had its own government,

it fights for the right to rule itself in its own way. Even the fellahs of Egypt who have not fought for their rights in six thousand years of recorded history, fight now and have won. Two or three aeroplanes made short work of their mud-huts and their wives and children; but Egypt, taken in the Moslem mass, high and low, for the first time refuses to accept plenty, wealth, rising real estate values, and an increasing cotton crop, at thrice the old values, as a compensation for the refusal of self-government. This is what comes of letting an "idealist" like Jefferson launch that "all men are created equal" in one century, or another "idealist," Woodrow Wilson, "self-determination" for all peoples in this century.

The old remedy was simple. If rebellion came, it was crushed. Once, if French troops had met a repulse like that at Marash, there would have been an army corps put in Turkey at the earliest possible moment. This can no longer be done. In March, 1920, the prime ministers of both France and England, M. Millerand and Mr. Lloyd George, frankly said that they had no troops to send to restore order in Turkey. Enlistments are slow. No government could retain power in France, England, or Italy, if it entered on such an adventure with conscript soldiers. Volunteers object to such service.

Why have we reached this situation? Why is it that the Turkish Government cannot maintain order now and has not in the past save at the cost of massacres and crimes innumerable, and no power has the means adequate to the task or is willing to undertake it? What is it about the Asiatic territory of the Ottoman Empire that it never reaches stability for itself, justice within its borders, or can be brought to order as a colony? What is Turkey, anyhow, that it goes on without the emergence of any administration equal to the task of bringing order, peace, and prosperity out of resources untold of every order and a population including representatives and descendants of the earth's ablest races in the past? What is the remedy? These are the questions these pages propose to answer.

Nor is Turkey alone. China has been growing worse decade by decade for seventy years. Massacre comes and widespread disorder, famine, pestilence, battle, murder, and sudden death. Latin America from the Rio Grande south is in recurrent disorder, save where European immigrants have steadied Argentina and a landed aristocracy, Chile. Persia has come perilously near losing self-government in the treaty with England. Order and safe roads could not come unless brigands were hung and self-government was suspended to get the

brigands hung. A Bolshevik Russian army has held up part of northern Persia. If a change does not come in Russia, whose experiment is still unsolved and its true working almost unknown, another 180,000,000 will be added to the 400,000,000 human beings of whom it is true to-day that the régime of the past has collapsed bringing human misery inconceivable, and for it all neither remedy from without nor within yet appears.

Not a single reader of the day's news but is daily wondering if there is to be no end to this ghastly record of human suffering. Once we looked to see Europe rule. Europe is broken and bankrupt by a great war brought in great measure by the attempt of the German military autocracy to furnish a remedy for Turkish rule. This has failed, and left all Europe east of the Rhine for varying reasons close to the fate of Turkey, China, and the rest.

III

TERRITORY AND POPULATION

ALL countries look alike on the map. As Americans always see the United States on a relatively large-scale map and Asiatic countries on maps of a much smaller scale, their impressions of Turkey and other lands in Asia are wrong. They do not see them as they are. The adjoining map, which shows Turkey spread over a part of the United States, will give a better conception of the size of Asiatic Turkey. Turkey as it stands, with its share in Arabia omitted, is 696,894 square miles, a little less than one quarter of the "Continental United States," the United States exclusive of Alaska and insular possessions. With its possessions in Arabia, Turkey was one quarter of the size of the United States between the oceans. The area Turkey had in Arabia, Hejaz, holding the holy cities of Islam, Mecca, and Medina, 114,330 square miles, made it a full quarter of the United States; but this is gone, not to return in our day. The Kingdom of the Hejaz, practically guaranteed by Great Britain, is to-day, for

all practical purposes and international relations, part of the British Empire, as indeed is all Arabia, about 1,000,000 square miles, with large certainties of oil wells in a region holding the largest unexplored area on the globe, except the South Polar lands. As Lord Robert Cecil neatly said in the House of Commons when asked if the British Government was responsible for the creation of the Kingdom of Hejaz, "No, but I cannot say we were surprised at the result," while the members shook with laughter over the neatness with which the span between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf had been bridged.

The Ottoman Empire that is left constitutes a homogeneous unit. The European and the Arabian possessions that it has lost have sometimes been held by what is now Turkey and sometimes not; but this area between the Black Sea and the desert of Arabia, between the Mediterranean and the Persian steppe, has through all history tended to hold together. The trade of the river valleys of the Euphrates and the Tigris has always needed the trade-routes across Syria and to the Black Sea, to its rivers (the Danube most important of all), to the Bosphorus and Dardanelles, and so to the three Mediterranean peninsulas. Whoever held these trade-routes ramifying into Europe was certain to invade Syria and the

great river plain of Mesopotamia. Whoever holds Syria and Mesopotamia wants these trade-routes. The long delay, the doubt, the hesitation over the past two years since the Armistice are due to this. No one power ventures to take all of Turkey. The attempt would bring a European coalition. No division can be anything but temporary. All know this. Each is trying to get a temporary foothold, but as they cut and carve and grab this and that slice of the seacoast, each is aware that all history makes the current division untenable.

Greece occupied Smyrna in May, 1919, and in March, 1920, Lloyd George refused to make public the report of the international commission into the massacre at the occupation because it would discredit Greece before the world. The Greek army is the centre of a constant border warfare which has destroyed Aidin, the largest city of the western interior of Asia Minor, ravaged the countryside, and given proof of the determination of the population to fight for self-government. Smyrna needs territory to give it trade, the territory needs Smyrna, and both need access to the south cut off by the occupation of Adalia by Italy and to the north by hostile Moslem inhabitants. Neither Italy nor Greece can extend their occupation without conflict. In Cilicia, the French cross the Italian future, if they hold the railroad that connects this

fertile region with its markets. The Armenians were disarmed and left to slaughter by the French command.

A network of agreements as to railroad rates, concessions, and loans to native governments is needed to provide for, but cannot prevent, future friction between France and England over Mesopotamia and Syria. The trunk line, to be completed in another year, all built now but a brief span, from Constantinople to Basra, crosses eight jurisdictions from the Persian Gulf to the Bosphorus. The Bank of Persia, an English corporation, in its last annual report notes a loan to the Persian Government to carry the railroad from Teheran to Bagdad before Persia extends its lines to its own ports on the Persian Gulf. As this is done, the Indian railroad system will come in touch and rail communication will be complete from Calcutta to Constantinople. Behind all is the Russian Bolshevik army from the north, already down to the Caspian on its way to take over England's occupation of Baku and reconquering the new republics Georgian, Armenian, and Azerbaijan, carved out of Russian Trans-Caucasia. A strong Turkish movement is in full sympathy with this advance, endeavouring to stir to action the entire Moslem population from the fringe that is skirmishing with the Greek-Italian-French-

English-Armenian-Persian line, to the Turki and Tartar hordes of the central Asian Khanates and all the rest of central Asia to Mongolia.

These are the fruits of the secret agreements made five years ago, some known and some hid, to divide the Ottoman Empire between these various powers instead of taking the only plan which tends to peace—the creation of local, independent states under the protection and mandatory of the United States, which has the regard and respect of all the peoples of Turkey. Delay has frustrated much, perhaps defeated all, but the population of Turkey is so various, so long divided, so mutually hostile, that it is ready to accept a mediator and arbitrator.

IV

THE DISUNION OF TURKEY

ASIATIC Turkey is less one in land, race, tongue, and faith than any equal area in Europe, Asia, or Africa. There are smaller areas as broken up, as was the southern stretch of what was Austria-Hungary or Caucasia. These are so broken because they were under Turkish rule for 200 years. There are much larger areas, as the Anglo-Indian Empire, in which there is as big or a bigger mixture of earth's features, of peoples, languages, and faiths; but the units are larger and the differences are less intermingled in the same stretch of territory. Nowhere else is there a territory like Turkey in Asia, a quarter as large as the United States, in which there is so much mutually alien in its surface, descent, speech, and belief, brought together like an old-fashioned patchwork quilt, the seams close and the patches small.

The "unity and married calm of States" requires reasonably similar physical conditions; that is, plain, hill, mountain, and so on; rainfall,

temperature, and soil. The diverse peoples must be enough alike to merge and understand one another. The languages spoken must be able to amalgamate because, not too far back, they have the same background of primitive words, parts of speech, and the inflections of verbs, nouns, and the rest. They must be near enough in their views of time and eternity, good and evil, God and man, so that what one honours, the other does not despise, though they may differ on these issues within limits. Time is also necessary for these similarities, relationships, and common heritages to wear off the sharp corners of those side by side. All these factors do not always bring union. An Asiatic finds it not easy to see the difference between an Englishman and an Irishman of the same station, education, and pursuit; but the two have never been able to get on together, though even Americans cannot always see just why.

Time is indispensable for the mutual contact and working together of peoples. Events in the Turkish Empire are constantly compared with west Europe. Europe, west of the Rhine and the Adriatic, has had between 1,500 and 1,600 years in which its fragments have come to an understanding. The Roman world went to smash for England in the century between Cerausius (286-294) and his claim of an independent empire in

Britain, and the withdrawal of the Roman legions by Honorius (about 410). It was 500 years before Alfred the Great began modern England (871–901) ten centuries ago, and the seam we call the Irish Sea has not yet been fully closed up. More time is needed. The Roman order was still supreme over Asia Minor 171 years after Alfred closed his work. Charlemagne had behind him three centuries of efforts to still savage disorder before he began, when he was crowned by the Pope Roman Emperor in St. Peter's December 25, 800, to make a new France, a new Germany, and a new Italy. It was a thousand years before France was made one in all things when the Pope crowned Napoleon Emperor of the French, December 2, 1804. Italy took nearly a century longer, and in the opinion of many Italians the job is not yet quite done. The seams of Germany still gape, bleeding and rent.

Take it by and large, each European civilized self-governing state occupies territory in which, after effective Roman rule disappeared, there were four or five hundred years of whelming disorder, in which Rome became a legend. A thousand years of slow growth were needed before the present order was established and the mill of ten centuries, which grinds exceeding fine, had brought to a common denominator the fractions of warring

tribes and people which rent one another in the slime and bog of human misery into which the destruction of Roman order plunged the Western world of Europe.

This order fell and was lost in limitless destruction about as early in the Balkans and Greece as in the rest of Europe. From the southern boundary of Austria to the Ægean all was swept and harried after about 500. When Alp Arslan, the Seljuk Turk, at Menzikert in 1071, smashed the Byzantine army five years after William began at Hastings the re-Romanizing of England, the new conqueror from central Asia did not, like the Norman, sweep over a land which for six centuries had developed its own new order, of which the Duke of Normandy was chosen king at London. Alp Arslan rode over Armenia and Asia Minor, in which Roman Law had never ceased to rule since Cæsar brought it there eleven hundred years before. Greek temples still stood over all the land, Christian in worship but still untouched. The splendours of Pergamus, though despoiled, and the lonely mausoleum Artemisia built, still mocked the future to equal their message of triumph and the stately sorrow of a widowed queen. The Venus of Melos was long since walled in the niche which preserved her untouched from the worship of one age to the wonder of another. The Winged Victory still looked

out over the Samothracian wave, in sunlight and in shadow. The last poems of the Greek Anthology, fit companions of those that Simonides began and Meleager gathered, had not long been written by Paulus Silentiarius, and the collection itself still remained to be gathered in Byzantium into the twelve books of best and worst epigram by Planudes. If beauty had departed, Grecian science had not, and the engineering skill which had begun in Greek temple and Roman road had increased from century to century and was still full high advanced in dome, bridge, ship, and highway. Greek was spoken or known by all, over Asia Minor, and used by the advantaged, as was Latin, over the entire area where to-day Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, Arabic, and Romaic or modern Greek are the tongues of the hour.

This fragment of the ancient world, from the outer bounds of the tract held by Constantinople in Europe (close to the area now left to the city) unto the Persian frontier, was still riding out the storm like a well-found ship, head to windward, meeting the waves, while all the fleet besides of shipwrecked European lands were dismasted hulks drifting for centuries to leeward, refitting as best they could. Christianity had replaced Hellenic worship and Stoic morals, an immeasurable improvement on both for the working world, though

a multitude of intellectuals still held their secret sympathies with a past more sane and beautiful. All Europe but the Byzantine realm had been swept and submerged for six centuries when Alp Arslan, from central Asia, broke the Byzantine line, modelled on the Roman legion. No barbarian commander had done this north of the Taurus. Alp Arslan was a Moslem. Before Mohammed began his work (622) every new inroad from the barbaric unknown had in the end adopted Christianity. After the Prophet of Mecca had preached his substitute for Christianity, every new invasion on the eastern flank of Europe and every tribe forcing its way into this Byzantine fragment of the old order in the Near East turned to Islam, the Moslem's name for his faith. He never calls it Mohammedanism. "Islam" stands for complete self-surrender to the will of God. It has its brief creed that God is one and Mohammed his Prophet; but the supreme act of faith lies not in creed, in rite or organization, in mutual communion. These are well, and enjoined. But the test of faith, the path of religion, the proof of conviction, is submission to God's will, come what may. No creed is wholly lived. There are frivolous Moslems, vicious Moslems, Moslems that are hypocrites, Moslems that are unspeakably base, bestial, and cruel, and all the weeds

that grow in our sustaining faith mock and mar the world's greater creeds, but you cannot know a sincere and trained Moslem without feeling that the years in which he has schooled himself to submission have brought a support, a certainty, a habitual trust in the future now and hereafter during the world's storms and conflicts.

> Whose foundations builded are
> Below the tides of war.

Three results followed, overlooked and unappreciated by those who see Turkey from the west.

First, in two centuries, from Alp Arslan (1068) to Othman (1290), the founder of the Ottoman Empire, there was the same horrible havoc of the greater past which befell Europe from about 500 to about 700. How fragmentary is our knowledge of these centuries in England, even when it is pieced out by the imagination of Green! So these two centuries in Asia Minor are the least known of all the last 3,000 years. A clean sweep was made in Europe, and it took six hundred years to rebuild even the beginnings of a new order. Before the bar of public opinion, all acts, which appear daily in the same columns, are judged alike. This is inevitable, just, and right. Historically, we must remember that the space of time needed in Europe for like work has not been vouchsafed to

the Ottoman Empire. Where European lands have had 1,200 to 1,500 years, Turkey has had from 600 to 900 years. The time has been correspondingly short in Russia. See how the Muscovite in our day repeats the jacquerie or peasant savagery, the mediæval guild or soviet, the massacre, oppression, and arbitrary power of all western Europe six or eight centuries ago.

Second, the invaders of the Western Roman Empire accepted the faith they found. The invaders of the Eastern Roman Empire rejected the faith they found. This digged a deep gulf never yet bridged and still filled with blood. "And, O, that such should be," to change one word in two lines of Aytoun's ballad, "The dark tide of Christian blood that flows 'twixt you and me." Why, I know not. Christianity has ceased to convert these invading peoples since Mohammedanism appeared. This brought in a separation between the new and old in southeastern Europe and southwestern Asia and North Africa such as western and central Europe never knew. The Bolsheviki Government also constitutes the first European power in 1,400 years which has refused Christianity, save the brief rejection by France.

Third, the new building which took place in Turkey in the fourteenth century was nearer by centuries the survival of the organization cre-

ated by Italy, Greece, and Judea than was the new building at work in the west in the fourteenth century of Rudolf and Albert of Austria and their cousin Frederic of Hohenzollern, of the three Swiss cantons before Sempach, of the Hanseatic League, of Huss, of Edward I and the first "perfect Parliament," all three estates summoned. These men built on foundations, long building. The Turkish Empire came into being immediately after the wreck of the older order, as if those men just mentioned had begun between 600 and 700.

Time, "slow time," is the essence of the contract for the advance of humanity the centuries of the Most High make with the generations of man and, in judging the capacity for self-government in the Ottoman area and the need for help and the peril of its lack, one must bear in mind these absent centuries which western Europe had and the Turkish rule had not. How swift the growth may be if there be isolation, security, and teaching from without, Japan shows. Given these and a nation may and will be born in a day. The United States, a nation, detached, could give Turkey isolation.

V

HOW RACES DIVIDE TURKEY

RACES, tongues, and faiths, bitterly held and bitterly persecuted, divide Turkey as they did western Europe for six or eight centuries, 500 to 1300, and as they still divide parts of eastern Europe which, like Asiatic Turkey, have had none of the training, melioration, and amalgamation which Europe has gained in the last 700 years. In those years the uniform tongues and organized, consolidated countries of Europe of the west have emerged. Turkey, to-day, as to local tongues and races, is as the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Italy were 1000 to 1300.

You look at a map of Turkey and you think of it as a land where Turkish is spoken, but it is not. Neither is it a land where Armenian or Arabic or Romaic or Kurdish or any other tongue is spoken as a whole.

In the house in which I lived in my boyhood, in Diarabekr, five languages were familiarly spoken—English at the table of the family of an American missionary of which I was a member; the man who

waited on the table spoke Armenian; the other servant who had the stable and the patio or courtyard of the house spoke Turkish; a family living in this part of the two-story, flat-roofed house spoke Arabic; the goatherd spoke Kurdish. He came every morning to take the family milk supply (in the shape of five goats) out to the great pen where with several hundred other goats they were led to feed through the day. No other race is quite equal to the goat.

Boyhood has its various thrills in all lands. Among them all, a boy of ten, I held high the morning trip to the Mosul gate of the city. The streets were narrow, walled, windowless lanes, ten to a dozen feet wide, narrowing to five or six feet. Down narrower defiles the goats darted, alleys that curved and bent to the silent door of some man of means, a money-lender, and behind the dumb door was his pleasant court of trees and running water, judiciously hidden from curious tax-gatherers. "Young man," said C. P. Huntington, head of the Pacific railroad system forty years ago, to the boy of ten, become a young Washington correspondent, who asked why he was building his New York house off Fifth Avenue, "when they begin to hunt millionaires, I propose to be off the main trail."

The goat knows no main trail and is predacious. There were disputes all the way—with hucksters

whose stalls were built into the walls while they sat just goat-head high with green vegetables and fruits; with shying Persian ponies and camels that know not goats; with street dogs that brooked no stranger goats and that began barking at invisible boundaries, only the dogs knew and shifted like the bounds of Balkan states. There were decorously veiled women, enveloped in white sheets from head to foot, past whose opening door a she-goat bolted at sight of a patch of green plants, and on whom fell, with salty objurgation of the Kurd, the delicate and difficult duty of expelling this daughter of Eblis without disturbing yashmak, veil, or the drapery freely showing bare and henna-stained legs. "Could I get the goat?" from the ten-year-old American boy. The woman: "Ten? No, you are three years too old. Be a man and know these things, thou strange son of strange tongues."

The joy of the city gate! Bactrian camels, woolly, changing loads with thin-coated Syrian camels. Swaggering Bashi Bazouks clinking with pistol and dagger. As the boy of ten was in European garb, the Turkish sentries in those distant days saluted and century-old dignity clad him. Once out of the gate one looked up at the great roundel in the basalt city wall, a hundred feet high, and on its curtain were the jagged edges of the great breach the Persian King Kobad drove

and Belisarius defended in the great war (524-531), Rome's last triumph here. The very goat pen, walled and loop-holed, was part of his provision for a siege, and that black door led, I knew, by a secret passage below the wall.

To the right there were low adobe huts where Kurdish was spoken; across the river Tigris a better built village, with masonry, spoke Arabic, and Christian builders there were skilled in many arches of strange curves, all carried in traditional obscure craft, never drawn. Beyond the blue hills, among Kurds that slew, were timorous Towrani Christian villages, the last remnant of a race earlier knowing Christ than any other, now scattered, peeled, and forsaken, speaking a bastard Syriac dialect. Across the Roman bridge below, Narses, the eunuch general, one of two in history, had ridden, and Sapor, Saladin, and Tamerlane; and, by the great gate, I knew, a dozen years before a Turkish pasha had impaled a Kurdish chief and four followers, tent poles, iron shod, driven up through their bodies, and they, leaned alive against the city wall, through a long summer day, hung until death came to raving men, the chief alone game to the last, repeating the Asr afternoon prayer when the call came, and going to his end unperturbed, with the long shadows of the setting sun.

The place is changed now. The Christian

quarter has spread beyond the walls. A broad German road follows the grades of the Roman highway, and on it run the "Fords" which carry the food of the Near East Relief Committee to Armenian orphans and refugees, in new peril with every month; but races and tongues and camels and goats remain.

This medley of tongues was and is nothing unusual in the Turkish Empire, nor was it a matter of accident. If the other tongues spoken by over a hundred thousand people had been represented—and there are some surviving spoken only by a tenth of the number—there would have been someone speaking Yourouk (an ancient form of Turkish), Nestorian, and Towrani (modern forms of the ancient Aramaic), Romaic (successor and heir of the Greek of the classic period), two or three dialects of Kurdish so far removed that they do not understand each other; Persian, spoken by a large number in southeastern Turkey. There are, besides, tracts of Arabic so near to cognate tongues that it is nearer Aramaic than the Arabic to which it is ordinarily credited, and a domestic patois, the relic of Circassian immigrants who have crossed into northeastern Turkey in the last seventy years, bringing in an entirely new tongue. In addition, every one of these languages is divided up into dialects which differ from each other as

much as Spanish and Catalan, or the Provençal and the French of Paris, still reckoned as different tongues. The former Austro-Hungarian Empire has as wide a range of tongues, but for the most part these are separated into clearly marked districts except in that part of Hungary which was for nearly two hundred years a portion of the Ottoman Empire. If we were to include in this list of tongues spoken in a single country those in European Turkey, the total number of definite and separate languages would reach nearly twenty. Where these tongues exist apart in separate districts they offer no greater problems than those presented by most of the countries of eastern Europe.

The difference which separates the Turkish Empire in Asia from every other adjoining land is that in all the cities and in most of the rural districts these languages are intermixed. War, massacre, and guerilla fighting which has gone on in Macedonia for the past twenty-five years, are due to a similar babel and bedlam of tongues. The rest of the Balkans has been able to divide into different lands because in the territory of each—Serbia, Roumania, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece—one tongue is chiefly spoken. In Asiatic Turkey (except for narrow areas) no one tongue suffices for the ordinary demands of life in the house, the school,

the market, the court, the army, and worship. Asiatic Turkey is on our maps as a single integer; it is as large as New England and the Middle States—the six states of our old Northwest from Ohio to Iowa and Minnesota, with Maryland thrown in for good measure—it occupies, in short, about the area of the United States east of the Mississippi and north of the Potomac and Ohio. Instead of having, as do these states, 60,000,000 of population, this area has about a third this population. Instead of having one dominant tongue with a twentieth composed of recent immigrants who speak various languages and no English, but whose children all learn English, it has opposing tongues over its entire area, spoken for the most part by those who from immemorial times have looked upon one another as enemies, liable at any time when they are in power to turn to massacre, and when they are weak to be massacred themselves.

Why not? Asiatic Turkey is the link-land between three continents: Europe, Asia, and Africa. It is very nearly in the centre of this land mass. It is the only expanse of territory anywhere in the Eastern hemisphere which fronts on three separate sheets of water—the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. During its history of six centuries its territory has extended

from the Caspian to the Atlantic Ocean, has included Egypt and north Arabia. Of the five great races into which humanity is somewhat arbitrarily divided, which for convenience we call the yellow race of eastern Asia, the white races of Europe, and the Semitic races of Arabia; the region to the South with the negro and the Red Indian of the West as the other two—of these the Turkish Empire is the only point at which three of them meet, the Semitic or Arab coming up from the south. The Turk and Tartar of central Asia both, in their early history, related with the stock of which China is the largest member, swept into Asiatic Turkey by the great trek which sweeps around the Caspian Sea and from ancient times has poured through this human sluice into Asia Minor. From the earliest time to the war which has just closed the history of this area has been the entrance of the Semitic races from the south, bringing with them the idea of a single supreme deity; the entrance of the Aryan from the northwest with a polytheistic culture; and the Turk and Tartar sweeping in from central Asia.

It is a fundamental basis of all early human development that the mountain races or the races in lands mountainous, divided and set apart by valleys large or small, develop the arts, learning, letters, and knowledge; and the races of the plain

furnish rule, sovereignty, and warfare. Eastern Asia is divided between the great plains of the north and the fertile mountain-encircled river valleys of China and India. The dynasties of both China and India have come for the most part from the Turk or Tartar, Mongol or Manchu, of the great northern Asiatic plain. In the Arabic-speaking world from Oman in southeastern Arabia to the last Arab-speaking land in Morocco, a span of four thousand miles and over fifty millions of people, the local ruling families are Arab, though the people they rule descend from many past races. If Europe be halved between its western region broken and mountainous, bounded on the east by the heights which rim the valley of the Rhine, and the other half, the great eastern plain beyond the Rhine where the Germanic race developed, manifold differences are present both in the territory which begins in the heights that overlook the Rhine valley and ends in Spain and Ireland and in the German-Slav plain ending in the Ural Mountains. Many races, peoples, and tongues are in this various stretch we call Europe from the Ural west. In twenty centuries many lands and races in Europe have brought forth rulers; art and arts manifold have come in many of the mountain and valley lands, but when the last war ended the king business, with the exception of new dynasties

(Sweden, Serbia, and Montenegro) all the royal families of Europe derive from a Germanic origin, though of a various ancestry. The central plain had trained rulers for wide rule.

In this our day, three great plains races, the Turk and Tartar of north Asia, the Arab of Arabia, the Aryan of this central plain of western Europe, have furnished at one stage and another the rulers of the Eurasian expanse from the Pacific to the Atlantic. All these varying human forces, which have sorted and separated themselves in the plains of China and the plains of India and have given Europe separate and individual countries fenced off by mountain ranges or the sea, have each and all played their part in the Asiatic area of Turkey. All meet there. This is the Turkish problem. Within the boundaries of Turkey all these forces have combined in one gigantic whirlpool and centre, taking in human tides from the northeast, the northwest, and from the south, from the plains of central Asia, from the Aryan area, and from Semitic Arabia. The length of Asia Minor has been like a vast sluice in which there surge alternate currents first from Europe and later from central Asia, now one and now the other achieving supremacy. Across these currents have come Semitic outbreaks from the south. A refluent Iranic tide has entered from Persia. Each move-

ment has left its mark; not one has a place apart. Through all the centuries each maintains its place intermingled and intermixed with all that has gone before. Each has jealously maintained itself in this vast mosaic of tongues, of tribes, of lands, and of races in Turkey where fragments of many races survive like flies in amber.

VI

TURKEY, ENGLAND, AND OTHER LANDS

IMAGINE an England in which to-day Cornish was still spoken in Cornwall and in Wessex and Sussex, Saxons retained the dialects of the Elbe and the Weser; where Britons were speaking British between these Saxon shires, and in Wales men still spoke the Welch of the legendary time of Arthur. Think of Constantinople and many a Turkish city as being what London would be, if to-day, at this hour, it had quarters in which were still spoken Latin, British, Saxon in its various dialects, Danish, Norman, German—each having its market, its ward, its internal organization, its recognized head. Let these various languaged quarters have boundaries, where on the rim of each houses faced in, as in mediæval days did the quarter, say, of the Easterlings at Sterling Yard. The houses to the north, which held the descendants of the Norman garrison around the Tower, would still face toward the fortress, so that there was a clear line of defense between. Saxons, speaking Saxon, would be about "London Stone."

Romans, still using Latin, would hold London Bridge and the space where the Legion once had its camp. A settlement of Danes, speaking Danish, would be about the Danes' Church and in Southwark. Briton would hold the space between Walbrook and the Thames. Divide London between four or five religions, each with its edifices of worship and a mingled religious and racial hostility so strong that intermarriage would often be fatal to the man or the woman who had dared to cross the line.

Many existing Turkish cities are like this. Go in imagination a step farther and think of Essex holding its Saxon settlers, and the Dane-mark dotted with Danish villages as it is with Danish names, while the graves of Litchfield were cared for and possessed shrines to which a pilgrimage of Danes yearly resorted. See in the north in Northumberland the descendants of the Vikings still speaking early Icelandic, their boats hauled up on the beach; and along the wall of Severus find large groups speaking a bastard Latin, their houses decorated with the Roman arch, column, and capital, all descendants of the legionaries which held the uttermost lines of the empire. Look, with amazed eyes, in Yorkshire on villages of the prehistoric, short, sturdy, and keen dwellers of the region who have left in cave and fen their stone

implements and their irrefutable stamp on the Yorkshire man. Add to all this clear and definite consciousness of races surviving over England, that all these different peoples still cherished their folk-lore, had their songs, their legends, and their traditions, each heard a different tongue in the ritual of his worship, and each cherished the ineradicable belief (which haunts all oppressed races) in Him who is to come, the destined leader who is to right the wrongs of centuries, as Britons looked to Arthur and so on through all the long procession of the helpless and hopeless generations. If by a flight of the historic imagination we hold this focussed, distinct and sharp, this definite picture of England in all its details, remembering that the Roman rite in Canterbury will by no possibility accept the ancient rite of the British church in York, and that both will wholly reject the rite, the joint product of the islands of the Gael off the coasts of Scotland and Ireland and Roman Druid and Viking still hold their own rites, we will have some conception of the conditions of Turkey. Like this are its villages, cities, and vilayets and no other.

If these different distant races had sorted themselves out and reached a common language we might have something approaching France. France to-day is one, yet the Greek profile is in

Avignon, and the taller men of the north recall the dire years when the German tribes burst across the Rhine. The devotion of Britanny brings back memories of an earlier worship, while even in Paris itself there was, down to the Revolution, a semi-racial difference between the two halves of the city on either side of the Seine. But in Turkey these races are scarcely anywhere apart and alone. The shock of a long succession of conquests has broken and shattered all these races. It is twelve hundred years since the fire-worshipper was beaten by the Arab of the Battle of Nehavend, but in the mountains to which they fled they still linger, and when sunrise comes the family gathers and the father holds up a little child to kiss the spot where the sun first strikes. If you will go to the mouth of the joined rivers Tigris and Euphrates in Irak, you find the negroid profile which appeared from the same region on the bas-reliefs of Sennacherib twenty-six hundred years ago, and while they speak Arabic, no Arab will for an instant accept them as belonging to his own race. There was once a vast network of worshippers of Hassan, whose name, by countless murders, gave us the word "assassin." The descendants of these worshippers of murder are still sending their annual toll to his descendant in Bombay, who lives like a millionaire and enjoys the revenues of a prince! Fragments

of what are believed to have been the remnants of Canaanite tribes driven out by Joshua apparently linger in one place and another, and ancient prehistoric rites remain in the defiles of Lebanon. There are central houses of Turkish-dervish orders where are the fields which the eunuch farmer-priests tilled with their slaves in the days of the Hittites. These fields remained associated with some religion through the period of the Greeks, the cleaner but not wholly impeccable discipline of the Christian monastery, and at last are the site of the Tekke of the Bektashi-dervish, whose celibate dervishes carry a flat disk on the lobe of the ear, dimly recalling, it may be, the flat disk Hittite days suggested on cylinder and relief.

Through the entire area of Asiatic Turkey there are scores of these examples of which I have named only a bare fraction. Worst of all, with the great and varied resources in land and natural wealth of Asiatic Turkey and, more precious still, in trade-routes, the balance of Nature is so close that a single sweep of conquest may destroy a population and destroy also the means of subsistence. Nearly six centuries ago Tamerlane swept his way through the mountains of Tour across which the Tigris cuts its canyons as deep as some in the Colorado River valley. The irrigation ditches and reservoirs which made the whole region populous (as the size of the

churches proves) were destroyed. They were the product, as we know, of centuries of patient toil, growing bit by bit in a great network, yearly repaired. The population slain, the ditches broken, new forays breaking in, the region never recovered its old inhabitants. A great area fertile with crops for centuries before the Christian era extended over Mesopotamia and had a rainfall so small that its profitable cultivation depended upon irrigation from the Tigris and Euphrates. Once destroyed, part by the Arab onset and more by the disorder that followed for twelve hundred years, these river plains have never since had the population which was dense at least twelve centuries before Christ. Over the whole of Asiatic Turkey there are left the marks of great cities, of thick-sown villages, of fertile fields. Sometimes these depended upon keeping free from marsh the fertile valleys in whose bed flow the streams from the central plateau into the three coasts of Asia Minor—the Euxine, the Ægean, and the east Mediterranean. As these were abandoned, fever came, as it has cursed the Roman campagna. Nothing remained but urban populations living in a meagre fraction of what was once the area of the city, and the sites of villages no longer hold an agricultural but a nomadic population.

This destruction came chiefly after 632 and be-

fore 1290. It is not easy, let me repeat, for us to realize that when Britain was a waste and the Roman campagna a place in which to fold flocks, when the Italic cities of the Iberian peninsula were uninhabited and nothing but a stone-walled citadel was safe from raid and foray of Goth and Allemani, Lombard and Hun, over all of what is now France and northern Italy, so that the very Latin tongue of the past disappeared and, over great tracts of Gaul, German was the language of the people—the Roman Empire in the east had extended all its boundaries in North Africa and beyond the Tigris. The terminus marked with the labarum and cross had been set up for the first time in its history across this swift flood. Egypt and Syria, the great Roman provinces of Asia Minor, were untouched and untrod by savage invaders. Though all of Europe had felt somewhere the shock and destruction of the long succession of tribes that broke the power of Rome and left few cities without their sack and no countryside across which savage horsemen had not ridden to slay, to pillage, and to enslave—for a period, as long as separates us from Elizabeth, what is now the area of the Turkish Empire had been free from barbarous conquest after the west lay in ruins. The arts of Greece, the law of Rome, the development of Christianity, and the administration that Constantine began at

Nicea, were still in full force and appeared as certain to survive the shock which had destroyed Europe, as our own country, we believe, will survive the shock which has destroyed Russia.

Without warning, without apprehension, and without prediction, the Arab broke from the south and covered all of the Roman Empire south of the Taurus and extended from the Indus to the Atlantic. The Crusades came and shook the powers which the Arab had created and left the Byzantine strength broken. The Ottoman Turk appeared and in successive waves broken by the Tartar invasions of Jenghiz Khan and the Turko-Tartar raid of Tamerlane, crushed the budding strength of the first invasion of Turks under the name of Seljuks.

The land and the people which now constitute the Turkish Empire had been for two centuries destroyed. Great tracts were deserted over all the areas; the beauty that was Greece and the power that was Rome was gone. After six centuries of this rapine, in the south by the Arab, in the west by the Crusader, in the east by Turk and Tartar, the founder of the Turkish Empire, Othman (reign, 1288-1326), began the creation of the new world which constitutes Turkey as we know it and as it has been known for six hundred years, in a region before his coming laid utterly waste.

What the Arab had left, the Seljuk slew; what he spared, Jenghiz Khan swept with devouring massacre; the remnants his hordes had missed, Tamerlane hunted down and left naught in city or field. On territory and on peoples swept by the flame before them and the fire behind, there entered Othman on a region harried by sword and spear, by pestilence, plague, and famine, to gather to his standards the ravage and the ruin of all that had gone before.

VII

WHEN THE OTTOMAN TURK BEGAN

THE existing medley of races, tongues, and peoples over Asiatic Turkey was in full flux before the Ottoman Turk appeared on the field of history. The breaking up of peoples was already over and accomplished before Othman became sultan. It is not to Charlemagne and his descendants that we charge the wreck of Roman civilization over all the lands the son of Charles Martel ruled. The destruction was over and completed before the new power appeared to massacre Saxons, to force wholesale conversions in the north German lands, and to fall ten centuries later in 1789 because of its injustice, cruelty, and oppression when the distant heir of the various families and lines that had been grafted on the line of Hugh Capet ascended the scaffold.

There is small truth in the utterance most familiar in regard to the Turkish Empire—the declaration that the Turks are a savage and marauding tribe which came out of the deserts of central Asia, despoiled the fairest portions of the

Near East and destroyed Hellenic beauty, Roman law, and the Christian faith in the Eastern Empire each of these had shared in creating. Mr. Gladstone made this assertion famous and eloquent. Dr. E. A. Freeman put it into a number of books written without any apparent study of original documents in Arabic or Turkish not already translated. What scorn he would have poured on any historian who addressed himself to classical history without a knowledge of either Greek or Latin! Applied as this resounding indictment was to the House of Othman and the Turkish Empire as it was and is, the one serious difficulty about its acceptance is that it does not coincide with the facts.

In 1290, when Othman, the head of the Othmanli clan, began to enlarge the little realm his father Ertoghrul had begun at Angora, the world about him was already destroyed and lay in ruins. He organized an army which proved for four centuries the most efficient instrument of continuous conquest the world had known since the arms of Rome were victorious for a like period; but this instrument of conquest never became an instrument of peaceful administration. Its origin and composition were not fitted to that task. It ended its career in our own day in the Armenian and Greek massacres and deportations of the past twenty-five years, no worse than many like them in

the past by many powers, pagan, Christian, and Moslem; but none of them sinned against such light or so shocked the moral judgment of their day. The innocent blood of Armenia has destroyed an empire which had resisted armies for six centuries and at Gallipoli won victory in the hour of general defeat.

When the Ottoman Turks began they created an empire for a season no more merciless but more efficient than any about them. Like most institutions and men, they lost their good qualities in success, and by their bad were ruined and spread ruin. But the ruin they found about them when their rule began they did not make. Our historians look at the Eastern Roman Empire from the west. The better and more recent of them, more fair to its achievements than Gibbon the Great, still see it as a part of the wreck of the Roman Empire, instead of perceiving in it the only salvage in that smash. It had survived all else in the empire that was Mediterranean in race, character, tongue, and tradition. For two hundred years the Eastern Roman Empire held Egypt, Syria, and Mesopotamia after all was lost in Europe, save scattered fragments that accepted the imperial authority of Constantinople.

In just ten years, 634 to 644, the Arab armed with new faith, Islam, swept Persia, Egypt, Syria,

Mesopotamia; but Asia Minor rode out the storm. For four hundred years more, Roman law, Hellenic temples, and the Christian faith were more secure than in Europe. A very large share of our Greek and Latin manuscripts were preserved in this region and the codes of Rome were known and obeyed as they were not in Italy, where they lay forgotten and unused for centuries. The old civilization had enjoyed a respite of seven hundred years in spite of occasional campaigns in which the armies of the caliphs of Bagdad had overrun parts of Asia Minor and for a season held Armenia and Cilicia. Both had been recovered when the Crusades began and Armenians ruled again in Armenia and in Cilicia.

This Byzantine Empire, final remnant of the Roman Empire, this last home of its learning, had its first attack from Arab caliphs at Damascus and Bagdad, but it had beaten them off. Constantinople, never taken in war but thrice—by the Latin Crusaders, 1204; by Mohammed II, 1453; and three years ago by the Allies, our associates—repelled two of the great sieges of history by the Arabs, the first in 673-7 and the next in 717-8. At the mosque sacred to the memory of the Arab standard-bearer of the first siege, Eyub, on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus, the sword of Othman is still girded on each new sultan.

Asia Minor so long held as a citadel of Rome and Christianity succumbed to the joint pressure of the Crusades in the rear and the Seljuk Turks in the front. The reader is familiar with the Crusades as seen by the historian of the West—a religious movement, with political and commercial ends, uniting Christendom, spreading knowledge and new luxuries, carrying on the awakening of Europe. You will forgive one, born on the other side of the Crusades, who has known the birthplace and palace of Saladin and seen the chain armour and helmets of Crusaders still worn on occasions of state by the men-at-arms of Kurdish beys, if he looks on the Crusades from the viewpoint of the Christians of the East. These, in central Asia, in Cyprus, Armenia, Cilicia, and the Byzantine Empire were hard-pressed, but, 1068, still held the solitary Christian state of central Asia, the mountainous plateau from Persia to Turkey, and the mountain walls of Asia Minor, in spite of the forays of Persian Buwayhids and Seljuk Turks. For two centuries and more the western crusading horde devoured the land, destroyed villages, lived on the country, deranged trade, and embittered all relations. Victories were won. For a season the Moslem was driven out of Syria, beyond the Euphrates. The Moslem population of Syria and Mesopotamia was swept by massacre. The policy

which led Omar and the earlier caliphs to spare Christians was abandoned by the rulers of Islam.

When Othman, the first sultan, stood at his tent door and looked across the Sea of Marmora to Constantinople, all about him was in ruins. All had been destroyed. What the Arab had left, the Seljuk had devastated; what he had spared, the Tartar had swept away. After twenty years of conquest Othman had still only his two herds of goats and his black tent, but, unlike his Moslem predecessors, he had led no horde on a stable civilization. He fought in a waste his predecessors had made. Some walled cities stood; the countryside was desolate. He was not on the edge of an empire he was to invade. Constantinople alone was left of the greater cities of the imperial past. Antioch never recovered from the crusading sack. Jenghiz Khan and his son, Hulaku (1206-1259), destroyed the great seats of empire and centre of commerce, from the Yellow Sea to the Mediterranean, the Hoang-Ho to the Vistula. Bagdad was sacked, Aleppo left roofless and its men headless, Smyrna became a ruin and the ancient Hellenic cities along the Euxine and the Ægean were left places where fishermen spread their nets and the winds of a rainless land covered the monuments of the past from the great temple of Sardis and Crœsus to the last Byzantine mosaic.

Europe to the west was beginning a new order. To the east all had gone down in a common siege and destruction of battering days and merciless centuries. When the sons of Charlemagne by the Treaty of Verdun (843) were dividing Germany and France for all time to come, the descendants of Haroun-el-Raschid were drawing from Turkestan Turkish guards whose commander ended the personal rule of the Abasside caliphs. One great horde of riding Moslem men after another, for six centuries, had swarmed from the deserts of Arabia and of central Asia and twice carried their conquest to the Biscayan fringe of north Spain. The Turkish race had built its first dynasty centring at Bagdad on the ruins of the Abasside empire, of the caliphs, and had begun, just as the first Crusade broke upon Asia Minor and Syria, to show the crippling and widespread rule, carried on with complete indifference to the justice of men or the sanctity of human life, which stains Turkish annals down to our own day.

VIII

THE TURKS OF CENTRAL ASIA

THE Turkish race has displayed a gift for affairs in conquest and in the permanent subjection of alien peoples unknown to the rest of the races of Asia. In Asia, Turkish still remains one of the world's foremost tongues. A man can ride from Scutari across the Bosphorus from Constantinople seven thousand miles to the gates of Peking and through all that long stretch he will never be more than two or three days' ride distant from some village in which Turkish is spoken. He will follow it across the Turkish Empire. Across northern Persia, he will still be on the great Turki trek. He will pass up through the central Asian Khanates, of which one, Bokhara, has made its name familiar in many an American house; he will rim the great central Asian plateau with from twenty to thirty million Turkish nomads, and when they have grown few in number as he crosses Mongolia, there will still remain an occasional reminder that the track of the Turk has led in conquest again and again straight to the gates of Peking.

In the upper waters of the Yenisei whose fertile

valleys bloom with the vivid flowers of a mountain spring, and Russian immigrants have begun the creation of a new world from the only migration that moves eastward, the Turkish trail divides. To the right, it takes the track of conquest to Peking. To the left, it passes on to the Yakuts who dwell under the long day and the endless nights of the Arctic. Speaking Turkish, they retain the dialects of the past and the ancient Shamanist rites, brutal and bestial, well-nigh the lowest faith known. Where these three trails divide on the Yenisei, Constantinople behind, Peking before, the savage Yakuts to the Arctic north, the Turk was already known in the eighth century in the centre of central Asia, when Charles Martel smote the Moor at Tours. Within the next two hundred years the Turk had created at one oasis and another in the cold and wind-blown deserts of Turkestan an art which rivals the portraiture of China at the same period, shown the same capacity for mural decoration which he displayed later on the mosques of Brusa and Constantinople, and still more the power to organize, to rule, and to ride to conquest. Turkish youths who sought the gold and service of the waning Moslem caliph at Bagdad in the tenth and eleventh centuries are often spoken of as "slaves." The Arab word is more general and genial. The loose and ill-defined slav-

ery of the East is household companionship rather than servitude, and partakes more of the relation of a squire and the pages who sought a like opportunity and education at a mediæval court, than to the legal rigours of propertied human servitude as it has grown in the past under Christianity and a rigorous law, always emphasizing race and status. For three centuries one Turkish clan after another held rule, and order had been divided between the civilization of the west, represented by the Greek, the Roman, and the Byzantine empires, and the civilization of the east, represented by Persia under successive Turkish dynasties. Over all this area from the Mediterranean to the mountain passes which looked down on India, one Turkish dynasty after another succeeded. The head of one of them held Jerusalem a year before Godfrey de Bouillon (1099) took the city. A Seljuk dynasty, Turk in tongue, more affected by Persia's literature, western learning, Arab theology, and Roman administration, for a brief season held unchallenged very nearly all of what is to-day Persia and Turkey. Then again in the thirteenth century there burst forth from all

> The black Tartar tents which stood
> Clustering like beehives, on the low, flat strand
> Of Oxus, where the summer floods o'erflow
> When the sun melts the snow in high Pamir

the horde of Jenghiz Khan, more Mongol than Turk. It destroyed in the first quarter of the 1200's all civilization over nearly half the inhabited world. The whelming rack swept over all of China, destroyed every other form of rule in the whole share of territory which we call Siberia, drove the remnants of Persian civilization into fortified cities on the coast of the Persian Gulf, left hundreds of cities empty of inhabitants, conquered half of what is to-day Russia, inflicted in a single decade such widespread human misery and such loss of life as was never known again until the war that has just passed. Some semblance of general rule remained over the northern coast of Africa, but outside of this territory when Jenghiz Khan died, over all of northern Asia and much of northern India there was left no sovereign rule which had not been destroyed. The Turkish rule begun by the Buwayhids, Persian rulers, and continued by the Seljuks which had begun on a large scale, broke up into small sovereignties. Battle had been succeeded by massacre such as was never recorded before or since. The royal and princely stock of half of Asia had been destroyed and their women tended the huts of private soldiers in the last great camp where the triumph of Jenghiz Khan was celebrated.

IX

WHAT OTHMAN SAW ABOUT HIM

THE successive and surging tides which swept and swamped all the Western Roman Empire have little logical succession and connection. Of some, we are as yet ignorant of their origin. Some appear with as wide and general a hail as the favourite answering call of the pirate of the South Seas and Indian Ocean off Madagascar and Zanzibar: "Gentlemen Adventurers, from the Seas." The Eastern Empire was the prey to definite hammer blows from the same source, and Enver Bey as he seeks to arouse the Turks of central Asia in behalf of the Pan-Turanian movement to an alliance with the Ottoman goes back over the same great passes by Erzerum and so on through north Persia as Alp Arslan took eight and a half centuries ago.

The Arabs could come by but two routes, one along the scanty waterpools which lead from Medina to Beer Sheba and so to Damascus or Jerusalem, the other along the successive wells which run east by north from this route to Bagdad.

By improving these wells Zobeide, the favourite of Haroun-el-Raschid, won a lasting monument. No woman, queen or commoner, of our Western civilization with its more abundant feminine freedom, rights, and privilege, has by a lasting good deed so effectually placed herself on the map, except possibly the Catherines of Russia and Victoria. "By means of water," is the divine utterance in the Koran, "we give life to everything."

The vast and continuous flow of Turk and Tartar for 500 years (900-1400) had but two routes, the great passes into north Persia or a march around the Caspian. The track then led east by Erzerum (Arx Romana was the city first called). There the Byzantine military engineers built their frontier stronghold. The mountain passes led them to Trebizond and the plain of east Asia Minor. The other Persian route led south down the Persian Plateau and then over a low mountain range to Bagdad. The Bagdad caliphs carried their rule north over Bactria, reached the plains, early converted the Turks, where Christian missionaries failed. Adventure and the easy service of the caliphate brought to the south and the great city those who first came. Later, these adventurers successfully seized Persia, extended their rule to Bagdad, replaced the petty rulers of what are now the cities of the plain from Aleppo to Basra, and

at last drove out the Egyptian rulers of Syria. Alp Arslan, Seljuk Turk, swept Armenia and Asia Minor by the direct route in the north already mentioned. Many marches, forages and floods brought the little tribe of Othman, which had wandered to and fro in its nomad life, to the shores of the Sea of Marmora.

East and west, it was the secondary invasion that was deadly. It was the Lombard and not the Goth who covered Italy with waste places. It was the Hun and not the German who drew the broad line of devastation across north Europe. It was the Arab and the Berber from the south and not the Visi-Goth from the north who made of central Spain a waste never since wholly repeopled. In the east, the Arab left the old life he found, changed but vigorous. The Tartar under Jenghiz Khan destroyed the irrigation canals of Mesopotamia which, after 800 years, the English are now restoring. A single one dug and diked on old lines and plans has whitened 50,000 acres with cotton in the last two years. The mountain valleys of the Taurus and the Armenian table-land lost its irrigation in the same way. So did western Asia Minor and north Syria. Ever since, 2,500,000 nomads have wandered to and fro through central Asia Minor where once were cities, villages, and fertile fields. How much population was lost in

the process is a mere guess. Estimates current now are 20,000,000 for Asiatic Turkey alone. My own estimate is 30,000,000 now, based on the English census of Basra, Bagdad, and Mosul. All over Turkey, the "Tells" or conical hills that once held villages, the empty sites of towns and cities, the size of temples, churches, and mosques of the past, now unfilled, suggest that Asiatic Turkey once had 50,000,000, perhaps 60,000,000 population. It would have it again, if a country like the United States, trusted by all, at a time when all races ask for the leadership of the American people, were to take up the job. Such a market and such opportunities the world has nowhere else, because nowhere else in Asia has the destruction of the past been more complete.

When the Seljuk Turks, Jenghiz Khan (1206-1226), Tartar and Tamerlane (1370-1400) Turk and Tartar, had swept the land for 200 years, the whole land was waste. How few there were left none knew. Increase went on through all the rule of the Turk, but the distribution of population remained the same. The Kurds who had furnished the leader Saladin and the men who at last drove the Crusaders from Palestine were forced up into the curving line of mountains that runs north from the Persian Gulf until it loses itself in the great uplift that runs to the Black Sea and Ararat.

The Armenians were in this great plateau holding the better lands. Tartars filled the land from northwestern Persia to the Caspian and across to Baku. A small but sturdy Armenian kingdom held the mountain range that looks down on Cilicia. Greek populations remained on the coast; Lebanon and other mountains of Syria held some Christians and so did the ports.

During 600 years before Othman founded the Turkish Empire, in all human probability a Christian population of 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 had been replaced by a greatly reduced population of Moslems and a tenth of their number Christians, the proportion to-day. How far this was due to force, massacre, and pillage and how far to a willing change, no one can ever know. How little do we accurately know of the change which found the Brito-Roman population of England Christian, speaking a tongue now gone, and left it full of Angles, Saxons, and other pagans. We know at least that the number of British women who were enslaved was so great that their word for woman became the Saxon word for slave. The Arab, Turk, and Tartar invasion filled harem and household with Christian women slaves. Population can increase rapidly under these conditions. As I write, there are at least 100,000 Armenian women in Kurdistan suffering a like fate, bearing children

to their loathed masters, and this in our day when America might save all.

Besides rapine and the argument of the sword there is much but not conclusive evidence that many turned willingly to the faith of Mohammed. It is far easier to underestimate Islam than to overestimate the ravage of its central Asian converts. Dr. Porter, long professor in the American Protestant University of Beirut, who has given more patient and accurate study to the field than any other scholar I know, estimates that one half of the Christians in Syria became Moslem at the Arab invasion. At Mosul, where I lived as a boy, voluntary conversion was the local tradition. Willing changes there were. Nothing is harder, when Christianity became dominant in western Europe, than to draw the line between conversion by conviction or by massacre. Either, it was held by the spiritual advisers of the day, was good enough to save a soul. Here, too, one cannot speak dogmatically.

These two historical questions have never been satisfactorily answered: (1) Did the Roman Empire become Christian because Constantine was baptized, or was Constantine baptized because the Roman Empire had become Christian? (2) Were the swift conquests by Islam of what were or had recently been Roman provinces from the Tigris

to the Guadalquivir due to the powers of the Arab or to widespread discontent with Christianity and all its works? The Roman Empire was far from unanimous for Christianity. The Christian Church in its organization was in Constantine's day closely similar in spirit, method, energy, and resolution to the Methodist Episcopal Church of our own day. I am positive that most of the militant bishops at the Nicene Council (329) would have been far more at home in a Methodist Triennial Convention than in the College of Cardinals or the House of Bishops of the Church of England, by law established. The Roman Empire was stormed for the Church very much as the Federal Prohibition Constitutional Amendment was carried in this country by the Methodist Church.

The Holy Catholic Church at the close of the third and the beginning of the fourth century represented the same vigorous, hard-working, strong-willed, aggressive, dogmatic religious part of society that the Methodist Church in America does to-day. Both threw their influence in politics for those who would go with them on the main issue and had in view a high moral and elevating end, sure to win. The Christian Church was far stronger in Constantine's day among the privates of the Legions than the officers, and the privates were choosing emperors. The Christians denounced the luxu-

ries of the rich and they had with them a great army of plain people who suffered from the results of these luxuries. The primitive and post-primitive Christians had no use for art, dancing, the theatre, or the amusements of life. Their bishops denounced these things in their sermons and attacked the Godless education of the big universities of that day. There was very little real fight just then in the upper classes the Church opposed, for these classes were in terror over the discontent of the masses about their wages and their share in the better, material side of life. The Bolsheviki of the day were just around the corner, west in the "Northern tribes" and east among the Persians, where a movement led by a mechanic had put the many on top; and a foreign despotism in close sympathy with the hereditary enemies of the Persian people had been thrown out.

The instant Constantine became Christian, the Church put the legislative and administrative machinery of the empire in motion for their views. All the heathen temples were closed, offhand, on the ground that all their influences were immoral. Life was made a burden for everyone who disagreed with the new order in the universities and a prosecution began of all forms of opinion which disagreed with the rigorous and elevated morals the Church required of the many. Constantine himself con-

tinued to play the old political game without interference, backed by the best organization outside of the imperial administration in the empire, the Church. Art, letters, refinement, social life, the glad dance, the willing drink, philosophy, and scientific research had a hard time; but the world of the many profited immeasurably. The virtue of women, the rights of the poor, the freedom of the slave, and the poor, from wage slavery and statute slavery, had new protection, inspiration, and advance. The old system stood for the head and not the heart, mind and not morals, and it fell as such will fall, if it does not democratize and learn from the many.

This undoubtedly satisfied the many, but it destroyed the intellectual leadership of society. In Europe no more books worth reading as great literature appeared for 800 years, St. Augustine to Dante. The mind of humanity went to sleep. The heart of humanity awoke and after 500 wasted years new art began, but it was at least 1,500 years before Europe resumed the daily bath. In western Europe the German and the Hun made a clean sweep of civilization, and in north Africa to Egypt grass grew in the streets that led to stately temples, and the jackal littered in their shrines.

It was 504 years from the time Huss was burnt to the Treaty of Versailles which gave Bohemia

liberty and set loose Czech religious support for his teaching. It was 300 years from the Council of Nicea to the Arab at Damascus. Was it not likely, in the span between, a large class had never really accepted Christianity, intelligent, dissatisfied, propertied, holding positions in the State, who had clung to the old learning? The large number of Greek manuscripts, their rapid translation into Arabic, the revival of Hellenic learning and philosophy, the clear influence of all these on Arab theology, law, verse, and history, look that way. The Arabs won where the bigots of Byzantium had least power. From Alexandria and the east came the first protests against orthodox theology. Great portions of the population, Nestorians, Syrians, and Jacobites, had broken away from the Greek Orthodox Church and its head at Constantinople. Saint Maron a century later was to turn from the Greek Church to Rome and the Pope.

Greek was spoken over north Syria and north Palestine at the Christian era. A very fair argument can be made that Christ himself spoke Greek. Greek inscriptions show how large was the Hellenic migration to Syria under Greek kings, the Selencidae who ruled there for nearly 300 years. Beirut was one of the great universities of the Greco-Roman world. The schools of Athens were closed

and Plato forbidden just a century (529) before the Arab was at the gates of Damascus, then a centre of philosophic thought as it is to-day for the Moslem. The grandchildren of those who had cherished Greek learning saw the Arab invasion. The Abassides at Bagdad and the Ommawiyah dynasty at Cordova give every proof of the leaven of the Greek mind. The Berbers of north Africa were estranged from orthodoxy and furnished the Donatist bishops Augustine denounced. The Arab came to willing lands when in the seventh century he began a renaissance of Greek learning repeated 900 years later in Italy. To-day, Syria is the one hopeful part of Asiatic Turkey, sane, using argument and not massacre, and begging for the free self-government for which they were abundantly ready, if the French Concessionaires will let them alone. This is partly because of the American University at Beirut, whose two presidents, father and son, Dr. Daniel Bliss and Dr. Howard S. Bliss, have sown the land with the seeds of liberty through law. Shall the American people let this harvest go to ruin?

X

HOW ISLAM HALTED OTTOMAN ADVANCE

THE work of organizing a new realm begun by Othman was often begun in Europe by pagan rulers. It was done at least, to take two places far apart, by pagan kings in England and in Hungary. In due time their successors adopted the Christian faith. But Islam was just enough of a religion to keep out Christianity. It is a real religion. It raises pagan morals. It supports men in temptation, in battle and, what is harder, it gives strength when death approaches a man in the soft fall of the steps of those who stand about his sick-bed. It gives support in adversity and courage in conflict. At their best, its courts are just; at their worst, they are inconceivably bad. So have been and are some Christian courts. Its law has bred men who lost life sooner than depart from justice. But these virtues, such as they are, do not weigh from the political standpoint, and I am discussing here and now the effect of Islam on the State and on the working of governments, of courts, and the general organization of society.

Islam inexorably divides. It always has. I fear it always will. For a hundred years, since the liberal steps of Mahmud II (1808-1839), one sultan after another has tried to grant religious liberty to Moslem and Christian, and equal civil and political rights for all. Twelve years ago, all men in Turkey and out thought at last that this was accomplished. With the men of the Revolution still in control, the past five years have been the worst and most barbarous in its history. The more the Christian races advance and the more the Moslem power becomes organized and armed with modern weapons, the more terrible have atrocities become. My main argument, thirty years ago in speaking and writing about the possibility and probability of white and black living apart and in peace, enjoying equal civil rights and a separate social and educational system in this country, was the existence of the substantial peace and apparently growing amity of races in Turkey and elsewhere in Asia. The experiment has utterly failed. No one can pretend to say that the danger of religious collision between Moslem and Hindu has grown less in the past twenty years, in India.

In Turkey, the failure has been so complete that the civilized world objects to Moslem rule and by delay brings massacre and yet more massacre. Islam's first obstacle to good and efficient govern-

ment and an harmonious order was its stimulus of race pride and its deadening of national political feeling. Self-government becomes difficult when a man's fundamental allegiance and personal self-respect rest not on the country in which he lives, but on the faith to which he is loyal as the basis of his political rights. The Ottoman Empire is often reproached for not developing for all its subjects of every creed and race, loyalty and faith in a common citizenship and nationality. This has been repeatedly attempted by the Sultan, by drawing constitutions and by parliamentary legislation. Such a citizenship and nationality the rule of the descendants of Othman never sought and never secured, because for the Moslem no separate citizenship exists in the lands of Islam. Modern Moslem laws provide this. Faith and practice do not. If one of our fellow nationals in the Sulu Islands, the last outpost of organized Mohammedanism, had moved westward 10,000 miles to Morocco, the western verge of Islam, while it was still one of the independent states of the faith, it never would have occurred to him that he must be naturalized to enjoy all the rights of citizenship in the Sherifian Empire, ruled by descendants of Mohammed, which the sultans of Turkey are not. He was, he would have told you, in the Dar el Salam, the House of Peace, which includes all orthodox

Moslem states. All its rights of residence and citizenship were alike his, there and everywhere that the Faithful ruled the Faithful. The day that he reached Fez and went to the great Mosque of Kairouyn, in which 8,000 worshippers can stand and kneel at their prayers and join in the noon service, he was as much a citizen of Morocco as he could ever become by any act of his own. Moslems may be accidentally divided by a different rule. Even this is a breach of the Faith, accepted but not approved as the ideal of Islam; but all Moslems in a Moslem land become by their mere "Shahad" or profession of faith part of the household of God on earth and all its rights are theirs.

Through all the long history of the Moslem states there are constant examples of men of one nationality reaching high positions in another land. An exchange professorship on which we plume ourselves as a new instrument of instruction has existed for centuries between the great universities of Damascus in Syria, and at Marakesh or Morocco City. When I expressed my surprise to the courteous and learned Imaum who was on his long journey from the western verge of Islam to the seat of the Ommiyad caliphs, he was aghast that any man who knew aught of Islam should not have known that in all schools of the Law instruction must be given in Arabic and the teaching is the

same. Any instructor in the sacred law could teach in any Moslem school. Had we but retained Latin as the universal spoken and written tongue of Christian learning as it was 400 years ago, our science, our learning, and our teaching would have been as universal.

The Sublime Porte was never under any necessity of requiring any one of the Moslem peoples of the empire to know Turkish, or the stranger who entered Moslem from without to take any steps to acquire citizenship through naturalization. His faith had made him whole, whatever might be his race, his tongue, or his place of birth. All the languages and peoples of the Turkish conquest from 1290 to the present hour remained therefore untouched and unchallenged through all the victories and vicissitudes of the empire. To the Moslem "ubi bene, ibi patria" is the last word of patriotism and faith. Where Islam is, there is his own country. The "international" mind to which many exhort us, begging us to drop nationalism as "unchristian," has been the doctrine of Islam for 1,300 years, with the inevitable result that in Mohammedanism there are no nations as such, conquest is easy, patriotism as a fundamental passion does not exist, and is replaced by "Deen," "Religion," the battlecry of the Mohammedan because his religious profession is the basis of citizenship

in the Kingdom of God, for both worlds—the world that is and the world to come. To race, people, tribe, clan, natural differences of birth, the Moslem may thrill. This is human. But not as a good Moslem over a boundary as such, for all, true to the creed and commands of the Prophet, are Moslems. Heretics, like Persian shiahs, are shut out.

The Turkish policy of receiving all Moslem comers, in centuries when Christendom drew sharp lines, is rendered the easier by the Moslem conception of the State. To him, the State is but a civil and human institution, law-made, possessing sovereignty to protect, prosper, and spread. To the Turk and the Arab alike there is but one supreme State, the one theocratic organization of Islam, begun by Mohammed and still existing, living in spite of all divisions. This was once the view of Christendom held by mediæval Christians as a theocratic sovereignty, with Emperor and Pope at its head. Thomas Hartwell, the London Chirurgeon who spent so many years in the practice of his calling in Turkey, and whose work on "The Warres between the Turks and the Persians" (1595) gave Shakespeare his view of the Near East, says of the wars he records that they were "very commodious and of great opportunity to the Christian Commonwealth." By this our Elizabethan worthy meant Christendom as a whole, over much

of which, in those days of the Inquisition, this Protestant member of the Guild of Barbers and Chirurgeons was far safer under the flag of the Sultan than under the red and yellow banner of Philip of Spain.

The Ottoman Empire is often reproached as neither nation nor people. The Turkish Government in the past never pretended to be either. It is not its job to stand for a national sovereignty or a popular will. Its coins, its annals, and its inscriptions do not speak of it as a kingdom, a nation, or the Empire of the Turks. Just as the German Empire, which has now come to its fall (Berlin seeing deposition earlier than Constantinople), was not the Empire of Germany but the Empire in Germany, so Turkey is a "Dowlet," a "government," and "administration." The Sultan is the Khan of the Othman tribe; he is the emperor or padishah, an all-shah; he is the Sultan of Rum or Rome and he claims to be on somewhat dubious grounds; the caliph though he has not used this title on his coinage, and very rarely in a treaty. Only one can I cite, the disastrous agreement with Russia of Kuchuk Kainardji. The nearest he daily and officially comes to the caliphate is in his use of the term "Commander of the Faithful"; but this is still borne by the Sultan of Morocco, whose subjects regard him as caliph,

and the title "Emir-el-Moumenin," Commander of the Faithful, has in some eras been on the coins of a dozen Moslem sovereigns. All caliphs or viceregents of the Prophet are "Commanders of the Faithful" and are thus to see that the infidel is fought when necessary. By Moslem sacred law the personal tax which the Sultan collects is his, not because he decrees it, but because, as it is the duty of a good Moslem to give alms and to pray, so it is also his duty to pay the tax necessary to support this agency of the divine will and command just as he can be summoned to the battleline when the Moslem faith and Moslem lands are in peril. Whether the tax is legally assessed by one protecting the faith and whether it is excessive are to be decided in the last resort, if the issue is brought up, by the doctors of the Sacred Law. All Moslems within the purview of a government so recognized must contribute to it, not as a civil requirement, but as a religious duty. So far is this view carried that in the earlier Moslem sovereignties and still in Morocco, the Imperial Government is known as the "Treasury," "Makhzen," its chief duty being to collect this sacred tax and expend it, to be a Fisc.

As every Moslem is required to obey, to pay this religious tax to, and to serve under the order of whomsoever is de facto exercising Moslem rule, it made no difference to the Ottoman Government,

as such, whether a man was Turk or Kurd, spoke Arabic or Turkish. It was not on these details or the place he lived on which this requirement rested for him, but on his meeting his religious obligation to the God-ordered government set over him in theory by the common decision of those praying in the mosque that such a name should, be, and ought to be, linked in the prayer of the Faithful to the title Commander of the Faithful.

For centuries of conquest this was all effective and efficient. Some doctors hold that defeat is itself divine proof that the defeated ruler cannot longer be Commander of the Faithful. The instant any overwhelming defeat came, as has occurred now, the entire empire ceased to have any cohesion. The different races all assert themselves. The Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburg, and the Ottoman Empire beginning at about the same period for centuries were dominant from the Ægean to the Baltic. In the middle of the eighteenth century Turkey bordered on both the Austrian and Prussian realms. Up to this century, the three empires held continuous front to the Slav advance, as seven centuries ago the three were facing the Tartar onset of the successors of Jenghiz Khan. Prussian policy down to its fall required amalgamation and grievously imposed it on Pole or Dane. Austria sought to make German a universal tongue

in the Dual Monarchy and failed. The Sublime Porte of old asked nothing of Moslem peoples and under Moslem sacred law could ask no more. Of the three, Prussia has lost most; the Austro-Hungarian Empire is dissected and dissevered. In Asia, an overwhelming share of the Moslem population—seven tenths of the whole—would prefer the rule of the Sublime Porte in Asia Minor and Kurdistan to any European power, but not to an American mandatory. Syria and Mesopotamia, desiring self-rule to aught else, would accept autonomy in preference to European rule, and prefer an American mandatory to either. Turkish rule, oppressive, corrupt, and blood-guilty, still emerges from the wreck of the war with a stronger hold on its Moslem subjects north of the Taurus than any one anticipated. This is more religious than racial. The Sultan is caliph and Commander of the Faithful.

XI

THE GOOD AND BAD OF ISLAM

THE faith of Mohammed improved the civilization, the morals, the government, the learning, and the spiritual life of the Arab of Arabia, of the Persian of Zoroaster, the Turk and the Tartar, as those races existed between 600 and 1200. It was accompanied in all these lands as the centuries went on by an arrest in development which prevented those who accepted Islam from keeping step with the civilization of western Europe. Why those races with all of whom Christianity had the first chance, refused to accept it, I do not know. I have never met any one or read any page that explained this. It ought not to have happened, but it did happen.

The Arabs of Arabia early had accessible a very fair translation of the New Testament with which I am familiar, but they would not read it or if they did, they would have none of it. The central Asian people that adopted Christianity ceased to remain Christians.

This rejection of or departure from Christianity

and the New Testament did a harm to these races which was never clearer than at the present time. A devout, sincere, philosophic Moslem feels that this is only a present lack and a temporary low condition like that to which the Christian Church fell in the ninth and the tenth centuries when a European had to choose between the Byzantine patriarchs and the Roman pontiffs of that day. To me this seems a very unpleasant choice. Into the merits of Islam and the possibility or practicability of its reform I do not here enter because it is not part of the job of showing how at the present time in spite of good done in the past, the teaching and influence of the Koran is and has been harmful to all concerned. With the patient, courageous, and noble efforts of many, some my cherished friends, who are endeavouring to reform a great faith, I have a profound respect and sympathy, though they have accomplished little yet. I hope none of them will meet the fate of a very distant kinsman of mine who was burned alive under Queen Mary of England and of Spain for urging religious reform on the Bishop of Norwich.

The Turkish Empire at start adopted Islam as the religion of the State and set its principles to work with a ruthless severity such as marked the period in the treatment of religious differences in all Europe, each persecuting the other. There

was, however, this vital difference, the varying phases of Christianity went back to a common source and authority. This permitted, as the years went on, a common meeting ground and a mutual tolerance. A man can go from one form of Christianity to another with nothing like the shock entailed in passing from Islam to Christianity or the reverse.

The two may agree to live and let live, but they cannot merge or speak a common tongue and accent. A sect in Christianity may remove one tenet after another until the faith left is monotheistic, rejecting inspiration, miracle, incarnation, or a trinity; but if such a sect retains only the ethics of Jesus, His meekness, humility, mercy, forgiveness, and resistance to the desires and demands of sense, positive or negative, this alone leaves it wholly opposed to the position of the Mohammedan and his outlook on life.

The best Moslems are seeking to rationalize their faith, to treat as myth, allegory, parable, or figure, all the utterances of Mohammed, in regard to heaven and hell, to reform polygamy, to heal past hatreds, to minimize the acrid denunciation, condemnation, and assault on all the non-Mohammedan world and eliminate the death required of the stubborn pagan and the subjection and humiliation imposed on the submissive Christian, but

when they have done all this, there still remains a doctrine of implicit surrender to God, united to the assertion of self and to the gratification of the desires of sense and self, through all their range, which is radically opposed to Christianity in spirit, however Christians may err at this point in their daily practice.

In all this I am patiently endeavouring, for all my own profound conviction, belief, and profession of the Christianity whose symbol is the Apostle's Creed, to be perfectly fair to both faiths and religions impartially defining the attitude and character of each. A good Moslem is a good man. Whether above a good pagan, opinions differ. To me, the good pagan seems less good. A good Christian is a good man, but he is not permitted to look on himself as above or below other human beings. They have all the rights he has in this world and in the next, where the Master may accept those who have denied Him and reject those who loudly professed faith in Him.

The two faiths at their core and centre are irreconcilable. The more you see Moslems, the more you know and like them, and come to feel for them a sincere affection as friends and companions whom you trust and value, the more you realize this.

The result is that when the Turk more than a

thousand years ago, with both faiths freely preached to him, decided in favour of Islam—some Turkish tribes did this after trying Christianity—an inherent antagonism was set in motion which the centuries since have never diminished. One can see how the creed of each might be brought nearer together in verbal expression, but the ethical reality behind each would still remain, to use a mathematical phrase, an irreconcilable surd or prime, one to the other, which no elimination, transposition, division, or reduction can alter, amend, or set at one.

Moslem and Christian may live together in harmony. Happy marriages are not very likely. Friendships may endure. But an essential opposition will remain which precludes mutual reconciliation. The motive, source, purpose, and end of life will remain different. If a superior power exists, the two faiths may live at peace in communities. The members of each may righteously discharge their mutual duties to each other, and the better each lives his own ethics and faith, the better will they meet their mutual duties. As each develops they may come to see eye to eye. I am one of those who hope much from the transformation and evolution of faiths and creeds, in spite of the difficulty I have carefully noted.

But humanly speaking, when the primitive Turk,

whose original faith was a crude and brutal animism, probably akin to Shamanism, adopted Islam, he set himself in opposition to those he was to conquer. The only hope of mutual peace, good-will, and forbearance between Moslem and Christian was in a power like the United States, providing justice, peace, order, and unselfish rule, accustomed in its legislation and administration to recognize and protect all faiths. The United States is the only country which has wisely recognized religion without establishing a church as has England or excluding religion from its work and administration as has France, for all the material provision which that Republic doles out to each faith.

If the Christians are in the majority, Turki Mohammedans (estimated at 2,000,000) have felt it impossible to live under Christian rule and have passed over into Asiatic Turkey leaving lands and all. Whether this movement will continue or not or whether a majority has gone, no one knows. Both Armenians and Greeks believe and say that when the territory in the Ottoman Empire they demand is under their rule, Moslems will leave, even at the cost of giving up lands at a heavy loss. In Bulgaria Moslems remain.

The Ottoman Empire has been for the last thirty years the scene of the withdrawal of Moslems on a great scale from Christian lands, because they be-

lieved, whether rightly or wrongly, that they could not have their rights where they had lived so long —these "rights" including the subjection of Christians to Moslems. The new Christian states have been ready to extend civil rights to Moslems. The Mohammedans have left for the same reason that the whites of South Carolina or Mississippi would leave if the negro majority in each state were given the control of its government which a majority usually exercises where free institutions exist. The white population of Jamaica has withdrawn for the same reason and has become a mere fraction of what it once was. If Jamaica became independent, all whites would cease to be permanent residents.

The Moslems feel about living under the rule of Christians exactly as southern whites do in regard to living under the rule of negroes. Moslems will accept a rule which is foreign and external, but in most—not all—cases they will not endure the rule of their Christian neighbours.

Christianity and Islam have together half the world's population, one about 600,000,000 and the other about 225,000,000. Each has its deep-rooted prejudices. The Christian prejudice turns on race; the Moslem prejudice on faith. Islam has almost wholly overcome race prejudice, but not wholly. Arab families there are who would regard an alliance with a Turk as a mesalliance,

and Berber families in North Africa who pride themselves on the absence of negro blood in their line. These are few. Islam as a whole has excluded race prejudice. Of the total of Islam 25,000,000 are Chinese and a number as large negro. These are accepted as fraternal equals by the mass of Moslems. To a difference of faith the Moslem cannot by his sacred law extend equality and he does not. He rebels at equality exactly as the Christian, taken in the mass, rebels at equality in worship and in rule, for the Chinese or the negro.

The results of this prejudice are alike. As the southern white Christian lynches the negro, denies him civil rights and political equality, and forbids intermarriage, so the Moslem in Turkey inflicts all these on the Christian. In both cases, for eighty years in the Ottoman Empire and for fifty-five years in this country, legislation has sought to remedy, relieve, and destroy this prejudice or its appearance in daily life. Progress has been made in both cases, much more progress than those whose memories do not go more than sixty years realize, but the prejudice remains. The religious prejudice of the Moslem and the race prejudice of the Christian take like shapes. The native Christians in Turkey are charged with insulting Mohammedan women, with conspiracy, with being

aggressive and uppish, parading their prosperity, and asserting equality in all the relations of life and seeking to practise it; charges familiar in this country against negroes South and sometimes North.

The more the Christian advances in property, in education, in ability, and in visible capacity, the more objectionable he becomes to the Moslems. Exceptions there are, but these exceptions on the part of liberal Moslems do not allay prejudice. Instead they embitter this religious prejudice among fanatics. The object of countless Moslem prejudice can always take refuge in becoming a Moslem. He is instantly accepted and may rise to any post in the state.

In European Turkey the Christians were in a decided majority. Save in certain areas, in Asiatic Turkey, the Moslems are in the majority. Taking all of Asiatic Turkey or in Turkey north of the Taurus, leaving out Mesopotamia and Syria, the Moslems are in a majority of seven to one or more. If the Moslem were left free to use their numerical advantage, the Christian would disappear as he has been diminishing through centuries. From Russia there has been a slow, steady departure of Moslems. Where the Moslem population in Russia is alone, it tends to remain, but departs where intermingled. This deep-seated prejudice is the

problem of Asiatic Turkey. Peace is little likely to come until it is removed. American colleges and schools are the only institutions which both Moslems and Christians attend together. There and there alone they meet on common ground. They join in the same games. They make friendships there as they could nowhere else. The American missionary is accepted by both as are no others. All European nations in the past have a diplomatic policy guided by religious institutions. The French Republic, while it expelled religious associations from France, gives its protection to institutions and missions of the Roman Catholic Church abroad. They aid French diplomatic influence. The German Empire, for all its past quarrels with Rome, zealously pushed German missions, Lutheran or Catholic. Russia for centuries gave the Greek or "orthodox" zealous encouragement and direct support. England had its Protestant bishop at Jerusalem.

The United States has adopted the wiser rule that all American citizens abroad should have the same protection whether missionaries or merchants. Turkish officials schooled in diplomacy have not forgotten the express disclaimer the United States gave of any religious end influencing any national action, in the treaty with Tripoli in 1797, when Washington was still President:

ARTICLE XI. As the Government of the United States of America is not in any sense founded on the Christian religion; as it has in itself no character of enmity against the laws, religion, or tranquillity of Musselmen; and as the said States never have entered into any war or act of hostility against any Mehomitan nation, it is declared by the parties, that no pretext arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony existing between the two countries.

The result of all this is that the United States is the one power which every factor, in the long conflict of religious prejudice culminating in the massacres of our own day, agrees in trusting and in desiring American aid.

Prejudice, of all human ills, is the hardest of all to relieve or remove. History has few more pathetic examples than a situation where oppressor and oppressed stretched out their hands in need to the one land that would remove past evils and were rejected. Suppose white and black in the South were certain that one power could bring them into harmony and asked of that power no more than supervision for a few years.

XII

ISLAM AND THE HAREM

UP TO this time the relations of Moslem and Christian have been lamentable on both sides and the faults have not all been on one side. One reason why Christian and Moslem have agreed in desiring the United States to take charge is because each sees no other path to harmony. In the Ottoman Constitution Islam is the state religion and about 16,000 Moslems discharging religious duties in the mosques and religious schools and those teaching the law are supported by taxation. In addition to differences of faith, the polygamy which Islam permits does harm to a country like Turkey where Moslems and Christians are mingled, because it cuts off all social relations between men. No man with a polygamous family can anywhere talk freely about his family affairs. Mormon and Moslem, Chinese and Hindu are all on one level here. An inevitable social gap exists between monogamy and polygamy. I do not analyze this fact. I simply record it. In a long and curious life among

Moslem friends I have but twice had a frank talk over the family life of a Moslem. It proved commonplace enough, regulated by custom and convention, claim and counter-claim. Only one gleam of common human nature shone forth. A man of lofty rank whose commodious family was described by a native whose English was uncertain as holding "four ladies and twelve women," said to me in a moment of sunset confidences: "Aside from all the other evils of our system, the strain on our income, nerves, and temper, there is this—you would not believe it until I tell you, so far must such desires be from your free educated women of the West—if one of the women gets a new article of clothing, however costly it may be and however large the outlay, not one woman leaves me one moment of peace until she has exactly the same thing. Can you imagine such unreason even in women?"

The corollary, however, of the isolation and separation from general society to which the seclusion of women dooms polygamous men, is that the influence of a man's family, its grip and compelling pressure, are inevitably far greater than in our system in which man meets man and men and women freely intermingle in social life. A Moslem in the past has seen nothing of any women who are his social equals out of his own household and next of kin. His own family, his mother, his sisters, and

his daughters—these are the only women he can respect, whom he can see face to face in free converse. Into his life there come none of the eddying and deflecting currents which arise from our perpetual contact of men and women in scores of houses. Isolated, his whole life spent in contact with the women of his own family alone, they have an immeasurable influence upon a man. Other women he may meet, dancers and so on, but this is different. The natural result is that the number of women who have swayed husband, son, father, or brother and ruled through them is far greater than in Western courts and royal families. The Valideh Sultanas, the fortunate mothers of the sons who become sultan, make in Ottoman history a long line who have administered great estates, erected monumental mosques, made viziers and unmade them, settled the issues of peace and of war. They have made reigns great and despoiled them of glory; by their advice they have brought victory or defeat.

Asia has a far longer and more numerous line of women who have exerted these great powers of State than the west can show. For them the veil is no obstacle and the purdah or curtain, behind which they sit, is a new source of power. There they sit, inscrutable and unseen, hearing and deciding. Tsz'e Hsi, the Empress of China, who for

nearly thirty years was the most powerful and most feared woman in the world, carried on such conferences as have Valideh Sultanas. So much alike is the East, I asked a minister of hers if these interviews were easy. "A thousandfold harder," said he, "than conferring with a man. How could you present your views and your plans, how could you argue or persuade with a woman you never saw, who made no sign, who raised neither voice nor finger, who listened and still listened unseen, until her voice, when you had no hint what was to come, spoke her decision?"

History at another point is profoundly modified in the reign of monarchs and the continuity of the great families of the State by polygamy. For six hundred and thirty years the sword of Ottoman has gone from hand to hand in the direct male line, though not in continuous descent. The eight descendants of Othman, great sultans all, culminating in Mohammed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, as I have said incomparably, hold the six ablest sovereigns of one line who have succeeded each other over a century and a half. Blood they shed, evil and woe inconceivable they worked, but out of a shapeless welter in which all civilization had disappeared they created a stable empire, after the passing of the ancient rule of Rome, in a period far less than any European realm or dyn-

asty took shape and came down to our own day. European lines are perpetually breaking and disappearing. In the Moslem world they continue from century to century. If Sarah fail, Hagar is at hand and the royal seed continues.

So with the great families of Islam, they pass on from generation to generation. From India to Morocco, Moslem families can be numbered with attested and recorded pedigree, the line lasting back to the days of the Prophet in the seventh century, three centuries before Alfred. Certain strains of ability are preserved in this fashion but progress is retarded. New families do not appear. The crossing of old lines with new is absent. The dynamic advance of society rests on perpetually bringing new blood, new parentage, new ideas, new discoveries together in new families. Sheikh Feisal, King at Damascus, can turn to a pedigree, recorded in the mosque entries at Mecca, which goes back to Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet, a descent centuries old before the house of Savoy, the oldest royal family in Europe, began its direct line in the days of Charlemagne. In Constantinople, a State officer, Reisal Shurfa, has kept the record of the descendants of the Prophet. But the Turkish race, an amalgam of many, owes its long power and present vitality to the circumstance that it has accepted those of all races. With this has come an

absence of the ties of family, of the continuity of tradition, of a respect for limitations on the brute use of power. Yet its ability was perhaps never more manifest than at this hour when still, after eighteen months of ignominious defeat, the only government of all the Central Powers which went down together remains acting for itself and commanding large and widespread forces of troops, which England and France do not engage in battle because of the magnitude of the task. The Central Empires and their armies are gone. Apostate Russia and Moslem Turkey remain with armed front facing Europe which two years after the Armistice lacks armies to subdue though each or both may collapse before these lines are read.

In Turkey this unexpected defiance is due to Islam. It gives a man self-respect, courage, and confidence in his future. Under the strict letter of Moslem law, a faithful believer must not live except where the ruler is a Moslem.

In morals, religion is only one of the factors, important, but not always the most important. The general level of life decides the general level of morals, and the morals of Mohammedans, like the moral practise of all the earth, in the main, not wholly, follows the general advance in the security of life. This is lower in Mohammedism than in western lands, and morals in the main run on a

lower level. The atmosphere of Islam is full of daily, hourly reference to reverence, praise, and trust in Allah, but His commandments from "Thou shalt not kill" to "Thou shalt not covet" are observed with exception. Truth is regarded as a relative virtue, a social means and weapon, not a spiritual end. "I observe," said Hadj Mohammed, who was in my travelling party for some months, "that your excellency always tells the truth." "It is the habit of my country," I said modestly. "Every American tells the truth," with a tide of patriotism which swept me over the shoals of doubt, not without an inner ring from the silver bell of conscience, for I have been a Washington correspondent, and memories of the marble halls of the Capitol rose before me. "I have observed it is the *custom* of Americans," my friend and companion responded with the faintest possible stress on "custom," which suggested that all customs have their exceptions—"but I am surprised that a man with the keen intellect of your excellency is not aware that the object of telling the truth is so as to be believed when you depart from it. For three months I have watched you. There have been a number of instances when your departure from the truth would have been to your profit and you took advantage of none. I call that the foolish waste of a good reputation."

This was but the Meliorism of the seventeenth century, the popular ethical theory of Molina and his many followers in Rome. If a stormy gust of passion upset your bark and you are drowned in the seas of desire the divine justice will not be too severe on a will overpowered by *force majeure*, too strong to be controlled. This is the moral philosophy of the worldly, and Islam in the Turkish Empire has always been either worldly or mystic and more worldly than mystic.

The Puritans of the Moslem faith are not in Constantinople, but among the Wahabis in the Nejd of east Arabia and in the Sus below the great Atlas in extreme southern Morocco. They keep the strict letter of the law, abstain not only from alcohol but tobacco, and will not wear silk or gold, not so much as a ring or gold-chased weapons. These rigours are of the desert and not for those who dwell in ceiled chambers. Even the antique morals of the Turk, the Arab, and the Kurd have faded away under modern European contact. This all note. Few realize or give allowance for the higher morals that have come to be a part of the Moslem world, through studies, sometimes in missions and sometimes in official schools, in India, in Persia, perhaps less in the three Moslem races of Turkey and in the higher classes of north Africa. If many have fallen below the old régime of Islam,

others have risen above it as they came to see that science is truth, morals, life and the uplands to which strong characters climb, bringing a moral outlook common to the best of all races and religions.

A ruling class and caste is usually more truthful than the subject herd, partly because its temptation is less. More than one traveller has credited the "old Turk" with a special veracity and overlooked his voracity, forgetting that the venerable looking official of rank was under no adequate temptation to vary from the truth with a passing traveller who had nothing to give and nothing to ask.

The precepts of morals do not greatly differ in all systems of ethics, religious or national; but the same advance which has led the Western world in a steady evolution of learning, governance, and institutions has played its part in ethics. How much is due to the general development of life and how much to the rediscovery and reacceptance of the teachings of Jesus cometh not with observation. The best men are not always Christians and Christians are not always the best men. But every open-eyed man who divests himself of the prejudices both of disbelief and of belief, one as misleading as the other, sees that when the criminal catastrophe of the war came, the world did not ask

what would Confucius or Buddh or Zoroaster or Moses or Mohammed say but what would Christ say. The newspapers and the reviews of Japan and China, of Turkey and of Egypt had their editorials and articles on this question as much as those of the west from Germany to New Zealand. When all moral standards were thrown into the crucible of war men of all faiths asked how His bore the test.

No one could ask what Mohammed would say. All knew. He preached War. He invented the sacred war which a recreant Christianity followed in the Crusades. He slew prisoners. His remedy for libel was the summary execution of the wandering poet—the quasi-journalist of that Arab day—who made jesting and bitter verse about him. He left no suggestion of the evolution of morals: "Moses said, but behold I say unto you." That can never be said by a Moslem teacher of Ethics. Mohammed indulged all the senses and loved each. Musk, rubbed on hair and beard, was the perfume for him. His loves were many-wived and many-wived were his loves. He was free, as Arabs are, from the worst sin of the Oriental world. The Arab is the only nomad race which has not fallen into this snare of masculine solitude, the solitude of the seaman which led the Phoenician to sow evil that still lasts in all the ports of the Mediterranean

he made his own, which curses the camps and cities of the central desert of Asia and the vast desert of north Africa. This is the dark shadow which rests on the life of the Moslem East, the survival of savage temptation, sung in verse, flaunted by wealth and station, a constant curse condoned and not mercilessly condemned as in a healthier Western world, not wholly guiltless at that and needing a more constant vigilance and more implacable ostracism.

Infanticide was rife among the poor in the barren Arab desert, as Mohammed knew, and there was indiscriminate indulgence among the favoured. He regulated both evils by permitting four wives and making legitimate all offsprings of wife or concubine, share and share alike, prohibiting disinheritance.

In the modern Moslem world of the Near East polygamy has come to be economic. The rich have harems. Nor is this true only of the East and Islam. The poor are single-wived. In moderate circumstances a coöperative household of two, three, or four wives may be able to care for various children and one husband in a way which meets the problem of domestic labour with economic advantage. Those associated with the mosque and religion are expected to use the full permission of the Prophet for four wives. The people want them adequately married. Even American parishes prefer a married minister. In barren lands

in Asia Minor and parts of Kurdistan, not in all, as in like lands in north Africa where laborious irrigation must be added to the plow, the mattock and the spade, four wives are sought for precisely the same reason that the many-wived Mormon household in Utah was economically profitable.

In the Ottoman Empire, the abolition of all these disabilities began with imperial rule the Tanzimat, 1828, and the Hatti-Humayoun, 1839, and has been continued by edicts, statutes, and constitutional provisions. They have been in general practically ineffective as our own Supreme Court pointed out as to the absence of negroes from juries to which they were eligible by law and constitution.

An ingenious but baseless hypothesis associates the decadence of the sultans of the eighteenth century with the harem and polygamy. Monogamy, however, has never been proposed for the decadence of the Merovingian line in the seventh century or of the Bourbons of various lines in the eighteenth. Polygamy and that vast museum of women on Seraglio Point existed in all its predatory and purchased splendour under the strong sultans as well as the weak, and when the inept monarchs had passed, the last century saw in Mahmud II and Abdul Hamid II two sovereigns no one could ever term weak. Men whose joint reigns stretched through 65 years.

The royal harem from Solomon down has been a state institution and not a personal preserve. In the early Ottoman Empire it was the polygamous family of a fighting head of a fighting state, most of whose days were spent in camp and among war's alarm. So secure was the Turkish camp deemed, that Bayezid in his campaign with Tamerlane took with him as his sultana the daughter of a Christian king of Serbia. It was her pitiful fate to be the last of the royal women of the West to suffer in defeat the public degradation of menial, unveiled servitude so often inflicted by Oriental kings and some queens on the queen-captive, whose crown and whose jewels might remain her only attire, the mark alike of her past splendour and her present plight.

But before Constantinople was taken, the imperial Ottoman harem first imitated the etiquette of Byzantium and, when Mohammed II had taken the capital of the Cæsars, he adopted the entire machinery of the Byzantine emperors, from their throng of slaves and the place given to the mother of the emperor, down to specific points of etiquette as to the personal discipline of the unruly. Man is monogamous by nature and polygamous by opportunity. Every harem gravitates to a single favourite. The degrading, disgusting, and prolonged training lavished on the young odalisque who hopes

to attract her royal owner is the best possible proof that virture was wise when clothing, separation, and seclusion were adopted. No one gorges on chocolate caramels who is employed in a candy factory.

The organization of the imperial harem with its slaves, its eunuchs and trained possibilities, its group on whom the sovereign lord has once smiled in vain and the few, the very few who in the imperial harem have borne a child to their owner have all been described, but such description misses the central fact of Ottoman history, the faithfulness of each sultan to the woman who bore him, his mother. When he reigns, she becomes the Valideh Sultana. Her advice he seeks, to her he defers. In all the pestilent, interested, intriguing horde that swarm about him, waving every lure, she alone has no interest but his, no ambition but his success, no desire but his omnipotent triumph. She has had the counsel and training of his father, she has been prepared to guide the chosen heir and take possession, at the death of his predecessor, of the royal seal of the dead or dying sultan. It is she who, in the brief period while demise can be concealed, has swept away perilous rivals, allowed no Amurath near the throne, and planted her son on a throne secure through her ruthless slaughter. The woman who, in the indiscriminate competition of the harem, has won the continual companionship

of the father and given her son sovereignty, has had training which, in the nature of things, makes her, inevitably, a more single-hearted adviser and often more experienced than any grand vizier. So Queen Victoria in her long reign came to know the policy of the British Empire better than any minister of foreign affairs who was still a boy at Eton while she had been for a generation in the confidence of kings, ministers, and premiers.

So that, out of the welter of the harem, there emerges mother-love as the dominant and directing emotion and Turkish history is known as much for its Valideh Sultanas as its sultans. Nor less favoured and favourite are the spouses of these Oriental despots. What Western potentate has ever given the woman he loved such a monument in beauty as the Emperor Shah Jehan built at Agra in the Taj-Mahal for the love of his lifetime Mumta-Za Mahal by whom he lies buried, or a monument such as Suleiman I, the Magnificent, built imposing in design, mighty in mass and cost, in the Sulieman-ieh for Roxalana, his wife, where she lies beside him, the one woman in Constantinople to be buried in a mosque, her resting place matching in majesty and size any of the greater buildings of the world. Of course, in theory, monogamy should have far outdone these records of personal devotion to womanhood, but it has not.

But these do not alter or change, as I have already pointed out, that the whole system is degrading, pestilential, and polluting, regretted and condemned by none more than by the educated Moslem. Even the Valideh Sultanas, whose long line and wide influence are a monument to the swaying force of motherhood, shopped all the year through the markets of beauty in which Constantinople once abounded to find the virgin who should grace the bed of the padishah (into which by immemorial etiquette she crawls at the foot) on the night of Bairam, the great Moslem festival, when the capital is ablaze with lights and the fasting of Ramadhan is over. It was Suleiman himself who gave his Admiral, Barbarossa, the commission to bring to him a young Italian princess whose beauty had spread about the Levant. For two years she kept from the coast, but in an ill-fated moment ventured near the sea and was swept away to the Seraglio to be the sport of an hour and the slave of a lifetime. Things like these breed the ruthlessness of the despot.

> Then everything includes itself in power,
> Power into will, will into appetite,
> And appetite, an universal wolf,
> So doubly seconded with will and power
> Must make perforce an universal prey
> And, last, eat up himself.

As all the world to-day witnesses in the Turkish Empire and its fateful fall.

Roman emperors, though pagan, and Christian kings though too often only Christian in name, have sought to lead personal and family lives apart from the burdens, the stains, and temptations of power. For 600 years this privilege has been denied to the Turkish sultan. His personal life has been part of a great system for breeding male heirs. Aside from his mother and the woman whose son should be his heir, he has usually had no personal union in the holiest relation human life knows. In the century past, three sultans have sought to lead lives more simple and personal. The system, however, they could not change. It made weak men weaklings and strong men brutal. From this foul fount came the cruelty of sultans, familiar in ordinary human beings, cursed by errant sex instincts.

The predatory and mercantile character of the Sultan's harem made all this worse. The harem of the Sherifian Sultan of Morocco draws from the great families of the realm, whose rule over provinces has lasted for generations. These temper the purchases of the slave market and give a touch of birth and breeding to some at least of the grand dames of the harem. In Persia, a great royal clan and families who claim a descent, more or less

mythical, to Sassanian monarchs, like Chosroes or Nushirvan, "the just," supplement the slave market. The Sultan and the House of Othman are so far above all other families and any other descent that, slave or free, all who enter the imperial harem are at an immeasurable distance from its august head, their lord and owner. Now that the brothers and kin of a sultan are not swept away, a small group of those of the imperial descent has grown up, changing the past at many points. In earlier times the reigning sultan has sometimes been the only surviving male of the Othman reigning line. Another branch lives in the Crimea, older in descent but without power or position save as it had been conceded by the Russian Government.

This strange isolation has been rendered the more certain and the more destructive to mere breeding from the start, with scores and later hundreds of possible mothers. A single Persian shah of the Kajâr-line, on the other hand, had 752 recorded and certified children. Several have run up into the hundreds. The last shah but two had 140 paternal uncles; but like the Sherifian line in Morocco at no one time has an Ottoman sultan had more than twelve brothers. Most Arab ruling families have had as few. The Tartar lines differ. The biological reasons for this it is not for a layman to discuss and I leave the problem to my

friends of the National Institute of Heredity at Cold Spring, but it has played its historical part in holding the Ottoman Empire together and preventing dynastic fission. In all Moslem lines descent is not by male primogeniture, but any male may be selected and usually the oldest is chosen. For, after all, in theory, this absolute despot is elected.

XIII

THE SULTAN AS CALIPH

THE caliphate just now offers one of the Moslem bogeys of the hour. Exactly as the Jehad or Holy War was to precipitate a torrent of fanatical Moslems of all races on the Allies during the war, so the circumstance that the reigning sultan of Turkey uses sparingly the title "caliph" is marshalled to predict that the Moslem world will be shaken to its foundation if the sultan is removed from Constantinople. The sultans of the House of Othman have indubitably gained place, standing, and influence in the world at large since Selim I, having conquered Syria and Egypt, received a cession of the caliphate from a descendant of the Abasside line of caliphs at Cairo, Mutawakkil. The position, however, won by this cession is principally due to the deference given it in the Moslem world through the belief of the Christian world in the deference paid by Moslems to the Turkish sultan because he was not only padishah but also caliph, not only the greatest

and most powerful Moslem ruler, but the spiritual head of Mohammedanism.

The caliphate has been in existence since 632, just short of 1,300 years. All human things have their changes in this span, let us for instance say, between Eadbald son of St. Ethelbert, known as Rex Anglorum in 632, and George V, one of whose inherited titles is Rex Anglorum; but no one would pretend the title meant the same in both cases, though a king of the English has been in England ever since. The first four caliphs at Mecca—Abu Bekr, Omar, Othman, and Ali—are and were accepted by all the Moslem world. They were in every sense of the word the lieutenants, deputies, vicegerents of the Prophet Mohammed—words that translate the Arabic word more accurately, taking its legal and colloquial use, than "successor." No inspired prophet who gave the world the will and word of God in the Koran and whose inspiration dies with his going could have a successor in the sense that every pope has had his successor, possessing all the power of his predecessor.

Islam has no priesthood. It has no rites and sacraments which only the ordained can perform and consecrate. The Moslem knows no miracles. Before God, he knows no superior. Legally, from the first caliph to the last, each has held his place by the choice of the learned in the law, and by

the people who ratify their choice. The office is not hereditary. The Sultan himself legally only assumes his title by utterance and acclamation of those learned in the law (ulema) present in the mosque when he is girded with the ancient weapon of the founder of his line. Since Ali, the last of the first four caliphs whom all alike accept, was assassinated, no man has held the caliphate without challenge from some other claimant. Muawiyah and his family held the caliphate at Damascus (661-744), but the descendants of Ali denied it and one, Idris, went to Morocco and became Commander of the Faithful and was accepted as the representative of the Prophet. The descendants of Abbas, uncle of Mohammed, the Abasside caliphs, held the title and all that went with it for five centuries (749-1258) until the last of them, Mustasim, was slain by Hulaku, a Turk, grandson of Jenghiz Khan; but through all these centuries there was a caliph at Cordova (711-1031), a member of the Damascus caliph's family having fled to Spain and raised a banner of revolt, never lowered until in 1492 the last of the Spanish caliphs surrendered Granada to Ferdinand and Isabella. This seemed to both of them a far more important event than the message a Genoese mariner brought them that in the west Atlantic he had found an island off the coast of Asia. It is very hard to tell in your

own day what is important. Will the victory of the Allies, the Armistice, and the Treaty of Versailles seem the great result of the World War 428 years hence, or will some economic reorganization of society brought on by it hold that eminence?

Besides these there were other caliphs, the Fatimide caliphs in North Africa and Egypt (909–1171) named after Fatima, the daughter of Mohammed, the wife of Ali, from whom they claimed descent. The Persian Moslems, Shiah, do not accept the Sultan's caliphate at all, but they are heretics not accepted by the great mass of the Moslem world. Even for the orthodox or Sunni there have been many caliphs that were questioned and none since the first four who did not face dissent. Not one of them had all the requirements laid down at the beginning of this great office that its holder must be the choice of a legal body of those learned in the law recognized by the faithful (this is the college for election), and must be named by his predecessor, hold the holy places Mecca and Jerusalem, be a ruler by the right of the sword (obeyed by the military force of Islam), and belong to the Arab tribe to which Mohammed belonged.

The last qualification no sultan of Turkey has ever held. The other he possesses, and his capitol is the only place in the world where Mohammedan law is interpreted by ulema under no foreign rule.

This is the argument and centre, the pivot and postulate of the demand from Moslems in India that the sultan be left at Constantinople independent, a ruler and caliph, his presence there to be in this capacity. The earlier caliphs, certainly the first four, led prayers and preached in the mosque; each was "commander of the faithful" and each "sat in the gate" and judged. When the Arab Empire ran from the Himalayas to the Pyrenees, as it did for a brief season, this ceased to be possible. Even in Bagdad, the sermon and prayers were done by an Imaum, the chief of those attached to the great mosque. The armies had their commanders. The learned man who spoke for the caliph in law was called Sheikh-ul-Islam. The local administration of justice was divided between cadis, or judges. In the loosely organized life of the East almost any one that is important, officially or personally, sits in judgment. He tries each case, if he is a just man, "on its merits." He has no decisions to guide him. Statutory law is a matter of tradition and custom as once was our common law. I was once at a Moorish country fair. Various tribes were represented. A noisy and tumultuous quarrel sprang up. The Moorish official asked me to sit in judgment, partly as a compliment to me and partly to avoid mixing in the dispute. Men at a fair, he explained to me, were

judged on the spot. I heard the case and decided. A forgotten page of Blackstone came to me. I had sat in a court "pied poudre," held at fairs where men came to the tribunal, the dust still on their feet.

For the great mass of ordinary disputes this worked well enough. It could not be wisely applied to the adjudication of contracts and mercantile law generally, to realty and trusts of realty, to all that makes up the law of the family. This passed into the hands of men learned in the law who studied, lectured, and gave opinions on a case stated at the mosques and on the tradition of the decisions of Mohammed and his successor. These were repeated orally, written, and a digest of 16,000 out of 600,000 was made (810) by el Bokkhara, who, coming from the city of this name (better known to Americans for its carpets than for the compiler of Moslem law), was born and buried there and read and honoured over all the lands of Islam.

The first of these doctors of the law who drew decisions on particular cases, applying the Koran, the traditional judgments of the Prophet and findings based on them, gathered at Mecca. When power left there, they gathered at Bagdad. Abu Hanifa, whose utterances guide the jurisprudence of the Ottoman Empire, is buried there at a city gate, and the conquering army of Selim I was

spurred to the assault to capture the sacred spot. As the Sublime Porte came to be the great centre of authority in the Near East, its men of learning grew more and more important and the Sheikh-ul-Islam in Constantinople became the leading authority on the system of law accepted in our Sulu Islands, in India and Turkestan. When we wanted peace with our Mohammedan nationals, we sent to Constantinople, and the Sheikh-ul-Islam at Mecca sent teachers who solemnly decided that our rule was just and that the practice of the Mohammedan religion was freely permitted. On these two conditions the Moslem expounders of the law of the Prophet have permitted his followers to live under the rule of a non-pagan infidel government. There was peace among the Sulu Islanders and Juramentados; men who had sworn to slay a Christian no longer killed American sentries by night so as to merit eternal salvation. After the Indian Mutiny, when the English ended the power of the Moslem Moghul who sat at Delhi in the seat of Akbar (1556-1605), the wisest and best of the rulers of Islam, the Indian Moslems were stirred with doubts as to their duty and loyalty to the British sovereignty or Raj. A decision was reached by the Sheikh-ul-Islam at Constantinople similar in its general form to the finding handed down in the case of our Sulu

Islanders. Later, in 1870-71, when a Wahabi conspiracy to destroy British rule drew new attention to this issue, the Muftis of the Hanifi and Shafii schools of Moslem at Mecca and those of the Maliki school, Morocco, affirmed the doctrine laid down by the Sheikh-ul-Islam on the Bosphorus. This included the Moslem law in all its jurisdictions where the more learned of those versed in the law are gathered, at Fez, at Cairo, at Mecca, at the Ottoman capitol. Morocco was then an independent state. The ruler of Egypt enjoyed a freedom of action now denied him. In the nature of things, Mecca can never be the site of a great power.

Turkey remains the one Moslem state still in a sense independent. It is natural that the Moslems of India desire that there shall be one source and fountain of the law of their faith free from foreign dominion. All issues of inheritance, of marriage, of family right for the Moslems of India, are still decided by the law of Mohammed in its development of 1,300 years, its stateliest monument for them being the digest of decisions made under Akhbar, the descendant of Tamerlane at Delhi. On disputed issues relating to the Moslems of India a final appeal lies to the Judicial Committee of Privy Council whose reports contain by far the best summaries of Moslem law accessible. A de-

cision by the Sheikh-ul-Islam at Constantinople on a point still at issue would be heard with profound respect by this English body. It is better for the course of justice in the two great English-speaking countries that in the courts of each the decisions of the highest tribunal of either are cited and accepted as law. It is better alike for the peace of British rule in India and for justice in the courts there called to pass on issues of Moslem law, that there should be a Moslem tribunal in a sovereignty independent in its jurisdiction.

These considerations weigh in the protest heard from the Mussulman world of India, but for obvious reasons they are not pleas that can be cited at the bar of public opinion in England. The Sheikh-ul-Islam began as the Lord Chancellor did, sitting to spare the time of Moslem caliph and Norman king. The English Lord Chancellor went on to making decisions, became the "keeper of the king's conscience," and at length held an independent judicature. The analogy cannot be pressed too far, and the parallel at many points is not complete, but it interprets better than any other portion of the law of England, from which our own is derived, the fashion in which for Moslem law the Ottoman caliph has become shadowy and the Sheikh-ul-Islam at Constantinople an authority to which distant lands turn. Exactly as a chan-

cellor may still remain when kings are gone, in an American state administering equity for the sovereignty of the Commonwealth, so behind a Sheikh-ul-Islam some aggregate, some corporate whole must exist. The Sheikh-ul-Islam may be, as at Cairo, head of the great mosque of al Azhar with its Moslem university, where down to the last decade the largest collection of students in any land was gathered, its pupils drawn from the winter twilights of Siberia and the tropic splendour of Senegal. He may as at Mecca preside in the same site over the same body of ulema who gathered to hear the words of Mohammed himself thirteen centuries ago. He may be, as at the mosque of Ahmed, the successor of the long line who have advised the conquerors of the past and now advises the conquered of the present. But his weight and authority are increased by a caliph, dubious and doubtful as are the claims of Mohammed VI to the ancient powers and qualifications of the title.

Much is ignoble in Oriental despotism, but more than once the Sheikh-ul-Islam in a Moslem despotism has faced death to declare the law he had sworn to interpret.

When Arabi headed the Arab revolt against the Egyptian khedive, Tewfik Pasha, the Doctors of the Law at the Moslem School of Law at Azhar

University in Cairo, were asked whether, if a representative of the caliph, as Tewfik was, left his post and allied himself with infidels—which meant the English army—it was legal for Moslems to oppose him in his wrongdoing even though the caliph still approved of him. The answer was that it was undoubtedly lawful, because anti-Islamic acts by the caliph had no validity and were, as our lawyers would say, either unconstitutional or *ultra vires* beyond his powers. When the rebellion was defeated by English bayonets, and self-government lost in Egypt, and Arabi a prisoner, Tewfik's officers hunted down the original of this opinion in order to execute its signers as rebels. The head of the School of Law was brought before a court martial and asked if he had signed the declaration. "As a matter of fact," he said, "I did not sign the opinion you cite. I was at my country place on the day on which it was drawn, and as time pressed it was handed down without my signature. But it was good law then and it is good law now. If you will have your scribe and counsel draw the question in proper legal form, I will be glad to sign and seal it now." Mr. Napier, later king's councillor, who was present, told me that every man in the room believed that the intrepid judge had signed his death warrant by the declaration, but English fair play asserted itself. He was released, and I

am glad to say lived to a good old age, holding important judicial posts. In the next instance I cite I cannot help feeling that the example would have been better if action had been taken earlier. When Abdul Hamid asked the Sheikh-ul-Islam at Constantinople to write an opinion condemning the rebel conspiracy at Salonica he responded that the law made it necessary for him to find out what their grievances were. When they reached him he decided in their favour against the remonstrances of his friends, who believed his life would be forfeited. He was eighty-one. "How can I," he said, "when I am entering the presence of Mohammed, justify myself to him when my first report must be, that my last opinion was in violation of his law, if I follow your advice?" As long a list could, I think, be made in English law of like examples of courage. No system of law is wholly free from outer pressure. As "Mr. Dooley" said, "Whether trade follows the flag, I do not know, but I know the Supreme Court follows the election returns." This was said when the insular cases over the acquisition of the Philippines were shortly to come before the Tribunal at Washington, and the Court decided for the annexation by just one majority, the odd member being much in doubt until he was asked to frame the decision. But while public opinion and public policy are felt in all courtrooms, it is

also true that no people, no land, no system of law, has been without the intrepid spirit which is true unto death. This will remain while men have courage, laws are just, and judges have the principle to administer justice and naught else, be the risk and result what it may.

Under the sacred law of Islam Christian evidence could not be accepted against a Moslem. His oath was not regarded as of the same value. There was doubt if he could be sworn as a witness. For him to strike a Moslem, still more to assault him, was punishable by death. The Roman law which made the conquered subject to slavery unless relieved by the clemency of the conqueror was adopted by Islam with all its implications. Similar provisions were present in the codes of every slave-holding state in regard to negroes. They have since been abolished, but their spirit at many points, by no means all, or for all whites, influences public opinion, the current of daily life, and the procedure of the courts.

Even under a ruler alien to his faith, the Moslem preserves a personal dignity absent in other Asiatics. Said an English barrister to me thirty years ago, a man who had defended Arabi Pasha and for years was the counsel of Ismail Pasha, once khedive, on his return from Egypt, "The Moslem is the only man who can be a servant with obedience and

prompt efficiency and still make you feel that he is your equal." No more unexpected human miracle could have crossed the path of an Englishman, a peer's younger son and later king's counsel and Member of Parliament. In adversity and defeat, this side of Islam is a constant support. It makes the Moslem likable, and most English and American residents in Turkey personally prefer him to the races he has oppressed and massacred. There are plenty of Moslems who fail in these things and are of little faith. Riding on a Moslem road, we became aware, as armed husbandmen hastened their oxen and shepherds hurried their flocks to safety, that trouble was abrewing. The solitary Moslem servant in the party of three was smitten with fear visible even to Mrs. Williams, who knew no Arabic. I chided him with the passage in the Koran which says that no man can anticipate or avoid the allotted fate, Kismet, written on his neck. Perhaps from this by some devious path is derived our "get it in the neck." "I know the verse well, your Excellency," said my servant. "You have a perilous familiarity with our sacred word, light on the tongue but heavy on the scales of the day of judgment. But I am not at all sure that Kismet holds for the believer when he is riding with an unbeliever whom Allah may have judged."

XIV

THE SULTAN AT WORK

THE Sultan of Turkey through 600 years was for western Europe part of the horizon of things great and fearsome. He appealed to the literary vision. Wyclif denounced those who "harme a Cristen men more cruelly than the Soudan." Good Dr. Hartwell, the London physician who spent his life in Turkey, translator of an "Account of the warres of the Sultan and Sophy," 1595, gave Shakespeare in the "Merchant of Venice" his "Persian Prince that won three fields of Sultan Solyman," slain by the Prince of Morocco. Milton saw "Where the Persian in Ecbatan Sat or the Sultan in Bizance." When the padishah had become a shadow of the past an annalist notes that "Tennyson said he considered Norfolk turkeys the very Sultans of their breed." Nor could Bowen a generation ago find a better phrase for Virgil's Georgic "vir gregis ipse caper," than "our Sultan goat."

The limitless harem of the Ottoman sultan had its effect on the partially monogamic imagination

of the West. The sultan was, too, the nearest of absolute rulers after the Asiatic pattern. To the West, the Eastern despot stands absolute. In his palace he is. Heads fall at his will and women perish at a nod. In his army, afield, while he is victor, his will is final. But all forms of government are by consent. No man ruleth to himself alone. The Sultan at Constantinople was as powerful as any hereditary despot can be. Even on his powers, many checks and brakes there were. With his army, beyond a certain point, he could not go or mutiny came. For nearly all the eighteenth century, the Janissaries, his local bodyguard, played the part of the Pretorian guard at Rome and chose between possible heirs to the Ottoman sultanate. Down to a century ago there were cities like Mosul, where the powerful and hereditary families of the region ruled in fact, while the Sultan's pashas came and went. There were mountain ranges where no one recognized the Sultan's authority unless an army came. Down to our own day, the Turkish tax-gatherer was held at bay through many years by two Armenian regions, Sassoon in northeast Turkey and the region about Hadjin, destroyed last year, abandoned to its fate by the French, among the crags and hills that look across the Cilician plain to the Phoenician sea. Hadjin last year closed the stern

and successful conflicts of centuries by the hopeless, helpless massacre brought on by the French occupation of Cilicia and the failure of France to protect men that trusted in her promise. He would have been a most unwise pasha who stirred up the Dersim Kurds between Diarbekr and Erzerum. The line which ended eighty-five years ago with that over-ambitious Kurd, Beder Khan Bey, ruled with small thought of any superior down to his fall, in the blue, jagged range, like mountains up-rooted, that rims the eastern horizon of the Tigris. The English find the region hard to police even to-day, so free of control is its people.

These limitations exist for all Oriental despots, not only on the outskirts of their realms, but in their very capitals.

European travellers in the hundred years or so that they have visited Fez, the capital of Morocco, wasted woozy words on the amazing power of the Sultan—heads falling at a word. There, in Fez, yes, in the great pile, half palace within, half fortress without; but if you know the tongue of the land and learn the place, you find that most "wards" of the city (this word and "guard" have the same origin and root meaning) are themselves checks and guards on the absolute, unbridled will of a despot. There, narrow entrance streets, with some great gates, are girt about by a close line of

houses blank wall to wall, windows all fronting in. The quarter or ward has its head (Reis) and a loose organization of men that carry arms. As in most houses, food is bought once a year, the ward is provisioned and can stand a siege.

I know nothing set to sterner heights of fruitless courage than the way the Armenian-Greek quarter in Diarbekr, when arms and deportation were demanded, barricaded street and flat roof and for three weeks held off regular troops with casual weapons until artillery was trained on the beleagured, desperate defenders. Fire started, and massacre followed. There was house-to-house fighting, while some few—not many—escaped in the Roman waterways that ran under the houses.

Travelling in Morocco, still primitive thirty years ago, with Mrs. Williams and with no real defense but a cool head and adventure backed by address, I once found myself in a little village in the hills where for many years no tax-gatherer had crossed the watched boundary. Three bale-fires sent out their warning smoke from peaks above. There was a whole district in north Morocco, three days' march from the capital, where, if a man were wise, he kept the Sultan's safe-conduct in his pocket and used instead a friendly letter from that dignitary, half warrior, half priest, like a mediæval fighting bishop, the Sheriff of Wazan.

This condition for less backward countries ended with the coming of new discipline and new weapons a century ago. From Cromwell and Tilly to Napoleon and Wellington weapons changed, but the change in range, accuracy, or fighting value was small. There is pretty fair evidence that when the English held Tangiers under Charles II, the Moorish flintlock was better than the English. At this period the Turkish artillery was better than the European. When the musket killed at only 100 yards, a space that could be covered by a fearless charge before the fighting line could reload, and artillery was lethal at a half mile easily covered in two or threefold the time it took to load, organized troops could hold down the plain and the well-villaged area and the city, but the mountains were not to be lightly adventured. The Sublime Porte, the Turkish Government, down to a century ago held the highroads and kept them safe. The cities were submissive. Garrisons obeyed. The Sultan's arm was long, strong, and active.

On the edge of my memory an open-eyed and open-mouthed American boy used to be told, among spicy odours and candies, sweet and oily, by shopmen of the bazaar hard by the house where the servant was marketing, how *sometimes* when the Sultan's mail passed through the crowded street, whips snapping and galloping horses slipping

on the stones smoothed by centuries, the Tartar who rode ahead, cashmere-girdled, gold-embroidered, yellow-booted, pistols and daggers clinking, had at saddlebow a round ball, done in black sackcloth waxed and sealed, and within, the head—it might be a pasha's—for which the Sultan had sent. It was going duly certified with the executioner's signet and the certificate properly witnessed as to whose shoulders the head had once belonged between. Such a head, forty-odd years ago, the head of Midhat Pasha, first of Turkish reformers, better embalmed, for civilization and modern undertaking had come to Turkey, was consigned f. o. b. to Sultan Abdul Hamid, after the courageous, patriotic statesman had "died from sudden illness." The black ball at the Tartar's saddlebow I never saw, for all the promises I had that I should know when the next one passed; but a Puritan missionary father did not encourage these random excursions and alarums in a lad who was being prepared for American life on Bible proof-texts and the Westminster Shorter Catechism. Midhat's head came to the Sultan as per invoice. He liked its look and its clear ivory, though a little shrunk.

Nine short years ago, measured by months, when Abdul Hamid was over and gone to Salonica and we all sat—were there once such years? . . .

Moslem and Christian, Turk, Syrian, Armenian, Greek, Albanian, and Americans, celebrating at dinner "Constitution Day" and universal peace, amity and fraternal love in the Ottoman Empire, I found myself by the side of the Turkish official who inventoried, as head of a commission, the contents of Yildiz Kiosk, the Sultan's favourite palace, "Star Kiosk." I had heard of the head and had a deep admiration for its original owner. "Did Abdul Hamid keep that head?" I asked. "You will remember," he said, "there is a pleasant room with a bow window on the corner of Yildiz Kiosk which looks up and down, catching a pleasant breeze?" I nodded at the pleasant picture it called up of one of the most lovely views on earth. "Afferam," (agreed) said my courteous friend. "In that room is an old carved wooden cabinet of Ahmed's days, wonderful. In it was the head of Midhat. I knew it from photographs, though I never saw him. The palace attendant told me that when the day's work was done (his Imperial Ottoman Majesty was a hard-working man), and he had dined in comfort with the favourite of the hour, he came to that charming room 'to smell the air,' as we say, and smoke his *narghileh* and then, satisfied and at peace with all the world and himself, he would go to the cabinet and open it and gently stroke the smooth surface."

"Thinking, I suppose," said I, somewhat flippantly, I fear, "that all heads come to the sultan at last."

"In our history," said my new friend, suddenly become a little stiff and official, "in our history, many heads have come to many sultans."

So they have, and when Mahmud II (reign 1808-1839) bought artillery and had his troops drilled by French officers, who had seen service in the grande armée, he was able in 1826 to wipe out the Janissaries. They had long since ceased to be recruited from Christian families. The force lasted 500 years. They had become a military caste, a secret order sought by adventurers, turbulent, plundering, rebellious. Of them, 26,000 were slain where they were found in streets or houses in three days. The Sultan of Turkey from that massacre became as absolute a despot as at the beginning, so long as the army was loyal and obeyed his command. This abruptly ended in 1908, when two army corps turned out Abdul Hamid.

The army is drawn from the people by conscription. The officers do not come from a privileged class. The Moslem preachers and readers who lead prayers in the mosque have a powerful influence with both army and people. The military force of Turkey, officers and men, shares the opinion

that the one country which can tide over the Ottoman Empire to peace and prosperity is the United States, because they know what the American people have done and how it has kept its word and its principles. True or not, this has been believed, and general belief in the East has as much influence on men as recorded facts. Lastly, the Turkish army knew no allegiance but to the Sultan, as the Roman Legion of the empire worshipped the image and superscription of Cæsar and of Cæsar alone.

XV

SULTANS, PRESENT AND PAST

BY A miracle of descent, unknown in any other dynasty in history, the progeny of Othman gave a series of men of the very first ability with long reigns for nearly three centuries. Niebuhr thought the Roman kings were apocryphal because their reigns were too long, taking the average of recorded history. These six great sultans did better, Othman 1288-1326, 38 years; Orkhan, 1326-1359, 33 years; Murad I, 1359-1389, 30 years; Mohammed II, 1451-1481, 30 years; Bayezid II, 1481-1512, 31 years; Sulieman I, 1520-1566, 46 years. Two weaklings there were in this period and an interregnum after Tamerlane's terrible defeat of Bayezid I; but these six able men had 206 years. Brutal they were, their hands red with blood of the guilty and of the innocent, their victories many, their tortured victims innumerable; but they did the sultan job as never before or since. They kept the roads open; the ablest of all races sought their service; their realms were at peace within and at war without; oppression was every-

where and much devastation and empty fields, but their armies were the best of their day; trade flourished, no rights were respected, and their fear lay like a shadow over all western Europe.

In their warfare fanaticism was added to personal allegiance. The core of their realm of men was the mingled blood of all the Near East, Arab, Kurd, Armenian, Greek, Roman, Bulgar, Serb, and all the strange forgotten peoples of that mosaic of races. Asia Minor and this lava-like force was made one working whole because the family descents of a single ruling tribe, the Ottoman Turk, had neither privilege nor nobility to create jealousy. They were diffused through all the vast mass, giving those who ruled below the Sultan one tongue, one faith, one literature, one relentless ideal—victories which left no vanquished behind.

These strong, bad, magnificent sultans built great edifices, bridges, roads, and aqueducts, they created codes born of mingled Arab and Roman origin, they peopled the wastes left by the previous invasions and made wastes anew, but their wrong, their massacres, their broken faith, their personal crimes were also beyond measure. Weak sultans came after, nineteen forgotten rulers at Constantinople, averaging twelve years apiece for 242 years, cut-purses of empire, squanderers of rule, of power, of armies, and of territories.

Abdul Hamid maintained the old tradition without faltering. He was the first to turn to the possibility of America's saving his realm from European conquest. In 1889 the absolute ruler of 30,000,000 in that day frankly laid his troubles and perplexities before a young American billionaire who came to Constantinople in his steam yacht. His realm, Abdul Hamid explained, needed everything: ports, roads, railroads, irrigation, mining, manufactures. European capital meant European control in the end and European meddling at all points. As sultan, he could trust no one, at home or abroad. Every government in Europe was ready to seize something. England had just broken the "word of an Englishman" and taken Egypt. He spoke only for his realm, not himself. To what purpose was a man sultan if he could not advance and improve his realm? No growth could give him personally more than he already had. An American he could trust. The United States asked nothing and had flatly declined in his father's day the offer of an island in the Ægean as a naval station. The American people had no ambitions. "What better can you do with your wealth," he said in substance to the American billionaire, "than save a nation and reap immeasurable profit? Let your own lawyers draw the contract and ask what security you will. I can give you

what I never could give a European, because I can trust your nation, your people, and yourself. You will become one of the world's great figures. I cannot afford to break with you because I have nowhere else to go. To Europeans, I shall never give concessions which diminish the empire my successors will receive." But the young man who had great possessions said: "Why should I do it? I have my yacht, my houses in Pau, in Paris, in London, in New York, and anywhere else I choose. I have all I want. I have an awfully good time and I do not spend half my income."

The offer was refused. Whether Abdul Hamid would have kept his word is an open question. He was a shrewd and able man, and everything called for fair dealing with an American who could furnish the capital needed and would have no political ambition. Such a development of Turkey as was anticipated thirty years ago can be accomplished now. No European would have adventured alone to exclude America, and no alliance between Turkey and any European power for this purpose could have been made, as it was to the interest of England to have the United States in the Near East, where the responsibilities of the English Empire were already large enough to absorb all its resources and the field for English capital would have been enlarged.

This was not to be. Abdul el Hamid began his cultivation of Berlin, secured support and approval for his army and for the Armenian massacres, brought on six years later, and in the end was forced to turn to Germany instead of the United States to develop his empire.

An American again was present at the scene of the last decision.

A decade later, when the Boer War had reached its crisis, a peace conference was sitting at The Hague. In 1898 the Kaiser set out to organize an alliance which would prevent the United States from taking Cuba. The American fleet was no match for the combined fleets of Europe, but England interfered. In 1899 the Kaiser was seeking an alliance to interfere with England's policy in south Africa but was unable to go forward with France and Russia against him and, instead, paid a visit to his grandmother Queen Victoria, at Windsor, as a sign of amity, giving up the Boers. From there he sent a telegram, not in code, to his ambassador telling him to insist on the immediate signature of the concession of the Constantinople-Scutari-Bagdad-Basra railroad. The despatch was, of course, intercepted and went before the Sultan. By night, he called in a distinguished American. He knew diplomacy too well to give an opinion. The facts were eloquent. The Kaiser

was in England, at Windsor, and the despatch came over English wires. The inference seemed inevitable. The Sultan yielded. Later the American found that the despatch was sent without the knowledge of the British Government; that after the easy English fashion no watch or guard was placed on the telegraph office at Windsor and that this momentous telegram had been filed with the blonde-haired young woman who misreads your despatches in England telegraph offices, exactly as if it had been an order for so many cases of Smyrna figs. Out of this, however, grew the successive steps, now a matter of history, through which the United States ceded one of the Samoan Islands to Germany, England negotiated the modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty without notifying Canada, and the Kaiser ceased to trouble the English Government in south Africa. The Kaiser gave away Kruger; England gave away Canada, and the United States gave away Samoa, each of them giving away what did not belong to them, and out of the whole came an agreement in Germany to some form of arbitration board in the Peace Conference then sitting at The Hague.

In no other country in the world could this have occurred except at the court of an Oriental despot, at the centre of the world's affairs. Had it been possible at that time for England and the United

States to act together and to bring into European affairs the unselfish policy and purpose of the American people, it would almost have been possible to render impracticable any attempt on the part of the central monarchies to secure control of the Ottoman Empire, and the woe of the four years of hideous war with all it brings of suffering, sorrow, and death to hundreds and thousands might have been avoided.

Once more the United States faces, as it has for nearly a century, the possibility that its entrance into the affairs of the Ottoman Empire would bring peace and not war ending the selfish interference which had prevented its growth, its development, its order, and its prosperity. In 1823, when President Monroe drew his first draft of the Monroe Doctrine, he promised the protection of the United States to Latin America and the Republic of Greece. Had this not been struck out on the advice of John Quincy Adams, who had been a minister at St. Petersburg and was a strong sympathizer of Russia, as a possible ally and defender for the United States, the republic of the West would have then assumed a responsibility which would have changed the plans of Europe. Vigorous action by the United States in regard to the Bulgaria massacre, accounts of which were brought before Europe by an American Chargê des Affaires

—Eugene Schuyler—would have given a different complexion to the Berlin Congress. Had American capital entered on the task of developing Turkey, successive enterprises would have given the Ottoman Empire the power to stand alone. Had the United States committed itself in 1899 to the freedom of Turkey from foreign concessions certain to interfere with American commerce, it would never have had the complications which followed. Even at the last moment, when Austria was ready to crush Serbia, an emphatic declaration by the United States that it would not pass over the refusal of arbitration to a weak state from a strong state might have halted steps already taken toward war.

Once more the government of Turkey and all its controlling forces desired the United States to assume a responsibility which the history of 100 years shows would have preserved the peace of the world. For all purposes of good, Europe is so divided that the United States is needed in order to let the good prevail, as our entrance upon the war showed!

XVI

WHERE THE TURK WENT WRONG WITH A WORD ON PASHAS

THE "Eastern question" which has been facing Europe over a century and now faces the American people is, bluntly, why the Ottoman Empire is so far behind western Europe. Between Turkey and Russia there is little to choose. Turkey is to-day safer than Russia, more advanced, guilty of no more crimes, and more open to diplomatic and commercial intercourse. Why is it no better? Why are there still massacres? Why will no one trust the present government of Turkey to rule anything or anybody? Three factors have decided the fate of Ottoman rule: the pasha, the sultan, and the faith of Islam.

The Turkish Empire started wrong at the beginning, six hundred years ago—wrong because it selected its government group the wrong way; wrong because it had the wrong religion; wrong because these reacted on each other. The two quantities needed to be known about any land are the general mass of its people and the group that

governs. In some countries a despot has governed alone, as in Turkey; but the most absolute tyrant that ever lived has to have a group that governs, just as much as a democracy needs such a group.

About 15,000 to 20,000 people in politics in the various states run the governments of the United States. The two national conventions bring together some 3,500 people (delegates, alternates, and various party officers of all orders). Trebling that gives approximately the governing group that practically initiates Federal and State government action. This group is changing all the time as the vast mass of voters changes the individuals of this governing group and decides on its proposals.

Germany had "before the war" as a governing class the Junkers and the people of wealth who wanted their grandsons to be Junkers. England has as its governing group a class ruling by birth, the leading members elected to the House of Commons and a very able, permanent, and nearly hereditary civil and military service, including the judiciary and the newspapers—about 10,000 men with a few women.

In Turkey "the pashas" are the governing group. They number nearly 5,000. They come and go from Constantinople, and direct affairs in the vilayets which are modelled on the French Departments. In Constantinople are the cabinet

or the vizierat and the departments—army, navy, and civil administration. Some pashas are known and some unknown. You can no more tell as to many individual pashas how they came to be pashas there, than you can tell the names of many of the 1,600 who will decide in two National Conventions which two men we shall all have to choose between for our next president. Once the boss pasha was such by the Sultan's say. Now, the army, an elected National House, the newspapers, the banks, and in parts of the empire old and powerful families, share with the Sultan in deciding who steers and who strokes.

Othman (1290) stood on the extreme edge of Islam, on the very frontier of Christendom and between Europe and Asia. He began on the "ground floor," the rock bottom. All before Othman who had despoiled the Roman Empire of the East in Asia came from some organized source. The earlier foes of the Byzantine emperors were Persians of a remote antiquity, though the continuity of the dynasty had been broken by the Parthians who were never more than a camp. The Visigoths under Genseric in the African provinces of the empire had come close to Latin civilization in Spain. Mecca was mentally as civilized as Constantinople. Its prose was far better and so was its verse. Mohammed and the first four

caliphs came from a family and a tribe that had borne rule and furnished the foremost priestly line of north Arabia. The Seljuk Turks (1040-1245) had been trained in Persia and knew its letters, its art, and its administration. The sultans of this line, who ruled Asia Minor and Persia, ran back in the organization of their realms to the Satrapies of Darius to the tribute and taxes, the powerful lords of the "Great King's" Court, and the lesser local chieftains of whom we catch glimpses in Esther, Daniel, and the Apocrypha.

But behind Othman were none of these things. Always, when things Turkish are in my mind, I turn back to this man, leathern girded, of the iron sword, with one black tent and two herds of goats, all his wealth. No city was his, no fields, no ceiled house and no thronged streets. A nomad he was; nomads some of his successors have remained. Up to thirty years ago or so the papers of the foreign office in Constantinople were filed in saddle-bags, strapped and ready for the packhorse, because some day the Sultan might take the field and want in camp the despatches from Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay, where the English and the French varieties of the diplomatic spider spin their webs. Sultan Abdul Hamid lived in the European fashion in his palace, chaired, tabled, butlered, and all; but on the days when he received all petitioners, as a

Sultan did by immemorial usage, he was seated on a low leathern cushion. He looked at the petition; if it found favour in his eyes, he handed it to the Grand Vizier, kneeling at his elbow. If the petition met disapproval, the Sultan tucked it behind, under the cushion on which he sat. That was the end. The Sultan had sat on it. So Othman sat in his tent and so thirty-two sultans between him and Abdul Hamid sat for 500 years.

In this simple, direct way the first six sultans chose their officers. So long as a man were a Moslem and had ability, any post was open to him. For 200 years these selections were made with prescient penetration. Race, birth, station, family, were of no avail; merit flavoured by the caprice of personal despotic preference led in their choice of commanders and administrators in the first centuries.

This ready and open path to all posts in the Ottoman Empire for any man who sought service, became a Moslem and had ability, is often praised and approved. But no questions were asked. The way was as open to the man exiled for some noble struggle as to a man who had fled from some crime. Ali Pasha, one of Kossuth's generals, had won a conspicuous victory for the freedom of Hungary. He was overborne later by a Russian army and fled with his staff to Ottoman territory. On the dim edge of my boyish memory, I saw at Aleppo

the sad-faced, self-composed man, with the look I had seen earlier in the eyes of a Greek who had become Moslem in the horror and terror of the massacre of Scio. Not easily or lightly can men bear through life a change of creed or faith for cause other than moral and spiritual conviction. Another case. A physician practised long and well in a city in Turkey. He had been caught in a plot against King Bomba of the two Sicilies, the Bourbon ruler who shelled his own cities, whose son fled before Garibaldi. The physician, a foreworker in his calling, fled from Palermo, became an army surgeon, and comforted his exile by relieving pain and healing the sick, though he operated little. "Was this true," thought a missionary child, whom he attended in a childish ailment, "or, as they said in the bazaars, was this physician, kindly, burly, and radiantly benevolent, really the valet of a physician who after long service fell in love with the young wife of his master, slew him, eloped with the dark-haired, anxious-faced Sicilienne now his wife, and practised medicine with the books, the instruments, and such share of his employer's knowledge as he had absorbed in assiduous years?" These be not wholesome suspicions in old or young of those in government service. More care is taken now. Extradition laws exist. But a bad tradition long does its evil work.

The practical, inevitable result of this freedom for any able man, whatever his character, was that a tradition grew up in Turkey that ability is all and nothing else need to be considered. Carry this on for centuries. Let the service of a great empire admit any that knock on the door, asking only loyalty and capacity to act, but little of character; let descent continue this strain, and you will at length have, among the men in official life, many of long and honourable lineage, faithful, truthful, serious, sincere, and believing alike in their faith and in the empire, a constant share of a different order and origin. Who could be finer than Munir Pasha, for twenty-six years, even under Abdul Hamid, a zealous Minister of Instruction, laboriously and successfully doing a lasting service to education in the East, thwarted, money refused, often defeated, but still persevering, doing what he could, aiding all good efforts where he was able. What could be worse than a system neglecting moral character and a stainless reputation in admitting the stranger to opportunity?

Oriental despots these sultans all were; but despots of the East with Western machinery and institutions. Roman law and army were familiar to them and their subjects. Down to my own early knowledge, the civil staff of a pasha was made of four officials patterned after Constantine's

reorganization of the provincial system of the empire. This simple machinery separated the finance and taxes of the Fisc, their accounting, reports and record of what was done, and general administration. There was a local provincial council whose members were chosen by custom, prescription, and appointment. Even the Christian communities were represented. The pasha system which I have outlined gave administrators irresponsible in their local rule, corrupt and inefficient, but absolutely under control. By no possibility could any pasha become the rival of his master. Exactly as Byzantine emperors conferred on barbarian rulers of city or province in west Europe the title "consularis," so on the hardy Moslam buccaneers and pirates, who came to the top in those pirate-haunts, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Alexandria, sultans conferred the title of pasha. The present Egyptian dynasty began with Mohammed Ali Pasha, whom familiar report and gossip in the Levant sixty years ago alleged had, as a needy subaltern Turkish officer, stolen the spoons of DeLesseps's father before the young Albanian adventurer acquired by massacre the domain of Egypt.

In Othman's day, the whole region in which he fought was full of men without hope. They turned to the new ruler and leader of men. He, his son,

and grandson, and their successors, took the able who came. This was inevitable. The "pashas" came into existence. Like all the administrative side of Turkey, this post was Byzantine in origin. The Roman consul became, after his term expired in the later republic, "consularis." He alone was eligible to many offices in civil administration and military command. For four centuries under the empire or *principate* elections were held. After Constantine (312-337) men were appointed to civil or military posts and raised to consular rank by the direct action of the Emperor. The pasha is on this model. There are four grades, first, second, third, and recently fourth, once designated by one, two, and three horse-tails on their standards on land and one, two, or three lanterns at sea. Pashas are created by imperial rescript. From among them are selected the heads of the military and civil service. The title is not inherited. The Sultan appoints on his own instance, in a rescript modelled on Byzantine practice, as far as known. The viziers and members of the imperial cabinet are usually but not always pashas. The government of vilayets or departments are generally. So are nearly all the generals and men of like rank in the navy. Diplomatists, heads of diplomatic missions receive the title. Hereditary chiefs of Kurdish, Arab, and nomad tribes are made pashas,

so are Europeans brought in to "reform" Turkish administration, particularly when they reform nothing save in rosy reports. If you are a foreign banker or concessionaire and do a good turn in contracts or floating a loan, you will die a pasha as did that ill-fated French spy at daybreak among the bullet-marked trees at Vincennes, Bolo Pasha. Even a great scholar who rewrites history and ethnology to please the head of the empire will be able in time to put pasha on his title pages. These are but frills to which Abdul Hamid was prone. A pasha does not get pay when not in office, and cheap compliments and decorations are the small change with which a sultan pays for personal favours. But the real pashas fill the chief military and administrative posts of the empire.

The title of pasha itself is early and primitive. The three horse-tails by which the (3) grades are indicated were an early symbol of chieftain and leader on the Turkish steppes. This rank and order does not affect the precedence and is not held by the religious hierarchy. The Arab genius which formed Islam does not run to titles and ranks, official terms and precedence. Official affiliations among Arabs do not deal with degree, priority, and place but with functions and offices. The instant we turn in the Sublime Porte from civil and

military administration to ecclesiastical order, pashas disappear. The Sheikh-ul-Islam ranks with the Grand Vizier, but he is not made pasha. The weight, origin, and precedent of his office comes from the Arab world. There are in the Ottoman Empire (forty) Ulema, "Learned," Prudentes their nearest equivalent in the Roman system of law. Three of these are appointed Kazi-Asker, the chief justice of Rumelia, Rumeli-Kaziasker of Anatolia, Ananadoll-Kaziasker, and of Constantinople, Stambul-Effendi. When the Sultan's life was of camps and war, those who as judges expounded the law were part of the army establishment. The judicial establishment, on the French model, set in operation some 60 years ago, carries on the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the empire; but the more ancient system set in motion by the sacred Mohammedan law holds its place in public life and Moslem opinion, even when its jurisdiction is narrowed to the lands held in Wakf (trusts) for sacred foundations and such religious rights, relations, and causes as survive. The weight of this ancient judicial power is not unlike the fashion in European countries, where though the law prescribes a civil marriage as the one necessary in contract wedlock, the real wedding for the majority of the population is the sacrament of the Church.

As a system suited to rapid conquest, the

"pasha" group in the past was effective; but it created oppression and corruption in all quarters. As a system for civil administration it had and has every possible fault. The Turk who succeeds in official life cannot, to use the English phrase, "found a family." He cannot even, as is true of a successful American in our political life, make his son talked of at his death as a possible political power in the future. The whole tenure of a pasha is like a theatre ticket, "good for this performance only." His son does not even carry his name. Down to recent years, the Ottomans have had no family names. The son's name does not tell his father's. There is in his attitude toward all the affairs of life something histrionic. In the early period of the Ottoman Empire, operating in a region without national barriers, an official force gathered on the principles which I have just outlined was certain to go far and win much in the Byzantine Empire weakened by the Crusader in its resistance to the Moslem. Every past but recent Crusade, when this system began, had made the Christian population of every region through which the march of Turkish conquest led less numerous, less able to govern itself, less equal to the task of self-defense and certain to fall a prey to the vengeance of the nearest Mohammedan dynasty and its subjects.

The goatherd, whose sword and bow were his only weapons, had conquered west Asia Minor and the name of Othman had displaced that of the Seljuk sultan in the daily prayers of the mosques about him within a decade (1299). Before his death in 1326 he held eastern Asia Minor; his two sons conquered Greece and half the Balkan peninsula; his grandson reached the Danube.

The staggering blow dealt by Tamerlane in 1402 brought a pause to extension in the east, but the great-grandson of the goatherd had carried Turkish rule across most of Hungary.

Changes from Christianity to Moslem faith have often been due, as in these current years, to massacre and impending death, sometimes to the enslavement of captured Christians; but conversions also have a number of those who are men of ability, of adventure, attracted by a service in which no privileged class favoured the way, no principle was required, and personal opportunity was practically unlimited whether for ambition, for aggrandizement, or for corruption.

All who go to Constantinople are impressed by the personal keenness of the "pashas" as a group and as a class, and by the moral opacity of their vision. They are singularly like the group of ministers in the old Austrian service at Vienna, of whom M. Take Jonescu, the foremost Roumanian

of the day, says in his book "Some Personal Impressions":

> . . . Their essential characteristic is the absence of real intelligence, yet they are not quite as innocent as they look, for they have bureaucratic traditions and a guile that stands them in lieu of intelligence. When one first sees them one is charmed by their beautiful manners and what I can only describe as their encyclopædic polish. This prevents one realizing their hopeless nonentity. Then one is liable to err in the other direction. From astonishment at their ignorance and want of brain one comes to believe them harmless. It is only after a time that one learns the real truth. Then one perceives that at bottom these people are possible rogues, and that one should not reckon too much on their intellectual nonentity.

The Turkish pashas, in spite of all that exists of corruption and lives both base and noble, and careers both selfish and patriotic, constitute a group, adroit, unscrupulous, in war and in peace alike, efficient so far as immediate results are concerned. The practical result of the system by which the Ottoman Empire has been officered in peace and in war by recruits from without the empire and from those who rise within it, is that "the pashas" are rootless, as the French say, "deraciné." An imperial khatt or rescript made them and as easily unmakes.

Austrian ministers and Turkish pashas are alike

because both serve a dynasty and not a nation; a sovereign and not a government. As long as the Hapsburgs and the Othmans were conquering and adding new realms, this kind of diplomat and administrator worked successfully. They were brutal, cruel, and ruthless, but they were on the job to please no one but their master. Marshall Haynau, the representative of Francis Joseph, had women of all stations flogged naked in public in Buda Pesth, in 1849-50. Nobody else in Europe, outside of Germany, Austria, and Russia (which was then, as now, the home of tyranny and personal rule) would have done this. So it is, only three Turkish pashas, among all the officialdom of Europe, out of Germany, who would have carried out the Armenian and Greek massacres and deportations, aided by the sympathy and plans of the bureaucracy of Berlin.

These pashas at Constantinople are spoken of as "Turks"; but like the same class in Vienna, called "Austrians," they come from all parts of the empire. The group that overthrew the Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1908 was headed by Shefket Pasha, an Arab. He came of an old family in Bagdad, I have been told. He was at all events of a good family. These Arab families in the Mesopotamian cities usually keep up their relations with their own ancient tribe. They marry from them

as Abraham sent to Padan-Aram for Isaac's wife. Their sons are sent to live in the tribe, from eight or nine years of age to twelve or fifteen. They learn there the desert life, to ride, to hunt, to speak good Arabic, tradition, family lore, genealogy, so near are ancient Arab families in the cities to the desert life. My one playmate for a very brief period came of this class. When he was sent to the desert for this kind of education and I slaved at geography, partial payments, and spelling, I confess to an inner admiration for his happy desert schooling. In Shefket's staff were various races. What we should call his judge advocate general was an Albanian. High in his staff, said to be its head, was a Croat. Kurds of the chieftain families make excellent regimental commanders. One, by his drastic suppression of rebellious Kurd villages, lost his real name and came to be known as "Kurt" "Wolf" Pasha. Once by the roadside I saw the spoils of a village pass, women and cows tied together, common booty. He rode last, impassive, with the Kurd's short-stirrupped, easy sway in the saddle such as has a man of many mountain climbs on horseback. Those who planned and led the Committee of Union in the successful revolution of twelve years ago were Moslems of Jewish origin, frequent among pashas to-day and known in the past. For them Turkish Moslems have a most dis-

agreeable term, but they, too, are part of the perpetual entrance of all races and classes into the pasha group. This secret committee has for a decade ruled the pashas themselves.

As with the Austrian ministers, these pashas have no real constituency; no group political or national, local or racial, looks to them and supports them individually. It is true of these men, as with the cabinet officials in the past at Vienna, that they can offer no real opposition to any change. The head of the army is their master. Enver when he was "seraskier," as his post was called in the old days, secretary of war now; Mustapha Kemal Pasha, in command of the nationalist army now; with these is power. Mustapha Kemal Pasha was not widely known when in 1919 he took command of the Turkish army in Asia Minor and broke with the pashas at Constantinople, hemmed in by the English and French fleet. Following a fiction familiar in all history, he claimed to represent a sovereign imprisoned by his enemies. A good soldier, simple, direct, a man of decision, he was beaten at first, lost Smyrna, and his cause seemed hopeless; but he has gained ground by sheer dogged fighting. On our officers, who met him, he made a most favourable impression. He, too, welcomed American direction. Whatever his final fate, this Turk is the one man among the

central European monarchies who faced defeat with a stout fighting heart.

The unity of the empire is preserved by an army which was the first in modern history to rest on a powerful infantry. The Janissaries succeeded, at a long remove, to the drill of the Roman legion. The advance in the art of war by the Byzantine Empire was adopted by the Turkish military authorities and for 300 years (1300-1600) it was the only force which practised the art of war, aware of its principles. The Turkish feudal fiefs gave a light cavalry so powerful that the Turkish "Oglou," "son" "or boy," used as we call soldiers "boys," is the origin of "Uhlan" the light cavalry in the German and Austrian army. The Council of Toledo prohibited powder in Christian wars, and this was another advantage possessed for centuries by the Turkish army, and shared by its navy. Ancient weapons remained in strange juxtaposition. The sling used by the Turkish Capidan Pasha or Admiral at Lepanto (October 7, 1571) is in the Royal Spanish Museum of Arms, at Madrid. This is probably the last sling carried in modern warfare.

The early Ottoman sultans had a regular army on modern lines while Europe had only feudal levies. There was added to it the use of light cavalry on a scale never seen in European warfare,

a system of intelligence far superior to that of mediæval armies, freedom of promotion unknown in the privilege-ridden forces of Europe. This army used gunpowder two full centuries before it had come into use in the West, a siege train and, most important of all, an effective commissary. It was no mere accident that the soup-kettles of the Janissaries were the centre of the organization of each oda or brigade. This force of 70,000 men recruited in its earlier years wholly, and in later years in part, from Christian families, was the core of the Turkish army and maintained its efficiency for nearly four centuries. In cruelty, in slaughter, and in merciless disregard of what in the past have been regarded as the rules of civilized warfare (gas bombs for instance) the Turkish forces did not, however, greatly exceed what was practised in the war just over.

The Turkish army now, even after defeat, remains the strongest part of the system. If the empire is divided, the Turkish end of Asia Minor set apart, the army and the administration at Constantinople will begin a new state.

In spite of the evil deeds during the war of three pashas now fugitives, whose cruelty has never been surpassed and not often equalled in thirty blood-stained centuries in southwestern Asia, the Revolution in Turkey raised to the rank of

pasha men of high character, scholars of eminence, patriotic and able administrators. These are the hope of the empire and of all its races. They once constituted a party in favour of accepting and loyally supporting the supervision of the United States under a mandatory. If this were undertaken, the new administration could come in without shock. This is the specific administrative reason why, if America assumed control, there would be no such resistance as a ruling class, a trained bureaucracy, factions, or fanatical elements can give. Nor has any sultan had any of these either for the support of reforms or as a limit to his powers. The pitiless cruelties of the war alike in Armenia and in Belgium call aloud for punishment and public penalties on rulers and people. The rulers have fallen. The people suffer. Wrong brings suffering. But justice also demands memory of the fashion in which war silences opposition. Nothing is to-day more necessary for Turkey than a recognition of those of all ranks, some conspicuous, even among "the pashas" who are striving to preserve future self-government and to prevent a recurrence of past crimes. Hate never redeems wrongs.

In every Oriental country, in close contact with Europe, there is always a group Europeanized. Besides the great mass of Turkey, which I have

described, there has come into being a group not large but powerful and very visible who have had a European education. To the training and literature of the East they add the scientific, military, diplomatic, or general education of the West. I have sometimes felt that these were the best educated men I have ever met. They were not only bi-lingual and tri-lingual, as much at home in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish letters as in European literatures, but they were bi-cosmic. They habitually lived in two worlds, the East and the West. It is often said of them that they have lost the morals of the one and have not gained the morals of the other. This is not always true. Some such are as good as any I have known, men to be trusted in all the relations of life.

This class as a whole is very conspicuous. Its members hold high posts. They are often good administrators or diplomatists, sometimes military commanders of merit. They have never gained the confidence of the great Moslem mass, Turkish, or of other races. They have drawn codes, created universities and professional schools, given the army highly trained officers; but they nearly always lack character. In their acute intellects they remind one of the men of the Italian renaissance as well as in the morals of most of them. Like Italians of the fifteenth and sixteenth cen-

turies they can do everything in statecraft but lay the foundations of a secure state.

In modern days much else of change has appeared. The public debt has certain revenues allocated to it. These are collected and payments made by the debt service which is responsible to the bondholders committee. The debt in 1913 was $644,000,000; now no one knows its size. Many utilities, railroads, trolleys, telephones, port facilities in wharves and lighterage are under the control of foreign concessionaries. These raise many difficult problems and lead to officious, disturbing, and, in some cases, corrupt, foreign interference. The necessity of disposing of these is taken up by General Harbord in his report on a mandate; but as these would all profit by stability and order, they would offer few difficulties in adjustment.

The past two years have consolidated the Ottomans. The fight they have made has given new confidence. Differences have gone. All Moslems look to them. Delay in Europe, refusal in the United States, have encouraged a belief in an Ottoman destiny, alone and unaided.

XVII

HOW THE OTTOMAN TURK DEVELOPED

THUS far I have dealt with the Ottoman Government, its sultans as rulers and caliphs, its pashas, with the selection of its administrators and the part which the choice of Islam rather than Christianity had on its policy, practice, and rule. The Ottoman people was gathered by the Ottoman sultans. Under their policy the small Turkish tribe which Othman led played no such part as the Koreish tribe of Mecca from which Mohammed sprang. For three centuries his tribal kinsmen furnished the rulers and counsellors, the commanders and the provincial governors of the vast empire of the caliphate from the Indus flowing into the India Ocean to the Douro, whose narrow stream finds its way to the Atlantic at Oporto. In the flood of personal wealth which poured into the tribe of the founder of Islam, houses in Mecca rose a thousandfold in value and men who went forth to the conquest of the world with naught but sword and camel returned with the revenue of a kingdom.

No such record attended the early annals of Othman and his tribe. Meagre as his biography is, it records that he ended thirty-six years of conquest with no personal property but the tents and the herd of goats with which he began. His people founded no ruling class. Instead, the new Turkish realm absorbed the congeries of races which it found about it. The coast of Asia Minor was Greek, the interior given to the various peoples, some nomad, who filled the elevated plateau within the rimming mountains in which there start the streams which flow into the Ægean and Black Sea. In 700 years of Byzantine rule, before the battle of Mezikert (107) brought the first Turkish invasion, Greek became the language of communication for all the region and the familiar tongue of most of the cities and much of the countryside. Greek, Carian, Mysian, Lycian, Cappadocian, and Cilician were all absorbed in the new Turkish stock. How and by what means this change came we know not. As I have already pointed out, this entire region preserved almost unchanged the civilization of Rome, modified by Hellenistic culture, the later civilization of Greece. Anthropological investigations into the races of European Turkey show that what we call the Turks of European and Asiatic Turkey are closer in physical measurements to Greeks than any other people

about them and show no apparent resemblance to the Turks of central Asia. The view that a horde of Turks poured into Asia Minor, slew the original inhabitants, and keep to-day the characteristics of the region from which they came has no more basis than the assertion would have that the English to-day resemble the Angles, the Saxons, the Danes, or the Normans who invaded England for 600 years. These are gone. There remain a new race and tongue whose foundation comes from the conquering Angles and Saxons; the language has few British words but has absorbed from the vocabulary of the other conquering nations that follow.

What share each has played there is not recorded any more than in the case of the Turks of Constantinople, of Thrace, and Asia Minor. These are the core of the Turkish Empire. They organized it because they brought conquest, security, and victory. Othman's progeny gave the world the mighty sultans whose triumphs are so great and whose transgressions are so grievous. The people they welded together and to whom they gave their tongue was as much of a composite of many races as the English, "Saxon and Dane and Norman are we," as Tennyson says of the British people. A great empire, as mingled as the British, the Turk and his rulers have founded. They created their verse, their architecture, their army, and their

law as England did on the past of Europe. Their faith they drew from the Semite Arab. The myth that a barbarian tribe came from central Asia, slaughtered all it found, and furnished the 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 inhabitants of Macedonia, Thrace, Constantinople, and Asia Minor, has no more basis than would the assertion have that all Frenchmen are descendants of the Franken who from the third to the fifth centuries (256-418) extended from the basins of the Rhine or the Marne to the Loire, or that the Visigoths are the ancestors of the Spaniards, or the Lombards the progenitors of the inhabitants of Lombardy. In all these instances there happened what took place with the Turks, a conquering and savage tribe swept in. It seized land and rule. Many it slew. Many it incorporated into its own structure. It left ineffaceable traces. The Franks divided into two realms, one of German and the other of Latin tendencies. The Lombards were absorbed. The Visigoths melted into the north Iberian mass and lost their rule. The Turks absorbed the races about them, opened, as I have already pointed out, a door of opportunity but barred it with a change of faith to Islam whose results have been at most points lamentable and obstructive to future development. No one can accurately say that they have "produced nothing," any more than the Franks, the Lombards, or the

Visigoths "produced nothing." Each used the arts of more civilized races, each absorbed and was absorbed, each left a name, which like the planes of a pseudomorphic crystal held new material under a more early name and structure. The one crucial difference is that all that Frank, Visigoth, and Lombard left in their respective territory has had 1,500 years of development, and the Turk only from 600 to 800.

Divisions like those in Turkey resting on this fourfold category, faith, language, law, social life, existed in Europe down to the Reformation; but Europe early rid itself of dissidence. The large Arab and Berber population of Sicily which flowed in during a Moslem occupation of 200 years (827-1061) and under the liberal rule of the Normans and their predecessors, was either killed or converted. Spain did the same. England reduced its Catholic population to a small number by legislation and persecution. Under the convenient phrase, *cujus regio ejus religio*, by which the religion of the sovereign was held to decide the religion of the region, Germany made the northern states more Protestant and the southern states more Catholic. If there had not grown under Moslem rule a contemptuous sufferance for three kinds of Christian religions and races, Hungary, Roumania, and Jugo-Slavia would not to-day be ready to fly at each other's throats over

Transylvania and the Banat. The persecution of differences in one century breeds peace and unity in another. Partly from clemency and partly from contempt, Turkey preserved Christian communities which could have been eradicated when it was the custom of Europe to require uniformity in religion. On massacre the civilized world has passed its final judgment. It is still in progress on a scale the world has not known in centuries, but these are the going out of the demon, tearing its victim as it leaves.

In addition, Turkey espoused the wrong, losing side in a great war and the massacres by its rulers of helpless Armenians and Greeks—a crime shared in many regions by its people—has deprived it of the sympathy of the world in its defeat and brought on all concerned the just condemnation of humanity. Yet those who speak Turkish in Asia Minor, the few who are advantaged, and the many who are illiterate remain bound together and in touch and sympathy with the Turkish millions in central Asia because of the ties of a common folk-lore and their share of the world's greater letters, little known or recognized in the west.

XVIII

LITERATURE AND JOURNALISM

GREAT empires can only be founded, if there comes for their inspiration, their order, their welfare, and their spiritual sanction, verse which expresses the national attitude to the current day, an army equal to conquest, a system of law equal to order, and a faith which, be it false or true, gives men confidence in the hour of death in the dark beyond death. This all great empires have had and this all great empires need. You cannot round a dome on less than four great piers. More will tax the builder's skill; less will sap the strength and support of the arching round beneath which men meet in their thousands.

Unless the proud full sail of verse and letters moves over the trackless waters of a voyage of empire, just beginning, the few who rule and the many who follow will not have a common medium for the consciousness of a common task, a common purpose, and a common conviction as to the task and toil of conquests won and to come. So Homer gave the Hellenic sense of the mutual strife of cen-

turies with Asia which culminated in Alexander. So Virgil and those about him sounded the music of the great march forward of conquered and conqueror alike, through the centuries in which Rome was both great and secure. So the spirit of Chaucer, of Arthur in Malory, and of our great dramatist sounded the higher note to which the drumbeat of the English-speaking folk steps to victory in all its homes. As the various verse of the tongues of western and central Europe took their verse from Rome, which had learned of Greece, so the Turk from the days of Alp Arslan (1068) and the Seljuk sultans in Asia Minor (1040-1298) took like echoes of far-off centuries from the Persian and the Persian took from the Arab.

The amazing and intricate structure of verse begun by the Arab, in the unwritten centuries before Mohammed, was destined to give measure, form, rhythm, manifold rhyme, alliteration, quantity and accent, all united, to the verse of Arab, Persian, and Turk, through 1,300 continuous years for the Arab, a thousand years for the Persian, and six full centuries for the Turk. Arab verse shares with Greek the genesis and origin of a world of verse in many tongues. In no field are English, French, Italian, or Teuton verse without some Greek prototype whose muse sowed with lavish hand the seeds of verse for the fertile soil of tongues

yet unborn and lands yet unknown. This seminal function Arab verse has accomplished in succession for Persian and Turk, each finding new forms and each enriching its vocabularies with words drawn from founts of inspiration long since sealed by time and silent through centuries. Drawing as the Turkish did from Persian verse, from Roman law changed and digested for new issues by Arab commentators, and from the Koran the Moslem scriptures of its faith, it came about that Turkish as a language is as composite as English which at certain points it resembles in its simple inflections and direct syntax. It has no irregular verbs, it has but one conjugation for all its verbs, even the verb to be, and no genders save in its pronouns.

The Turkish words used in the simple life of nomads are almost all of the original Turkish vocabulary still left in the tongue after the change of the last six centuries. When the Turk speaks of wolf, of dog, and of ass, animals familiar to the plains, he uses Turkish. For cat he employs the same term which has spread in two forms under pshut and kot, the names of Egypt. The jackal was new to him, and he applied there a Persian word which has passed into all European languages. His shirt and drawers are Turkish, but his names of apparel are drawn either from Persian or Arabic just as the outer garb of women comes to us,

so often, from France or from Spain. He had words for all the furniture of the tent, but when he comes to deal with the parts of a house the words are Persian. Halter and pad for a horse are Turkish, but saddle, bridle and its parts are Persian. He has his own name for the sour milk which the Asian races use from Manchuria to Morocco, but when he came to deal with a more civilized cuisine, with fruits, with sweetmeats, with the luxuries of life, he turns to Persian and Arabic from which he learns the various arts of satisfying the desires of his body not always to his moral benefit. Something akin to this, as every reader will remember, Scott marshals in Ivanhoe of English and of Norman. As in the examples cited by Scott, this by no means shows that Saxon was without words for the objects whose names have a French origin. Neither is Turkish without like words in all cases, though in Turkey a larger proportion have no analogue in the original tongue, and are drawn outright from the civilization with which the tribes that spread from central Asia came into contact in the tableland of Persia, in the plains of Mesopotamia. From Greek and Rome the loan words are few, these being often taken through Arabic and Persian, exactly as many Greek and Latin terms for us reach our vocabulary through the Romance tongues. In the art of war,

the proportion of Greek and Roman terms is larger because here the Turk added to his own a large Greek population which carried the arms and kept the name of Rome. Its use of military technology was more frequent than with the Arab and Persian who never learned from defeat to imitate the skill in the art of war which began on the Tiber and ended on the Golden Horn. The Byzantine Empire has failed in war in the popular opinion, created by Gibbon on this point, but the only field in which the Eastern Empire improved on Rome and Greece was in its arms, its tactics, and its strategy. It added to the mobility of the legion the shock tactics of heavy-armoured horse and man. It secured larger units than those of the legion. It met the great increase of numbers on the fighting line by developing the organization of an army, as we understand it, while Rome to the end handled groups of legions instead of welding them into a common army. Alp Arslan, in his epochal defeat inflicted on the Byzantine Emperor, Romanus IV, at Alashgerd, treated commanders and rank and file with great clemency. This appears to have been early the general policy toward the conquered by the conquering Turks.

Turkish sovereigns, as we know from the ancient inscriptions of the eighth century north of the Thian Shah Mountain, had organized rule before

their envoys came in contact with Justinian in the sixth century, four hundred years before they appeared on the borders of the Byzantian realm. This government was probably influenced by China, but it disappeared in the trek across Asia, and the Turk learned from Persian and Arabic, from Rome and Byzantine, the art of rule, of administration, of taxation, and of law. In Turkish, legal terms and the words of faith and rule are from Arabic; its verse thrills to Persian.

Verse is the world over the passion of the nomad. It is easily remembered. His early annals, his genealogies, his lists of ships and of tribes, fall into verse and in Persia, in the steppes of Turkestan, in Asia Minor, and in Arabia, the nomad life is always near. Wandering tribes are close to all their cities. Where life is hard, mysticism is easy. Whoever knew of a mystic in fertile alluvial tracts? The south deserts of Judea, the tracts between the arid and the irrigated of south Persia, the arid and rock-strewn hills of Arabia and of the Nomad Turk have given us the mystic of the East. In the Near East, also, verse is a matter of daily life and daily use; princes and sages write verses. The founders of the great Dervish orders all left verse behind. It was a line from Sadi which came to the lips of Mohammed the conqueror as he entered Constantinople and remembered the palaces of Roman

empire swept with ruin. Love, mysticism, war, and rule—these are the recurrent themes of Turkish verse. The European critic has for it little praise, but verse, or great or small, is known fully only in the original and only birth in a tongue unlocks all its treasures. From Arab verse I can only say for myself that its splendid beginning in the pre-Mohammedan poem of the Moallakat, hung in the shrine at Mecca as supreme, calls for all the toil and gives the rewarding joys of the greater Greek chorus. Persian and Turkish verse both have their high place and whatever literary criticism in alien lands may assume, the historian must record the fact that the Near East gained a common inspiration for faith, love, and life from poems in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, the common heritage of these lands.

The passion for mysticism in Persian and Turk, which gave Arabic verse its mystics, few of whom were Arab and most of whom were Persian, gave the faith of Islam in the hands of the Turk a channel in which the stream of faith no longer followed the chief current marked by Mohammed, its founder, toward ethic, alms, and direct personal prayer and devotion to the one God. Turkish and Persian mysticism substituted a passionate desire for communion with the divine. Exactly as the Moslem in general made the discovery that

it is easier to say your prayers five times a day than to be good, so the mystic, in all faiths and lands, however pure his life may be, does not emphasize ethic. It is not to John the Mystic to whom we turn for the ethical teaching of the great master of both ethics and divine communion but to the plain, straightforward Semitic gospel of Matthew. Mysticism did not prevent Loyala and Saint Therese, born in the arid hills of north Spain, from believing in persecution and inquisition. A mystic may even cease from ethical troubles which perplex us all, to find rest for his soul in communion with the divine, so vague, so impassioned, that the mystic comes to a perfectionism open to all manner of unhallowed desire. The Persian mystic early came to believe, to use the words of a song by one of the Vokes familiar to those of my age with memories of the early nineties which runs: "It makes no difference what you do. So your heart is only *true* TO Poll" or Allah. The Turk followed this example. He, too, so he had the rapt adoration and communion of the mystic vision, left the lusts of the flesh to run riot. This sapped the ethical basis of Islam for the Turk and it quickened persecution. From the start, this blend of the lust of slaughter in war and the mystic's capacity for confusing himself and the universe, this pantheistic union between individual desire and the divine

creation, symbolized after a fashion which weakens the curb on human nature's greatest failing, is familiar in the mysteries and mysticism of many faiths. It led straight, as it has in many persecutors, to a passion for human torture on the pyre, perilously near the perverted.

The national and modern mind almost invariably assumes that the individuals of each particular country or of each particular race have some special moral obliquity which leads them to whatever moral lack or immoral obliquity of which the nation, the mob, the crowd, the gang, is guilty, not only as a whole, but in its individuals. Nations differ; individuals are alike. The world of men is much the same under all skies, in all races, all tongues, and all nations. If you have had much experience of the youth of religions, colours, or races, taken and submitted to high education, you instantly find that the descendant of one thousand years of ignorance in a single childhood seems to pass over separating centuries. If you know personally and closely the individuals of various nations and races who are charged with various "crimes" in the mass, you learn that the individual is much like yourself—kindly to the kind; loving to the well-affectioned—desiring, so far as our human nature is concerned, at heart to keep the common ethical precepts, principles, and practice

of most human beings. It is when the individual is molten into a single mass under the influence of race, local or national, conditions, traditions, habits, and impulses that national "crimes" come to the surface. As an American consular officer on an unfrequented coast said to me of a perilous trip which I proposed: "After all, you will find when you get into their houses that they are just folks."

Turkish massacres, like German outrages in Belgium, or the high murder rate of Sicily and Calabria, which fill police court records in an Italian quarter with knife wounds and homicide, the autos-da-fe of Spain in one century and Jew pogroms in Russia and American negro lynchings in another period, can all be disentangled and analyzed into causes which have affected the mass rather than to causes due to the specific dereliction of the individual.

The Turk began as a mystic of the plains. "Shamanism" is the savage religion of the Yakuts, Turks who live on the Arctic Ocean and still have this faith. In it there abides much savage mysticism. The Turk of the plains had the cruelty of the Sioux of our plains, a cruelty far worse than that of the Indians of the fertile and well-forested Atlantic coast. He adopted a religion which sanctifies murder in the name of religion exactly

as the Iberian form of Christianity sanctified burning alive in the name of religion. He had the prejudice which came from his belief, both in the superiority of his race and of his creed. This pride of race is far more apparent in the early literature of the race than it is in the later. Islam rid him of the prejudice of race, but deepened the prejudice of faith. His whole civil policy was based on a policy of incessant conquest which ran triumphant for just short of four hundred years (1290-1683), when his first fatal check came. At the end of that time, the Ottoman Empire was holding a territory of two million square miles in full control of the Mediterranean, occupying three quarters of its coastline. This empire ebbed. Successive defeat and impending doom brought increasing bitterness. As the lynching of negroes, while it diminishes, does not disappear, and is sometimes quickened by the prosperity of the coloured man, and in particular by any signs in the coloured man of the virtues of independence and self-respect, so the conspicuous massacres in peace of Christians under Turkish rule began just one hundred years ago after dire defeat. They have closed in the past five years with the basest and most criminal tragedies of Turkish history, though there is enough of reference to past massacres and implied proof in the gradual disappearance of the Christian popula-

tion to suggest that throughout all the periods of the Turkish Empire there have been periodical slaughters. A mysticism which weakens moral restraints, a prejudice which points out victims separated by race or by faith, as the case might be, and the great facts that the hated subject race was steadily improving—these causes have lit the fires of persecution in every century and still give us the tragedies of current years.

In the perpetual tending toward this aspect of mysticism, the "Comment" or "Tefseer" of the Koran, both for Turk and Persian, led straight to that extinction of Christianity in the Near East which the Arab caliphate never sought until the fatal influence of Iran changed the power of Abasside caliphate to Turkish sultan. Men were dyed with Persian desire rather than Arab austerity, the latter being in particular the mark of the earlier caliphs. Add this touch to a conquering race like the Turk, join with it contempt for Christians, precisely similar to the racial contempt for the negro in some of our states and let a dynasty be founded on the united claims of the exclusive authority of Islam, the military despotism of the Sultan, the pride of a conquering race and faith, with mysticism sapping the foundation of ethics and substituting the vision and catalepsy for the plain job of being good, and massacre will come

when victories fall away and prosperity disappears.

The printing press in the Ottoman Empire is barely two centuries old. It is only in the past fifty or sixty years that the current literature of those who speak and write colloquial Turkish has developed. In fiction, it has followed the French standards. In its history, it is for the most part, not wholly, after a mediæval pattern, and in verse, it has been somewhat affected by the recent developments in French measures, but remains more under the influence of past models whose history is longer than that of the Turks of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish verse began before Chaucer and is still moving men. In this century an extraordinary activity has appeared. The poets who have published at Constantinople have had an influence on current opinion and current affairs far greater than the verse which has appeared in English, either in England or this country. A woman, Halideh Hanum, a graduate of the American College for Women, in Constantinople, inspired the new movement in affairs and national life as much, if not more than, any one person. I doubt if there is any poet either in England or the United States whom either government would think of deporting, but the English Government, on occupying Constantinople, paid

Halideh Hanum this compliment, and she narrowly escaped to Angora where she strongly opposed Bolshevism in the government of Mustapha Kemal Pasha. A kinsman of hers has made himself conspicuous by his verse. But this literature and the fiction which has been published affects only a small part of the Turkish people, numbering from 6,000,000 to 8,000,000. Not over 10 per cent. have learned to read, though the number may in recent years have risen to twice this percentage. At this point, as in all others in the Ottoman Empire, the literary class and its readers is small in number but powerful in influence as men of letters were when European states had no popular education and only one tenth or one fifth of the population could read because as in the eighteenth century current literature reached the governing few. The vast, inert, inarticulate bulk of the population at large is still leading a mediæval life. Its literature is still uttered and not written. The story-teller appears in coffee-house and market-place. The ballad singer is heard in all moments of excitement. Every city has its poets who recite what they have written. The entire field of letters is in a condition not unlike that of England during the reign of Henry VIII, when a small group produced the literature by which men were deeply influenced, because it expressed their own individual interests,

while the mass about them, which they directed, sometimes read their inspired words, but really depending upon what they heard not upon what they read.

The newspaper press has developed in the same swift fashion, with circulation small from the western standpoint, but like the *Spectator* in the days of Queen Anne, reaching all who have influence or take part in affairs. It is in this last field that the final defence of the Turkish Empire has been waged. Journalism is to-day the one international universal profession. Ahmed Emin Bay was one of the early students of the "School of Journalism," in Columbia University, taking some of its professional courses while he was studying for his degree of Ph. D. in Columbia University. He returned to Turkey. He has established his own newspaper, *Wakit*. Even in the stress of war, he succeeded in paying for its plant and equipment, advancing its circulation to the high-water mark of the Ottoman capital, and now enjoys the honour of adding his name to the rôle of journalists who have fearlessly defended the cause of the nation to which they belong. Ships, the British Government could silence, and armies, it could force to surrender; on sultan, vizier, and officeholders, it could bring "pressure," but the only way it could deal with a trained and intrepid journalist

and deprive him of influence was to deport him to Malta and make him a prisoner of state. He is the first of those who have studied at the Pulitzer School of Journalism who has had the privilege to share in this fashion in the annals of a calling which in every generation has had its martyrs.

XIX

THE CHRISTIAN MASSACRES

ON THIS day, as we turn again to the long line of Turkish sultans, it is well that we should remember that perhaps nowhere is the evolution of man and the rise of Humanity more apparent than in the difference between the sultans, each to the very last who had real power, stained with the blood of the innocent, and Abraham Lincoln who stayed his hand from taking human life even when it was forfeited by the immemorial laws of war and the pressing needs of a cause just and great. The future is with Lincoln. The past alone is left to the Turkish sultan and all for which he stands. His like shall not come again, but in the womb of the future, America, great mother of the greater advance, there are others yet to be for the appointed hour if we but live the American life as new issues arise and a wider horizon flames in the East with the call of new national duty.*

* This was the opening passage of the lecture on this subject delivered on February 12, 1920, in the Lowell Institute course on Turkey, from which this book grew.

The Christian races of Asiatic Turkey are the condemning indictment of Ottoman rule, both past and present. Their presence is a proof that the sultans of Turkey and the Moslems they ruled were not wise enough to see that, in the early stages of the development of a people, unity of faith must be secured or all union will be lost. The European races have understood this perfectly and acted upon it. Down to a time within the memory of men now living, nearly all European lands still placed heavy disabilities on any departure from the established religion. No one can look upon the legislation of the Republic of France on religious associations and education as true to tolerance in matters of faith as the American Republic understands tolerance. Ottoman legislation and administration is legally more tolerant of the education and the religious association of alien creeds and hostile faiths than is Gallic liberty today in dealing with a creed and faith dominant in France for a thousand years.

But this does not weigh and should not weigh in the world's verdict on Ottoman rule against the hideous massacres which have stained the easy-going and rather inefficient tolerance of the Turk which in the past lost the empire all its unity and in the present has justly brought the Moslem races of Turkey before the bar of the civilized

world. All the Moslem races in Turkey, each in its measure, but the Arab in our day least of all, are responsible for the long-continued slaughter of the Christian races in Turkey. Each yielded the easier to the temptation to carnage because, as only students and observers of the Asiatic people fully know, massacre in the past—and still to-day in Russia and in greater Asia—is and has been the normal instrument of rule. It has been from the beginning the habit of the great monarchies of the Near East. These all added to massacre, deportation, or "captivity" as King James's version translates the Hebrew word for the enforced removal of entire populations. The Egyptian, the Hittite, the Roman in the west, rarely practised deportation. In farther Asia and India it was little used. Alexander and his successors the Selencidae followed the example of the empires they supplanted. The early Babylonian, the Assyrian at both periods, the Persian, Parthian, and Sassanian all led millions into captivity. Massacre has its greater horror; deportation its larger loss of life. Never has it been practised with such ruthless efficiency as in the alliance between the Turkish secret Committee of Union and Progress and the Berlin General Staff. Of the schedule of instructions for massacre issued to the military authorities at Kharput I have had a description from the notes of one who

read it. At every point it bears the marks of the methodical labours of the Berlin General Staff. Twenty years ago, when the Constantinople and Bagdad Railroad was but just planned, the ex-Kaiser told an American university president that some Armenians taught in American colleges would have to be eliminated as unruly. It is in the light of massacre, deportation, and the avowed policy of removing natural leaders that we have to consider the past, the fate, and the future of the Christian races of Asian Turkey.

Historical perspective is indispensable, if we are to judge aright on these issues. Nowhere on earth has there been more ruthless use of these instruments of rule than in the east Mediterranean and the lands adjoining its coasts. Torture has often been added to massacre and deportation.

As we read the contemporary official record of Assur-nasir-pal of Assyria (883 B.C.) it is apparent that we are dealing with a criminal perverted neural psychosis familiar in medical jurisprudence. Of course, as long as the king business is carried on along hereditary lines, we are always liable to have a Jesse Pomeroy in a palace with despotic power, instead of in state prison mercifully cut off from indulging criminal homicidal tendencies. Tamerlane is another such instance of imperial megalomania become a morbid homicidal passion, with

illimitable opportunities for dealing out death, torture, and shame from ruler and queen to peasant. No race is wholly free from massacre. This has come in our Indian warfare and the spirit of lynch-law and of mobs fired with race hatred are psychologically the parallels of massacre in the Near East where the flux of many races, tongues, and faiths is more varied, more constant, and more bitter. Rome furnishes the resounding examples of Carthage, Corinth, and Jerusalem. Males over ten were slain and all others sold into slavery, none taken were spared. Scipio, at Carthage, refused to let Massinissa, an ally of Rome, rescue from the slave market his betrothed, Sophonisba, daughter of the Carthaginian commander, Hasdrubal, and the African prince "found a gift for his fair" by sending poison as his last *gage d'amour*. At Toulouse, where all of every creed were slaughtered (1229), the chief objects of religious hate were the descendants of Paulicians of Armenian origin, known to us as Albigenses. These crimes come close to our own day. Grotius gravely discusses as a debatable question whether women have a right to escape from death and worse when they are found in a fortress taken by storm, after due notice of what is to come, and this by the founder of modern international law, a contemporary of Mather and of Milton.

The present survivals of the Greek or "Ortho-

dox" Church, of the Armenian, of the branches of both which have accepted the Roman obedience, of the Chaldean, of the Jacobite, of the Assyrian or the Nestorian churches, scattered and peeled and forsaken, are but remnants of their former selves, cut off and left desolate in this our day.

Before Islam came, Christianity filled the entire region of the Near East west of the present Persian boundary and much beyond was Christian. All now Moslem in Asiatic Turkey was once sustantially Christian except some mountain races, part of the eastern Kurds, and Yezidis, fire worshippers. In Asia Minor in Strabo's day Greek was the tongue of city and country. It had supplanted Aramaic in Syria by a long process beginning before Christ and completed before the entry of Islam. Armenia over its entire area was more Christian than any contemporary nation in the earlier centuries of the Christian era. Over all the Turkish Empire in Asia twelve centuries have reduced the Christian population to a seventh of the whole through the sword, honest conversion, and political pressure. This last alone, as the yearly statistics showed once in Germany, gives Protestant conversions in lands of Protestant rule and Roman Catholic conversions in lands where this is the state religion—so strong is the tendency even in peace, and without persecution, for faith to follow power.

The Christians of the Turkish Empire are divided historically into two groups, the religious bodies which received their faith in Christ outside of the Roman Empire and those to whom it came in the Roman Empire. Seeing all from the west, it is not easy for us to bear in mind that down to the seventh century, the number of Christians outside of the Roman boundary was equal, perhaps greater, than the Christians in the Roman Empire. In the sixth century, the patriarch of Babylon had a larger population accepting his spiritual authority than the Pope of Rome. A contemporary record, if true, gives 25,000,000 Christians in China. Armenia and its adjacent lesser Iranic regions were Christian. The main population in Mesopotamia and the valley of the Tigris, all Semitic, was nominally Christian when the church of the west was dealing with pagans in half of north Europe, west of the Vistula.

These Semitic churches, which began close to, or in, Christ's day, in Edessa on the Euphrates, had the Semitic predeliction for minimizing the Trinity and giving Christ a divinity carefully circumscribed and not of two natures, human and divine, as was held in the Nicene and Athanasian creeds. These were based on the technical philosophical study of the Schools of Athens, Alexandria, and Antioch. The creeds of the east were Semitic. The Armen-

ian church broke with the western (finding the orthodox creed easier, being Iranic) when the Council of Chalcedon inclined to moderate and lessen differences by means of a course regarded as an approval of Nestorius. These churches all retain a ritual earlier than those of the west; they continued the Pauline order of preachers and looked to their bishops for leadership rather than for succession. Prospering to the eighth century they were cut off from Europe by Islam, ravaged and slain. Their theological schools, the first which taught the work of the priest on a prescribed plan, were destroyed. To-day, where millions once were of the Syrian, Assyrian, and Jacobite church, there are, all told, 300,000 or less. The Assyrian Church is gathered in a single camp under English protection. The Armenians have been reduced to a remnant, a bare fraction of their ancient power when they defended Europe and furnished thirteen Christian emperors.

Two conditions conspired to bring this about. Their obscurity for awhile saved them. They were contemptuously given an autonomous existence, and had their courts and their councils. Even the Greek and Latin communions, which inherited their faith, form, and organization from Rome and Byzantium, fell into the same ignominy.

There came, too, what always comes and came to

Huguenot, Jew, and Moslem in Roman Catholic lands and to the Parsee in India. Cut off any race from political positions and civil rights and its members will devote themselves to exchange, to banking, to trade, and to transportation as did these downtrodden groups. They waxed rich, pursued all the four paths I have mentioned, and their wealth grew. The Christian races became the natural channels of European trade and the Turkish middle class disappeared or became poor, hostile, and fanatic.

There mingled in all this, economic, religious, and social causes. The Christian inhabitants of Asiatic Turkey are the crux and problem, the one insoluble difficulty in the solution of the many issues involved in the present state of the Turkish Empire. If Turkey had as small a Christian population as Persia and Arabia, we should have a Moslem state, like many another, far superior to pagan states, but ill-governed, marked and marred by cruelty, oppression, and economic difficulties at every turn; yet with no torturing issues which move Christendom and shock civilization. If the Christian population of Turkey in Asia were only drawn apart in narrow areas, clearly defined, Christian states could be established and protected by definite boundaries resting on differences of tongue, race, and creed. This was substantially

the situation of the Balkans, but small as was the disputed territory, it was enough to embroil the world. In Asiatic Turkey all the territory with a population, Christian and Moslem, is under dispute. Nowhere, save in areas so small and circumscribed that they could not be used to create a state, is there a population large enough to stand alone, unless it is joined to territory outside of the Turkish Empire. Smyrna is claimed and has been occupied by Greece, but even the Greek figures show a narrow majority of Christians and a majority made by including all the Christian population, Armenian, Uniate, or Roman Catholic Greeks and lesser groups. The Moslem population was admitted to be larger than any or all of the Christians in Aidin, the province of which Smyrna is a part. The Turkish population not unnaturally claims the right of self-government. Smyrna itself has a Christian majority. A preponderance of Moslem population exists through Anatolia or Asia Minor proper. If a census of population were to decide the name, what is called Armenia would be called Kurdistan. Joined to the Armenians in what was Russia, some 1,000,000 strong, now organized as a republic which made a brave, unsuccessful fight for existence, the Armenians in areas having a majority of Armenians and a sovereignty of about 3,000,000 could once

be organized. The area added within the Turkish boundary as laid down by the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, is seamed with Kurdish villages. They are armed, warlike, brutal, cruel, and savage, but a fighting race, loving their mountains, their valleys, and their homes. They have forfeited the respect and merit the condemnation of civilized opinion; but they will unquestionably resist either an Armenian sovereignty or eviction. Unless some higher power intervenes which they respect for the force it has and the repute for justice it enjoys, there is certain to be long, bitter, bloody, and costly guerilla warfare which will last over years and when peace and order are secured for a season, trouble will return, wars begun, and the world be in flames.

The economic basis of the region is gone. The final cataclysm is economic.

Turkey held the trade to the east from the fifteenth century to the seventeenth. In the seventeenth century the trade disappeared and passed into alien hands. The whole fabric of Turkish society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries passed under the shadow of disaster. Its currency, which had stood high in part of the seventeenth century, became depreciated through the issues to meet the expense of the war with Austria, the first of Ottoman wars which had not been paid for off the country conquered. The army lost its efficiency.

An English manual of travel in the days of Elizabeth urges a young man who wishes to see a country well governed to visit the realms of the grand Soldan. It was undoubtedly true, as the testimony of many travellers agree, that from the capture of Constantinople until the fall of the Turkish Empire in the eighteenth century, a period of three hundred years, the open roads of Turkey were safer than those of most European realms. Its mail was carried by Tartars who represented the Sultan with a rapidity and a security unknown anywhere in Europe. Turkish despotism, onerous as it was, dubious the practices of its rulers and heavy its taxation, could at least claim that its artisans and its merchants were in the seventeenth century more secure than in most of eastern Europe and in many districts in the western part of the continent. Military defeat and the loss of foreign trade, the disorganization of public revenues, the increase in expenditure of any army whose Janissaries changed sultans at will, brought earlier than in most lands the collapse in the civil and military establishments of the east which was to mark the nineteenth century.

Turkey remained mediæval. It had all the ills of mediæval life and also its picturesque aspects. I myself have seen the hawk flown by the beys of Mosul at heron and gazelle, with all the accompaniments of the noble art of falconry. The

vast machine at Constantinople ground out injustice and oppression; local rulers, sometimes independent, sometimes holding their fiefs on feudal tenure, practised a local mediæval tyranny. The Christian churches of eastern Turkey suffered anew, unprotected as they had been earlier by a strong superior power. Through the nineteenth century the Christians had conferred on them an equality they were unable to defend. As they grew in wealth, Moslem rancour increased. At last, as I have more fully shown in the last chapter, under Abdul Hamid and the new cry for national unity, local hate and the policy of the central government brought massacre.

Even these might have survived and reached the same reform as took place in Europe if it had not been that the industrial revolution, the creation of the factory system in Europe between 1750 and 1850, swamped all the wares and industries of the Ottoman Empire. The advantages which the Western trader had secured in the beginning of the sixteenth century and the profits which the sounder currency that imports of gold and silver into Europe from America had brought were supplemented for the merchants of western Europe dealing with the Ottoman Empire and seeking the goods of Asia which crossed its trade-routes, by factory-made cheap goods. To cheap manufactures were added

the cheap freights of the past seventy years. The entire industrial system of Turkey collapsed. It was a poor system at best, but if the peasant wore only one shirt and the potter could make only one pot, internal exchanges at least balanced each other. This balance destroyed by cheap goods, cheaply carried, and there came the economic ruin of the last half of the last century. The artificers of the past starved. The peasant farmer found his product hopelessly undersold by the grain and cotton brought from Russia and from America. There came in Turkey that inevitable collapse of all economic relations which has made colonies of half the world's area.

Immediately before our revolution in the eighteenth century Europe by right of discovery claimed about a third of the sixty-five million square miles which constitute the earth's land surface, the colonial area being about twenty-one million square miles. Between the Declaration of Independence by the thirteen colonies and the assurance of independence to all Latin-American states under the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the colonial area of Europe had dropped to over half of its former dimensions, standing at about twelve million square miles, and two thirds of those were the areas of what are now the Dominion of Canada and of Australia. For a half century after this acquisi-

tions were made, but it was still true in 1878 that the colonies of the world were, in the aggregate, about thirteen million square miles. By 1914, when the Great War opened, European colonies held nearly a third of the land area of the globe, amounting to about twenty-eight million square miles. The whole of north Africa once held by the Sublime Porte had passed to French, Italian, and English control; the European possessions of Turkey as they became free from the tyranny of Constantinople passed early under the tyranny of Russia and Austria, until the line of the Danube was reached and the lands to the south of that line, thanks to the interference of England and France (England leading), became independent. Their relations caused more wars between civilized states from 1878 to 1918, a span of forty years, than all the rest of the world put together. Involved in three of these wars—with Russia, with Greece, and with the Allies, Turkey sank by the steps which I have sketched to the bankrupt state which to-day needs a receiver and finds no country willing to assume the task.

The United States alone can meet this situation. How clearly would Lincoln have seen this, waited, and acted.

XX

ARMENIA

ARMENIA furnishes the same primary difficulty as the rest of the Ottoman Empire, a mingled population, Armenian and Kurdish. Each despises the other. Each has fought the other for centuries. Part of the Armenians speak only Kurdish, and the first translation of the New Testament into the northern dialect of Kurdish, Kurmanji, was for such Armenians. The natural boundaries of the Armenia of the past were those of the elevated plateau called Armenia by Christians and Kurdistan by Moslems. The Armenia of the past in Turkey and in Russia is just about as large as Colorado (71,900 square miles) including the five Turkish vilayets having most Armenians—Erzerum, Mamouret el Aziz, Diarbekr, Bitlis, and Van. There are 17,964 square miles in "Russian" Armenia, Kars and Erivan, to the east of Turkey, and 56,041 in the vilayets of Trebizond, Sivas, and Adana, which were part of historic Armenia, a rude oblong about 700 miles east and west and 250 miles north and south, making an

area as large as Nevada, Utah, and half of Colorado and of about the same altitude as the plateaus of these three states. The difference is that these states have more than 175 peaks over 12,000 feet high and Armenia has about 25, but its one isolated volcanic cone, Ararat, is 17,000 feet high. These states are a mountain range, the peak of the continent, but Armenia is a tableland, so that its stretches of lofty levels have far fewer mountains though the average elevation is probably higher. Lake Van is as high as Salt Lake or Lake Tahoe. Erzerum is 1,500 feet higher than Denver and 2,000 feet higher than Reno, Nev., Colorado City, or Pueblo. Kars is 1,500 feet higher than these places. Nearly all the cities in central Armenia are as high as Colorado City. This elevation gives the very best of west Asian climates.

Populations estimated in the East, when boundaries and national claims to area are up, possess the same value as similar claims in the West in a boom period. Estimates now are coloured. I prefer to turn to those of Gen. Sir Charles William Wilson, an English army engineer and head of the Ordnance Survey for eight years on the Turko-Persian boundary, who for years worked in the region, and compiled his facts before the Great War began. Over the whole of the Turkish vilayets, Erzerum, Mamouret el Aziz (including Harpoot), Diarbekr,

Bitlis and Van, Trebizond, Sivas, Aleppo, and Adana (Cilicia), and Russian Armenia, Kars and Erivan, the Armenians are about one fifth of the entire population and the total Christian population a quarter. The population of the two Russian provinces and the five Turkish vilayets has Armenians about thirty to forty per cent., and the Christians total a little more than half. In the five Turkish vilayets the Armenians are a quarter, the Christians total about three tenths, and seven tenths, or over two thirds, are Moslem. But putting the Armenian provinces of Russia and the five vilayets which have most Armenians and Christians together, a working majority once existed for the total Christian population. This was a bare fighting chance for the Christians in this harried, massacred, crime-drenched region. In the five vilayets, out of 159 kazes (counties) only nine have a clear Armenian majority. As for the Armenians and Christians outside of the two Russian provinces and the five Turkish vilayets, they have no chance, as their attempts even to defend themselves in Cilicia and elsewhere this year show. Of course, if brains could vote, the Armenians would be in an overwhelming majority ten to one or something of the kind; but after voting every election when I was qualified for nearly fifty years, I have never found any place or system under which brains could be voted.

The Armenians are quite certain that if an American or even a European army would help them rule the Kurds for awhile, the Kurds would move somewhere else. An American missionary of long experience in the region is of the same opinion. I am, myself. All the Kurds I have ever met had sense enough for that. This was not to be. Abandoned by the European world which had pledged them protection in one treaty after another for seventy years, the United States refusing a new responsibility, the Armenians, after a brave but unequal fight, have gone down in a hopeless struggle. There are left a mere remnant who have adopted Soviet rule and have been kept alive by American charity through the Near East Relief and the protection of the Moscow Soviet Government.

This country, and this country almost alone, through the Near East Relief has saved the Armenian race, preserved a great people for the future, and salvaged Christianity, after dire wreck, in the country of its origin, where it was first believed.

The Armenian question is, therefore, not as simple, plain, and easy as the brightly coloured maps of "Greater Armenia" appear to show. For two thousand years Armenians and Kurds have fought each other in this mountainous plateau where a handful could hold a defile against thousands. The

first thousand years the Armenians held the Kurds down. For the last thousand years or so after the Kurd became a Moslem he has massacred the Armenian and worn the race down to a minority, particularly in the massacres of the last five years. Nothing, however, has ever been gained by trying "to right the wrong of a thousand years." The world is not made that way. Put "Armenia," the whole of the largest dream or vision of "Greater Armenia," in the reign of Tigranes I (95-55 B.C.), under order, deal justly, hang the murderer and educate his children, put a school in every village, Kurdish, Armenian, or other, and high schools in every city and town—(there is already a good American college at Harput and another at Tarsus) —develop the untold mineral resources of the region, improve its agriculture, use its great water-power for manufactures—and in thirty years Armenians and Kurds would be living at peace together.

Both Kurds and Armenians need a period of tutelage and training in self-government with a wise and experienced umpire like Uncle Sam. Lord Curzon in the House of Lords has already drawn attention to Armenian reprisals and massacres. After all that has taken place, no one can be surprised. Our troops burned the winter food of women and children and destroyed their fruit

trees, when we attacked the Iroquois at the close of the Revolutionary War—a proceeding we have bitterly condemned in German operations in the late war. The Iroquois were more to blame for this than the Continentals. They had girdled more than fruit trees in their raid on Wyoming Valley. The chief difficulty of the future is righting the past wrongs of Christians in the presence of other wrongs as serious. No one of the Allied powers has ventured to give reports made on massacres by Christians by the joint International Commission of Officers to the public. It would, if it were published, make it still more difficult to bring peace in Asiatic Turkey.

If the Christians, whether Greek or Armenian, were in a clear majority over any one vilayet, the task would be easier. This is nowhere the case. Unless the Allies are ready to kill off the Moslems or drive them out of their homes and fields, theirs by every law, a very close hand will have to be kept to prevent oppression and massacre by the new governing authority. This is inevitable. Where great wrongs have been suffered, nothing but a higher authority, just, temperate, and firm, can prevent reprisal and revenge when a subject race is put in control of those who have been cruel, bloodthirsty masters.

Much ill-natured comment is now rife about the

Armenians. Even General Harbord's reports quote with thinly veiled approval the commonplace of the envious East: "An Armenian is always in his transactions legal but never moral." This is nonsense. This great race has made its mark in history. It is not popular. They are a nation of scholars. They were the first to demand and provide for an educated Christian priesthood. In the dire days and long centuries, when Greek learning and Roman power went down from the wall of Severus to Ararat, they preserved more of their own literature than any other race. No one is clear as to origin. The Hittites, who for 1,000 to 1,500 years, from 1200 B. C. or so, back for a millennium, were dominant from the Ægean to the Caspian, looked like Armenians. The Armenian tongue on the surface is like Albanian, an original tongue. In much below the surface it comes from some of the central Asian tongues. Early Christians, they long held the gate of civilization against Persian and Parthian, Turk and Tartar. They are wasted to a lost guard in the ranges about Ararat and in east Cilicia and the Amanus Mountains.

They have a literature. They love education. They translated the body of Greek Christian theology and teaching into Armenian when other churches neglected the task. They were liberal.

Their missionaries went from Tartary to Spain. I have known dishonest Armenians, but never a dull Armenian. In their village homes, mere adobe huts, cattle one end, family on a mud platform at the other, the chief fuel cattle-dung worked with their hands by women, I have seen them practise a studied and traditional courtesy. The sons all bring their wives home, and the daughter-in-law does not speak to the mother-in-law of a morning or when a stranger enters until the mother-in-law gives leave. I have seen an occasional American daughter-in-law less respectful. Discipline runs through the Armenian life in the family. In strange lands, they react to extreme radicalism. In the war they have shown great courage, and old charges of cowardice come from prolonged oppression and a hopeless fight which makes cowards of all. You should hear the songs of the north African pirate-Moor about the Europeans (all races) he captured in the old days at sea and held as slaves on land in a horrible captivity.

The Armenian is not easy to get on with, but he is acute, always makes money, keeps his contracts, has a passion for knowledge. Alone, in a minority, they cannot easily defend themselves; but if the present crisis could be tided over they would become a most useful factor in the reorganization of the Near East. As it is, they run the

risk of sharing the fate of the Protestants in north Spain and north Italy in the sixteenth century. Access to the sea they must have; but if Batoum is made a free port for Armenians, Azerbaijan Tartars and Georgians, with Greeks and Turks thrown in, this place and Trebizond must be policed by another power.

The seed of the race still remains. It can still be preserved. No more imperative world duty exists. If the United States Government has not acted, the American people has. The steady stream of contributions still continues. The world's public opinion has had its effect. Territory occupied by Armenians still remains. Other areas are open to them. A year or two will see them safe and increasing. The greatest crime of modern days has failed of its purpose. Separated and apart, they will be safe. Divine justice will yet protect and avenge them.

XXI

THE KURDS AND NOMADS OF THE STEPPES

ANY Moslem in Turkey is looked upon by Americans as a "Turk." So he is regarded and spoken of by most Europeans and even by European statesmen and diplomatists. "Turk," however, is a term which it is not wise lightly to impute to Moslems in Asiatic Turkey, except those in Asia Minor and extending into the debatable area between the River Halys (Kizilkirmak Su) and the upland of Kurdistan. This may be fairly said to begin at a line from Samsun on the Black Sea, south to Alexandretta, with a few west of that port. The pure Turks, as they are usually called, though they are an amalgam of all the previous races of Asia Minor, live in "Anatolia," western Asia Minor. There, Turkish is the one ruling tongue. East of its boundaries there are cities like Cæserea and Sivas, in which nearly everyone speaks Turkish but not all, and Turkish is the tongue of many villages, but not all. Rise out of this plateau at any point, to the heights above Samsun, to Tokat and Amasia (both old capitals of

monarchies now past), and you find to the south villages mostly Kurdish with Armenian villages scattered, and farther north villages Armenian but with Kurds about, and cities with quarters in which Turkish, Kurdish, and Armenian are spoken. Even those habitually speaking Turkish will tell you they are not Othmanli—resenting the appellation—but were once Kurdish or are still Armenian or "Greek Rumi" meaning members of the Greek Orthodox Church or the Roman branch of the same. In a city farther south, like Mardin, the Kurdish population is still divided into two tribes, which fight out their feuds across a narrow gully, speak Arabic, but are still Kurds. Arabic is in general spoken south of the Taurus, a range on the southern edge of Asia Minor. If the range looks across the Cilician plain to the Mediterranean, it is because much of the plain has been laid down by its own swift streams within the historical period. Here, too, is a mixture of tongues, Turkish dominant, but all who speak Turkish are not Turks any more than all who speak English in the United States are of English descent. Outside of Asia Minor, "Anatolia," Asia Minor west of the Halys, and the Syro-Mesopotamia area south of the Taurus, the Turkish Empire is like a patchwork quilt. The sun is setting and you are riding on a dirt road in the old days, or in the new in a Ford

on a precarious highway to your night's lodging on the edge of the Armeno-Kurd plateau. The black tents with herds on one side are Kizilbash (red-heads) who speak Kurdish or a dubious dialect of Persian. A little lower down on the plain are black tents of Karabash (black-heads). They usually speak Turkish, or perhaps a tongue of Turkestan. Beyond are the black tents of nomad Kurds pitched in a region where the tents are perched on low stone walls, a yearly camp. They are Kurds, and speak Kurdish. Lower down, you pass tents, not of felt like these, but of black camel's hair, the tops broken by short poles. These tents are Arab, to whose chief the Kurds who come down in summer from their winter villages pay rental for pasture. The Arabs speak Arabic. A village on the plain is Armenian. A village on the mountain side is Kurdish. In some cleft you may find a village of built walls, not mere adobe, which speaks "Youruk," the earliest form of Turkish. "Turks" no one of these will care to be called. A third of Asiatic Turkey, with Kurdish as its largest population, is all like this, like the home in which I lived, which I described earlier.

In both the Turkish and the Arab areas these nomad tribes penetrate. The great plain of Mesopotamia between the Euphrates and Tigris was

once irrigated and fertile. Eastern Syria was once dotted with cities and villages as the ruins show. Much of this was once irrigated and the rest would respond to dry farming. In area it is about as large as Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri. These states produce in fair years 100,000,000 bushels of wheat, 600,000,000 bushels of corn, 26,000,000 bushels of potatoes, 12,500,000 pounds of wool, and 700,000 bales of cotton. This last is all grown in Missouri. This area in Syria and Mesopotamia could grow cotton more than three quarters of its area, equal to Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, which yielded before the ravages of the bole-weevil 3,500,000 bales of cotton. Since the Tartars destroyed irrigation and slew the inhabitants about 600 years ago, this tract, most of it alluvial soil, has produced nothing. English experimental plantations of cotton since the war show what it can do in cotton. We have the unbroken record from Herodotus, 422 B.C., to Haroun, A.D. 806, that for a thousand years much of it grew two crops of wheat yearly. The old irrigation ditches are still there. I have ridden for miles along one of these ancient ditches in spring, ablaze with anemone and poppy.

Sir George Whitehouse, English irrigation engineer, surveyed this system and finds it in existence, needing nothing but a restoration of the old dams

and ditches. No country on earth is so well fitted in capital, experience, and capacity to restore this region as the United States, and here in this reclamation, by excluding no mad Arab tribes which the recent Turkish census showed to be but 75,000 in number, is a chance to raise a fifth as much corn as we produce, an eighth as much wheat, a quarter as much cotton. Whenever Asia Minor has not been protected by some western power, kept in order and saved for civilization, some Asian horde has swept over it, held the interior, and descended upon the coast. For three hundred years, from the middle of the eleventh to the middle of the fourteenth century, this interior plateau was ravaged, the cities on the coast sacked from Alp Arslan to Tamerlane. Turkish sultans restored order, but they never brought back prosperity or population. The chasm between Christianity and Islam, between the West and the East, still leaves in ruins sites where cities and temples stood, the irrigation of the past unused and its reservoirs, dams, and ditches useless in a region that once yielded a revenue to Greek kings, to Roman emperors, and Byzantine rulers. Instead there wander nomads whom summer takes to the mountains and winter to the plains. Their own products are the various carpets associated with their tents and the towns and villages where the one art of central Asia,

the making of rugs and hangings, is pursued in a region once European in its civilization. The Kurd in this flotsam and jetsam of Asia, made up of tribes who have wandered centuries to and fro and casual bands that have but recently come from central Asia, is the largest of the nomad bands, part settled and part still wandering. Their origin is an enigma, their tongue without a literature, their history almost a blank in the mountains in which they dwell and the tableland, called Armenian by us, Kurdish by a majority of its inhabitants.

Stolidly they have remained through the centuries, divided between a sedentary cultivation of the soil—by those who may be of central Asian origin, since they seem less Aryan—and the nomad life. Some of these chiefs are as fine-looking men as my eyes have seen in many wanderings. The Kurdish boys whom I met for a day and a night or a day or two in castles modelled after Crusaders' castles in Palestine, Syria, and Cilicia, were somehow more companionable than Arab, Turk, Armenian, Jacobite, Yezidi, and half a dozen more with whom for a few brief hours I compared games, sports, and weapons, for I wore a Colt's revolver early. The boy of just my age, fourteen, whom I first met as he was judging in the castle gate in his father's absence was very boy-like, alone on the terrace above. For all I can see in the dim light

of memory, his mind met mine at every point. I "broke" my revolver and showed him its hammer action. He produced a beautiful poniard, old enough for Saladin to have held, and showed me the swift, sudden blow (even if the weapon were hid up your big sleeve caught in a loop) which struck down just back of the left clavical and sundered lung, the arch of the aorta and heart at a stroke. We tried the range of rifled Colt, deadly and sure at thirty yards, burying a bullet four inches in clay, and the gold-chased flintlock pistol with a smooth bore whose bullet clothing stopped at twenty yards. I drew maps that showed him the outer world and the ocean I had crossed and he told me the teachings of his father, a chief of limitless lineage, in the art of rule and the decision of the just judge in the gate. Blessings on that generous-minded boy where'er he be. "My father," said he, "tells me to hear all, to decide quickly, never to give reasons." Sage advice if one "sit in the gate."

The Kurd has served, we know, in every army that passed his valley—from the Assyrian, whose cohorts gleamed with purple and gold, to the German gray of the Sultan's troops in the Great War. He is cruel beyond words. I heard from an eyewitness of the way a man was flayed alive by Kurds and years later in the British Museum I saw that the Kurds' method was the technique of the As-

syrian torturer at the same job. The victim is bound standing or prone, usually the former. Both postures are used in the Assyrian bas-reliefs. The curved knife is similar to the Assyrians'. The first cut is median to the end of the ribs in front, and the upper half of the torso and the arms and legs are attacked before the covering of the contents of the peritoneal cavity is removed. I was told that it was amazing how long life remained. A trustworthy eye-witness gave me these details. Some crude stroke is used on the larynx early "to keep him quiet." This horrible scene took place in a large Kurdish village, back of Mardin, about eighty-five years ago, with men, women, and children looking on. In this period the Kurd has changed but little. The details of some lynchings show to what depth of cruelty even Americans may sink in the present day. The number of these crimes steadily diminishes in all lands. Abdul Hamid armed the Kurd as an "irregular cavalry" and filled a third of his realm with bandit and robber. The Kurd is guilty of most of the Armenian massacres, and has been red with blood from the early dim days of history. An old race would start on a new career if teachers were in every Kurdish village and if Kurdish labour were furnished with the initiative needed for road, railroad, and mill building. Training would not be wasted on the

Kurd, who makes beautiful stuffs, embroideries, carpets, and weapons, carries his irrigation ditches miles around precipitous mountains, and loves fruits and flowers. Suddenly there comes before me the vision of a young Apollo of a Kurd stepping elastic down the mountain path with a great bunch of red tulips of the forest in his dark turban and on his garments embroideries as red as those of him who came from Bozrah.

But while the Kurd in his present estate is feared as a first-rate fighting man, his wits are held in no esteem by the active-minded Arab. This following, told me by an Arab muleteer walking by me with other tales too full of the wit of Rabelais for exact repetition here, as a story serves to show the revenge the race of the plains takes on the man of the mountain, the Lowlander on the Highlander, the Andalusian on the mountain races of north Spain, the Italian on the Swiss. Two Arabs, runs the tale, saw a Kurd plodding along up the steep hill leading his ass on his way home. "See me steal that ass," said one Arab to the other.

"You must be crazy. In broad day, Kurd villages about, every ass known, a quick khanjar (dagger) will be yours if you are caught leading off a Kurd's white ass."

"When I let that ass loose you hurry him off the road into that empty cave we passed."

Silently, lightly the Arab sped up the hill, loosened the halter, slipped it over his head, and plodded on after the Kurd, the ass feeding at the roadside until the confederate reached him, and confederate and ass were out of sight. Then the Arab threw up his head and drew the halter taut. The Kurd turned in sudden amaze to find he was leading a son of Adam. Instantly the Arab said:

"Alas, my friend and brother, I am the son of the Sultan of Khorassan. I committed a loathsome crime and Allah turned me into an ass until I had an owner all of whose prayers were acceptable to God. My time is over and I thank God that after years among infidels and Belial-minded Moslems my latter service has been to a devout believer whose prayers have been acceptable and brought to me repentance and forgiveness. I could not join you in your prayer, thick-lipped ass as I was, save in my heart, but I prayed God silently for your prosperity and all my life my prayers shall ascend for you."

"I am glad I treated you all right," said the Kurd, "but I wish you could have told me before I paid that round sum to that rascally Persian dealer in high white asses, who doubtless knew your deliverance was near. But all is forgiven. Go your way and remember me in your prayers."

So they parted and the Arab rejoined his companion.

"Well, what can we do now with this white ass known to all men?"

"Sell him at the fair to-morrow."

"Sell him at the fair! where his owner will come? You will be flayed alive by these Kurds."

"Come and see me."

"At a safe distance, my friend."

"So will I. A dealer will sell the ass."

The next day they stood waiting. The Kurd appeared. "You're safe enough, the Kurd hasn't seen you, wait and see what happens while I step aside."

The Kurd approached to buy an ass. He saw the white ass. He walked up and shook an impotent and angry fist in the face of the ass, who, as asses will, shed a tear or two. "You infernal scoundrel!" burst out the Kurd. "Your tears tempt me to no mercy for you. Here in one night you have sinned again and Allah has turned you once more into an ass. Let another buy you who will. I shall not."

So the white ass was sold and for the price thereof the Arabs bought two pale-gray asses and rode happily home to the plain.

No race in southeast Asia is so little known as the Kurds. They number at least 2,000,000, perhaps

more. The missionary has sought to reach them in vain. Up to the present decade, the New Testament had never been translated into their south dialect. They have jealously avoided Christianity. The semi-nomad Kurds, "Baban," ride a mount, solid-barrelled, sure-footed, heavy in haunch, for mountain climbing, carry gorgeous weapons and embroideries, and in their tents have what our dealers call Mosul carpets because they are sold in that city by those who make them. These Kurds rim the Mesopotamian plain and extend into the tableland where there are plains into which they can descend before reaching the mountains of the northeastern corner of Turkey. These tribes furnished the chiefs who once extended their power into Mesopotamia and even Egypt, a span of three centuries between Crusader and Turk. As over so much of the world of Islam, west of Persia, in Egypt, and north Africa, the chiefs intermarry with the families of the chiefs of the Arab tribes on the plain. Their women do not veil as Moslem women do in the cities. It is no unusual thing for women to become the real head when the father dies. Now and then, as they are on their yearly migration to the plain, the women ride armed with their chiefs and are often good shots.

These manly and warlike tribes are in the mountains about the region in Mesopotamia which the

English are endeavouring to "reduce" to order. They furnish the fighting force which has filled our American newspapers with short paragraphs of minor risings about Bagdad. The army of 80,000 men which England has sent has been wholly unable to bring the peace needed to develop the great oil fields of the plain about Mosul. The region gave the Turks no trouble because considerably over nine tenths of the troops that garrisoned the region were drawn from it, and the men who held commissions came from the ruling families on mountain, plain, and city.

It is significant that the Turkish Government has not had to follow the iniquitous example of Austria and keep one province down by troops from an alien region who did not speak the tongue of the area they were guarding. In Turkey, in time of peace, troops are generally, though not always, cantonned in the vilayet from which they are drawn.

The solidarity of Islam is nowhere more apparent than in the way in which tribes alien to the Turk, often disliking him, stand by the Sultan in preference to any other power, better in administration, more just in its courts, certain to promote material prosperity. After thirty-nine years in Egypt, England is about to turn over administration to

Moslems because the people prefer an administration worse than that of England provided it is by Mohammedans. This may seem strange, but I know no Christian land which would accept a Mohammedan administration, even if it were better than one conducted by Christians. From 756 to 1031 the Arab administration in the Spanish peninsula was better than the Christian king the Arabs had displaced, until the brutal and semi-barbarous Almoravides overwhelmed both Moslem and Christian; but this did not prevent the fight of seven hundred years to expel the Moslem Moor.

Our American missionaries, our colleges, hospitals, and schools have created a conviction in all the races of Turkey that the United States would remain only long enough to teach the Moslem Western learning and self-government and would then depart. This great power and chance for good has been thrown aside.

Besides the Baban Kurds to the south there are sedentary Kurds to the north, extending over the great plateau of eastern Turkey. They are less prosperous than the southern Kurds and more peaceful. A third race, speaking Kurdish, but inferior physically and in the arts, appears to be a primitive race, driven into the deeper recesses of the mountains. The Baban Kurds believe themselves to have been fire-worshippers before adopt-

ing Islam. The sedentary Kurds look back on a Christian origin. All three speak a Kurdish tongue, Islam in its relations. As a boy, picking up words as children do, I was amazed to find how many were like English.

XXII

THE ARAB

THREE conquering races impinge on the territory that is the Ottoman Empire. The Arab comes from the south and only now, after a thousand years, has retaken Damascus. The Turk and his associate (but not allied) nomads, Turkoman, Tartar, and the rest, are in western Asia Minor, Anatolia. Three races, Kurd, Armenian, and Persian, are on the eastern boundary.

The Kurd was probably, but not certainly, earlier than the Armenian. He is more widely spread, more primitive, and nearer the savage in nature. Only once, during the Crusades, did the Kurd bear rule, producing for the first and last time a series of war lords and Begs with brief kingdoms, like Saladin. Where the Kurd lives in a city quarter, as in Mardin, Diarbekr, Van, or Erzerum, he seems out of place. The Armenian seems out of place in a village. Even in the mountains he has, in Zeitoun, Sert, Bitlis Van, and Erzingan done better than the Kurd. The fashion in which the Turk has absorbed all the old inhabitants of Asia Minor

is so complex that his share in the present population of the East is as difficult to define or divine as it would be to say how much of the England of to-day is distinctly and distinguishably Saxon. Saxon was once dominant in southern central England; the place names settle that. Saxon strains there are to-day: skulls, figures and hair, names and family tradition, show that. A Saxon tongue was once freely spoken, as the vocables and vocabulary of English are proof. But how much of any one of us, whose ancestors may have all come from England to the eighth and ninth generation, are of Saxon blood—who can answer?

The Arab, the trading, conquering, verse-writing, wandering, slave-catching Arab has diffused his tongue over all north Africa. As Turkish extends from side to side of Asia, so if you start at Sierra Leone and go diagonally 3,000 miles to Khartoum, you will never be far from some white-turbanned teacher of the true faith, some trader who may on the morrow be sultan of some brief-lived realm such as Tippoo, the Arab slave-dealer, built up south of the Sahara and north of the Congo. Arabic runs across the whole of north Africa, from Egypt to Morocco and south across the Sahara.

The Arab was once but one of the Semite group. On the northwest he had the Hebrew or the Jew; straight to the north and east, the Aramaic, from

the field of Aram, Padan Aram, the same word that appears as a measure of area in the Egyptian feddan and is found to the north and east in Syria in its various forms. The pure Arab of Arabia, Syria, and Mesopotamia has not in our day numbered over 1,000,000. I doubt if the Arab world of Mohammed reached over one half that number. Hellenism and the Hellenistic world when it spanned a lesser arch of sovereignty from Cyrene to Bactria and the Indus had a far larger Greek population behind it than had the Arab expansion. The driving power in numbers was at least fivefold as large. For Art, save in architecture, in mural decoration and caligraphy, the Arab had no desire, and has none to-day. But in sixty-two paths of grace and beauty—founts, a printer would call them—his character may be read, and gradually the lines of manuscript, wall, and seal grow upon us as does the subtle composition of Japanese art. The Alhambra has had a prodigious meed of praise. If the author of ponderous volumes made at Kensington by Jones had only known how his coarse copies, missing the best, look to the trained eye! If one comes to the Alhambra from the East and not from the West, it is the proportion of the rooms, as in the Hall of Ambassadors, that goes home and not the florid style of the script.

The mind, pure mind, the Arab chose. When the European world had forgotten Athens and the Academy and the Porch, he translated the entire body of Greek philosophy and medicine and science. Portions of Aristotle we only know in these translations.

The Arab court physician at Fez, twenty-three years ago, used an Arab translation of Galen as the guide of his teaching and practice. At one point he had left his teacher. I sketched typhoid and asked his treatment. "For those long, slow fevers, I give them of the boiled, keep them in bed, and trust the rest to Allah." This is what our doctors call the "expectant treatment."

The leading authority on the schisms of Islam, Al Bagdadi (d. 1153), points out that his study of Aristotle and of logic led him to accept the Koran as the literal, invariable, infallible rule of life and of faith and that they who wander under the spell of Plato get vague notions about the Logos, trust to their own minds, and end in heretical views which are less wise than the Koran and the definite and inexorable rules of thought laid down by the greater Aristotle. A similar predilection and preference divides in their philosophical studies the Christianity of west Europe. The Catholic Church of the Roman obedience is turned to Aristotle, and Protestantism is reviving the study of Plato and continuing in his path.

The Arab mind of Syria, fed on Greek philosophy of a more liberal order, was not able to hold to the doctrine of the infallible eternal creation of the Koran. The exact position of the Koran necessarily raised every issue and problem of the incarnation and the relation of the second person of Trinity to the first. Was the Koran a revelation of the idea and purpose of God which Mohammed expressed in his own words and teaching, or were the Arabic words the divine substance, from eternity in God and revealed in its exact shape by the Prophet who was but the physical of the divine essence, himself prepared from the beginning in his human nature for this purpose, born to the task of revealing God to man in His eternal force? The Persian mystic on one side of Islam and the Syrian philosophic mind on the other struggled for a more liberal meaning, but Mecca, where Mohammed taught, and Bagdad where his vicegerent ruled, united like the temporal and spiritual powers of the Christian Church in Europe upon a rigid formula that the Koran in its very words was eternal and shared the substance and essence of the divine. For two centuries this conflict went on and it displayed every phase of the like conflict in Christianity. The Syrian Mohammedan leads in a way more liberal than Constantinople, Cairo, India, and Mecca. It is not the least of the wrong

of placing Damascus under European control (whether of England or of France) that cases in such issues as have come before the Judicial Committee of Privy Council in London or carried up to French courts in Algiers, on religious trusts for worship and teaching, have been almost uniformly in favour of strictest orthodoxy, just as English officers in India used in the good old days to have Christian converts flogged for not helping to drag the car of Juggernaut.

A careful summary of the effect of these scholastic studies and the mastery of "literary Arabic" (a dead language by the spoken tongue) made in Algeria reports that students from the Arab university in Fez, ignorant as they were of the facts of science, were more acute in study and in a few short months were matching the students fresh from the French Lycée.

For a brief season only the Arab ruled and while he ruled he had introduced the numerals of the Hindu to Europe, had given algebra its name and its advance, and measured a degree of the earth's surface with more assurance than the great Greek geographers. The modern literature of travel and the study of comparative religion began with the Arab. The Turk came in the east and Spanish bigotry in the west and all this ended.

But the Arab continued to be the teacher of his

new masters. He furnished the doctors of the law, the preachers, and the prose of the Turkish world of Islam. The Persian gave the verse and the meretricious rhetoric of the Turk.

The Syrian, whether Moslem or Christian, is the one race in Turkey which has worked out a racial renaissance without leaving home. Arabic for 1,200 years has never been without an advancing literature. The Arabic poetry of Syria in the middle of the last century matches any but the loftiest heights of the past. It is better, relative to the past, than Victorian to Elizabethan. Every wedding has to have its poems, be the family rich or poor, only, as the poet is paid, the best poets write epithalamia for the best families as they did in the "spacious days of Queen Elizabeth." In fiction a great advance has been made and the direct tale such as makes up the "Arabian Nights" has been supplanted by the modern novel embodying the combination of our plots, the life of to-day, and the plain speaking of the East—but this is all convention. Novels are read and translated from India to the seaport of Morocco. Arabic circles the world.

I had once to find a job in Philadelphia for a Syrian who had been a kawass, one of those tall attendants in gorgeous clothes, with a big silver mace, who precede secular and religious dignitaries in the streets

and make doorways impressive. He was a gentleman. Nothing could he do. A kind adjutant general at Washington—there are sometimes such—though few army officers will believe it—let him enlist, provided he could sign his name in English. Through hours I taught him and finally found he could learn if I let him move the tip of his outstretched tongue and the point of the pen synchronously. He signed his enlistment papers. He went out to the Philippines. He could read the Arabic characters in which the scribes of Datoes wrote, and earned a happy and early discharge with enough money saved to begin business on his return. He had beautiful manners, persistent good nature, a loyal gratitude for any aid, could sell anything, and never forgot a friend, a kinsman, or his own high merits.

These are Syrian virtues. Not all, for they have the gift of writing, leadership, and wandering. The London *Times* mourns in a leading article that young Syrians were intrepidly going into the vast interior of Brazil and took the local trade from Portuguese and English. The former the *Times* took easily, but the second almost brought tears into its diction. From Brazil, last September, twenty-one sons of former alumni came to Beirut to enter the Syrian Protestant College there. The Syrians are so successful as retailers over the coasts

and the islands of the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean and the South American coasts that in many places they have been excluded by law. They have the Phoenician gift of trade, travel, and adventure. I met one commanding a Moorish outstanding fort on the edge of a tribal rebellion and my friend was perfectly at home in the Sulu Islands.

The Syrian furnishes the journalists of the Arabic Near East. They edit the leading magazine and the leading daily papers of Egypt. A Syrian graduate of the Syrian Protestant College edits the organ or daily of the King of Hejaz at Mecca. They are in newspaper offices along the north African coast. Always and everywhere, to their credit be it said, they are in trouble with the French censor. But Arabic is a large, roomy, and capacious tongue with a vocabulary of abuse, invective, and suggestion which gives opportunity without end to the skilled writer who will pass the censor triumphantly and yet be understood on the instant in every coffee-house and by every donkey-boy and peasant. Thrice in this country I have had as expert to pass on charges of libel and obscenity. The Spanish is sardonic, the French journalist keen as his rapier, the Italian as suggestive as his sneer, as the countryman of Pasquin should be, and the German can be ribald in the south and brutal in the north, but no one of them

can do all these in more innocent phrase than the Syrian.

Still more the Syrian journalist has educated a widespread constituency in affairs, awakened a passion for liberty, met his fate unhesitatingly on the scaffold, and always and everywhere believed in democracy and equality as has the Arab from high antiquity. Not in vain did Hagar seek the desert with Ishmael.

The Syrian, Arab, and Greek, united with distant and hardy races early in Syria, has become the schoolmaster of the Moslem world of the West. The Nizam of Hyderabad, after the Sultan of Turkey and Shah of Persia, is a Moslem ruler of the first rank. A loyal ally of the British "Raj," he sent his oldest son to Oxford, but his second he has just sent to the American University of Beirut, whose president, Dr. Howard Sweetzer Bliss, a noble American, but yesterday the great leader for liberty, self-government, and education in the central lands of the Arab world. His death last year closed one of the most lofty and useful world careers of the American in our day.

"Don't worry, Talcott," said a cynical political leader forty-five years ago, adopting a paternal attitude toward the young reporter, "whether the man is fit or not. He can carry the district. The rule of politics is that the men who are fit

don't get the offices and the men who get the offices are not fit." The rule extends out of American politics and was early laid bare in the saying that the various kingdoms of heaven are taken by violence and the violent take them by force. Of all the races of the Othman Empire, the one which has generally been held least fit by those who have commented on it in the century and a half since it was plain that its sun had set in the fatal treaty with Russia of Kutchuk Karnardji (1772), the Turk is the only race which is resolutely making a fight for self-government and personal independence from the rule of the stranger. Ignorant, half-clad, poorly armed, unprovided with adequate munitions and with no base of arsenals and munition works, the peasants of the Anatolian plain and the householders of the few cities scattered over it are manfully facing the French in the south in Cilicia, the Greek in extreme west Anatolia, the English fleet at every point on the coast where they get within the range of a power which wisely avoids fighting on land at the present juncture, and the better and more deserved opposition of such of the Christian population as is left after the terrible deportation and massacre of the last twelve years.

The Arab, by far better fitted for self-government, educated to an unusual degree, possessing a native intelligence, thrift, commercial adventure

and capacity for trade, is being summarily suppressed in his passionate desire for freedom and self-rule by the French in Syria. The English in Mesopotamia, now that Kurd and Arab resist, are wisely and efficiently in good faith preparing to give self-government. This is fair, honourable, and an example for the world. The desert Arabs are making their fight along the Euphrates, and the Kurds, who love a fight as much as an Irishman does, and ask few questions as to its cause, are doing the larger share of the defense of the rights of the city Arabic-speaking folk. French shareholders have invested heavily in Syrian railroads and there is no way in which a nation can be more effectually bled of its just profits than by the control of its transportation facilities and the right to advance their rates at will without any regulation. The oil wells of Mesopotamia, too valuable an asset for England to lose, are to belong one fourth to the new government and three fourths to a chain of related companies, with familiar names among their lists of directors, who hold the Burman, the Persian, and the Mesopotamian wells under mutual arrangements which give the foreigner profits, but in no other way can capital be found. Without it the country would remain as poor as it has been for generations.

Neither England nor France can afford the heavy

expenditure of a military expedition in the present state of their finances. The French have been wholly unable to put an adequate force into the task of holding and protecting the region they are seeking to seize. The English force in Mesopotamia was technically under the control of, and a burden on, the finances of India, but this does not change the ultimate fact that, while the few who get the profits of the oil wells will undoubtedly reap large returns, the British exchequer is now facing a steadily increasing deficit.

Yet there is no better and more knightly leader than Feisal, late King of Damascus, sheikh because he belongs to the family of the Prophets in Mecca, and emir because he is a military leader. He comes of the oldest recognized and recorded lineage of the world west of India and China. He is a highly educated soldier in a modern sense. He studied in the schools at Constantinople and he had the advantages of French training. To an amazing degree he has the charm, the inviting dignity, and the perfect manner of those who belong to his stock. He is a leader of men. For two years he settled for England the tribal disputes which would have interfered with the progress of General Allenby and without whose settlement the English base would have been insecure. He accomplished the apparently impossible task of drawing together the

tribes living on the route north of Mecca and in the centre of Arabia, and he settled the local vendettas of generations. He spread his Arab levies like a vast screen on Allenby's right as he advanced northward, keeping a large part of the Turkish force busy watching him and rendering impossible concentration of the Turkish forces against their main antagonist. The understanding was clear and unmistakable that if the Allies won, he should bear rule in Damascus and begin the work of upbuilding a constitutional state in Syria and, in the end, in Mesopotamia. These affable, charming, delightful Arab races, with whose members educated or uneducated you can talk with an agreeable sense of stimulus on the wide range of human desire and philosophic interest, whose greatest man created a world religion with which we all have to reckon in the affairs of Asia and who have a passionate regard for the arts of life, somehow or other will not as soldiers grimly live on half a pound of bread a day (if they get that), patiently lie for days in a rifle pit, pay small attention to keeping their bodies in order and comfort, and much to maintaining the condition of their weapon and their ammunition ready. The Turkish officer and private at this particular juncture is willing to do this, and his prowess is saving the liberties of all the Moslem races in Turkey though he has pretty nearly every vice and fail-

ing which a ruling class always loses by—cruelty, massacre, oppression. However, as I have already said, there are good men who do their duty and are just and efficient; but the accursed influence of fanaticism and racial pride sears mercy in all the tribes of man.

The practical result of the conflict so far is that the French have occupied Syria with no great loss. They have made the Lebanon an independent state, which was well. The territory has enjoyed separate self-government by a treaty made in 1860 and has prospered amazingly. At the opening of the war it had a population of seventy-five per square mile; far more fertile soil outside of this mountainous region, only a fraction of which can be cultivated, has in the rest of Syria a population of only fifteen to the square mile. All races fared alike under the original treaty, but now that the French have come in, the Maronite Church will be in control of the government, with the results which always follow ecclesiastical influence in the task of government.

The next necessary step in the region between Persia and the Mediterranean, as well as on the Red Sea, will be that England will step into complete control of the great Moslem haj, pilgrimage, which brings together pilgrims from all over the world of Islam. The tradition and belief is that

when the great day of this pilgrimage comes there must be 72,000 souls waiting. If there be not 72,000, then God sends his invisible angels to make the number good. If the fervour of pilgrimage has brought more than 72,000, then cholera appears and reduces the throng to the canonical number. The path to Mecca lies through the tribes I have already touched upon, who are only kept quiet by an annual tribute which the Turkish Government yearly pays, no matter what debts and bondholders it neglected. Theoretically, of course, the path ought to be kept open by force of law and military arms, but it would be foolish to do this when a much smaller sum will keep these half-savage tribes at peace and when their suppression by a civilized force would entail an unseemly expenditure. There is positively no way in which influence can be exerted upon public opinion of the Moslem world as directly, as silently, and as efficiently as by the control of the yearly pilgrimage. This control now passes completely into the hands of England, and its mastery of transportation has for nearly half a century given it this power and make-weight in the complex politics of the Near East and India. No other country would have used this influence so well or done so much with it for world order and human happiness.

XXIII

THE BANKRUPTCY OF ASIA

TURKEY as a world problem is the problem of Asia. The bankruptcy of Turkey is the bankruptcy of Asia, bankrupt in order, in government, in product, and in economic distribution, within and without. Japan escapes these evils; so does India in some measure, not wholly. The experimental stage of a nation is not easily defined or passed upon.

Asiatic Turkey and the Turk lie nearest the civilized world. The eye of Europe is on the Turk. For all newspapers, from Vienna to San Francisco, what happens at Constantinople is "news." What happens from Teheran to Tokio may or may not be "news," as the case may be. Take massacres. The past twenty years have seen massacres in China whose loss of life has been far greater than the Armenian massacres, but the Chinese massacres have no such effect on the civilized world. For sixty years China has reeked with massacres. The Tai Ping movement for independence in south China, the massacres of the "Boxer" insurrection,

and a little later the massacres of the Peking government on resuming authority, taken together, left whole cities desolate. The massacres in south China thirty years ago and in north China ten years later cost life by myriads. The pillage and the massacre of the Manchu quarters in Chinese cities ten years ago, more than match, in the number slain, the Armenian massacres. Here was a ruling class having power, wealth, and position holding a section, generally the more opulent portion, in the larger cities of China, swept away by mob, massacre, and pillage. Russia, essentially Asiatic in its social and economic development, has furnished an appalling list of massacres, beginning forty years ago with pogroms against Jews in the parts of Russia held by the opponents of the Bolshevik régime and in the parts under Bolshevik rule against Christians, accompanied by torture, sacrilege, and murders innumerable. Even Japan has its skirts red with defenceless blood in Korea though all done there has followed a strict legal or military procedure and is as "regular" as the slaughter at Amritsar in India or the villages swept, men, women, and children, by aeroplanes in Egypt. Mexico has had its scores of small massacres in the last ten years, Christian murdering Christian.

Human nature is substantially the same the world over. Given certain racial conditions, ra-

cial pressure, racial prejudice, and economic derangement and within our boundaries and under our flag ten or twelve men and sometimes a woman will be yearly burned alive before an applauding mob of a superior race. The difference is that our lynchings decade by decade diminish in actual number and relative to population. Each year southern public opinion more strongly condemns. In time we shall get rid of our national shame, condemned both north and south. Asiatic massacres have been worse in the past 100 years than for three centuries before as far as accessible records go.

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, by the common testimony of travel and trade, though fields were untilled and cities losing population, the ports and roads of the Ottoman Near East were better kept, safer, and more open to the merchant, than the ports and roads of several European lands. To the French encyclopedist of the eighteenth century China was a model to the Western world. Why are all these Asian lands in one red burial blent of misgovernment and massacre? They cannot raise revenue enough to pay their debts or meet the costs of administration. They cannot maintain the order they once had. They cannot raise the capital needed for railroads, wharves, forts, city transit, telegraph and telephone, all

the equipment of civilization, without paying usurious interest which drains the profits of internal and external trade. The railroads of Turkey, about 4,000 miles, or one thirtieth of what we should consider necessary for the same area, are almost all owned in the Allied capitals. Six years ago they were divided between Berlin and Paris. France has direct or indirect control of nearly all the public utilities of Constantinople, Smyrna, and other seaports. French troops are in Syria now to see that its railroads pay French owners and after that meet the needs of Syrians and their trade. China is in the same plight, beholden to various nations for its railroads and other public utilities.

Turkey in 1776 had a yearly revenue of $25,000,000 as is recorded by an acute and painstaking English observer. In 1914, about a century and a third later, the revenue of Turkey had grown fivefold, to $125,000,000, and again a fair and friendly English observer pronounced this (only about $5.50 a head), all that could be raised. In this 138 years the Ottoman Empire increased its revenue fivefold. England and France advanced theirs from twenty to thirtyfold and we, as would be expected, three hundredfold. An efficient government cannot be maintained at $5 a head. The Chinese Government is in the same condition,

unable to raise even this revenue for adequate administration. The Mexican Government has never been able to raise over about $5 a head. This is the average yield of most Latin America, north of Chile and Argentina. No good modern government could in 1914 meet its expense of all sorts, administration, army, navy, education, works, without raising $20 to $30 a head. More is needed now.

Why has this come? Why has Asia retrograded while Europe has advanced?

First, the factory system in Europe, when it came to be aided by cheap freight rates at sea, swamped domestic industries in all Asian lands.

Second, these lands, without courts to protect contracts and capital, were unable to establish their own factory system. Factories require credits, and credit requires just courts to enforce contracts.

Third, supplies of foreign goods created new wants, new desires, and destroyed the internal economic balance.

Fourth, the disaffection this created led to no revolution or reform because European arms of precision gave the Oriental despot the power to crush resistance he had not before had and kept him secure from 1820, when re-arming native armies on European models began in Asia, under

Mahmud II, until the old economic order broke. From 1890 to 1910 internal massacre, credit collapse, universal discontent, the dissolution of the old governing forces shook the powers of existing governments from Korea to Morocco. Much like this has come in Latin America and by a similar path.

Asia and Europe, which is after all only a western extension of Asia—a part of Eur-Asia—have before been destroyed and seen one civilization or another perish; but always from savage pressure or invasion from the great central plain of Asia and at intervals more rare from Arabia. This was always a bankruptcy in courage of some decaying civilization; but the bankruptcy of Asia in the last 100 years has not been this. This bankruptcy has come from economic collapse. The last invasion from central Asia began at about 1000 A. D. and lasted for 400 years afterward. At the beginning of this period the vast central savage plain of central Asia ravaged all the borders of the Continent, conquered north China, even tried to invade Japan, and swept the Near East and Russia, again and again, from the victory of Alp Arslan (1071) at Manzikert to the sack of Delhi, 1399, by Tamerlane. Then there began the reorganization of China, India, and the Near East into the systems existing when the interference

of the West began. India, fortunate under English rule, kept order and is passing on to self-government. All the rest ran through the cycle outlined above as has Turkey.

A century ago order was still present in the Ottoman Empire as abundant travellers show from Rich and Kinglake on. American missionaries were in Turkey forty years (from 1819) before a single life was lost. They were always seeking places, as my father did, where few or no American or European had gone before. In the last sixty years the number killed has grown. Decade by decade the roads of eastern Turkey have become more unsafe from Circassian and Kurd. The former was a new immigration by Abdul Aziz in 1865, when Schamyl had surrendered to Russia and the defeated Moslems of the Caucasus turned to the head of their faith and the harems which for generations had willingly held so many of their willing young girls. The Circassian immigrant tribes spread across the Russian frontier into Turkey, robbing and plundering over northeast Turkey until they reached the northern edge of the Mesopotamian plain at Ras-el-Ain. They were the first to show how unsafe a few armed men could make the roads. They began attacks on Christian villages, taking their land as "guests of the Sultan" and by way of reprisal for the Christian occupation

of their own lands. The Kurds became dangerous on a large scale when Sultan Abdul Hamid began Armenian massacre by arming them as "Hamidieh," Turkish irregular cavalry, worthless in the late war, perilous to their friends, the instrument of Christian slaughter. Greek brigandage sprang up anew after 1860 in eastern Asia Minor, back of Smyrna. The nomads of Asia Minor ceased to be harmless and peaceful. The Arabs of the desert encroached on the plow along the Euphrates and on the flanks of Syria to the west of their campfires.

This loss of order has marked all the Near and Far East. England, which has watched over the Persian Gulf for a century, had to stop pirate dhows and gun-running to the Beluchee and Persian coast. Sixty years ago Persia had its perils by road, but a single courageous man could cross the frontier between Persia and Turkey from Van south to Kerkuk. Not for thirty years has that been true.

For a century the Turkoman raided the northern Persian frontier, a horrible tale of woe. Persians, men and women, city and village, and field, a better race, refined, civilized, were swept by the greasy, hairy, smelly Turkoman with his long-necked, deep-chested, long-legged, solid-barrelled, steep-haunched horse, homely but untiring. Per-

sians by the thousand were carried off into an awful slavery in black tents, serfs of the soil and slaves of the street in Bokhara and Samarcand. Not yet, after threescore years, can I wipe out of a child's memory the pale Persian I saw in our courtyard, with his close caftan and sloping lamb's wool headgear, kalak. He had sought the ready hospitality of the missionary, slept, ate, and cooked in the open arched space that led to the stables and poured out to a tense-faced American boy the hideous tale of the last of village, wife, family, kin, the night razzia, the lust of blood and worse lust, and the captives bound to their cattle for the better watch of both, going to a hellish, hopeless thraldom Persia was too weak to prevent, to rescue, or to redress. The czars spread their net of merciless massacre over Turkestan. The Kirghiz trail of skeletons thicksown by the fleeing route of days was a horror to all the East as example of the worst the Cossack's lance and sword could do. "Beware the Russian Czar," ran the proverb, "his bloodshed to the Shah's or the Sultan's is as the flood to the dried summer stream, as the camel to the she-ass's foal." Yet at least the Turkoman raided north Persia no more. But Persia lost safety on its caravan routes, and over all the south that Omar knew, the Bakktiari plundered at will. But Turkestan taken of the Russian and

Beluchistan taken of the English had lost order before the strange Raj of English and Muscovite came to front each other to-day, each doubtful who will strike and when.

The Anglo-Indian Empire itself grew, not from sheer rapacity as the heedless deem, but because as trade came and the trader went inland he needed protection, and the open highways Akbar made safe became a terror to the weak and plunder to the strong. The Sultan of Constantinople in the past forty years built roads, some good, some ill, so that wheeled vehicles came to a land where none saw them in my boyhood. When I first drove a buggy it seemed to me tempting Providence to expect to control a horse with leather tapes yards long, instead of backing him with spur and curb bit. A Turkish gendarmerie was organized, but the road was never held safe for a man alone as in less-enlightened and more stable days. The like has come in China and missionaries, once safe from all but mobs crazed by superstition over Fung-shuey, gods, and the graves and tablets of ancestors, are killed or held for ransom. Korea tempted Japanese conquest because the roads of a peaceful, docile people were no longer safe and even the capital, Seoul, was without protection from brawls.

Why this economic collapse, this failure to meet the first duty for governance—safe roads—in a

land like Turkey? The Sultan's well-guarded roads were once centuries ago the talk of the Near East. His currency was fairly stable for near 200 years, when Europe's was the prey of every depression with its perpetual depreciation of the coin of the realm. In spite of the ocean path around the Cape, the Turkish caravans brought the trade of the East to Aleppo and through the eighteenth century seventy to eighty English merchants were at this place handling the trade of India and China. The Napoleonic wars and the new East Indiamen of 1,200 and 1,800 tons ended this traffic. One of these merchants, Sale, two centuries ago gave the English-speaking world the best translation of the Koran it has ever had, less literal, less accurate than later versions, but coming nearer the spirit and substance of the original. The share the Ottoman Empire has had in this trade which connected the three great city centres of the old world, China, India, and west Europe, was the base of its prosperity.

For two centuries and a half the Seljuk Turk, Jenghiz Khan, the Ottomans and Tamerlane successively closed by their ravages the land trade-routes which gave the Byzantine capital its wealth and its close relation with Genoa and Venice, rivals for this trade. It was later transferred to the Red Sea route through Mameluke sultans in

treaty with Venice. Genoese sailors were thrown out of business and one of them discovered America just as the Portuguese ships had found their way around Africa. They were small and few. Their voyages were long and their tonnage could not carry what caravans could from Bagdad to Aleppo, but the Portuguese did much to close traffic by the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf by attacking the Arab and Persian vessels. When the Turkish Sultan seized Cairo, 1517, for a brief season Eastern products, pepper, for instance, rose, but fell again to the old average when the Ottoman power went to the Euphrates, took Bagdad, and a Turkish admiral defeated the Portuguese fleet and made the first chart, since the Greek, of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

The caravan route was resumed on roads the Ottoman guarded, and when East Indiamen took four to six months and were 400 to 600 tons in the seventeenth and half the eighteenth centuries, caravans did as well for this trade as they. The khans or caravan-serais (caravan-palaces) along the overland route from Aleppo to the Gulf number hundreds, Mosul has 80. These khans were in my boyhood far in excess of the trade left for the caravans when East Indiamen had become 1,800 tons, the largest vessels one saw in the Mediterranean in the middle of the last century when I went from

Boston to Smyrna in an American clipper of 800 tons. The Ottoman conquest of Constantinople did not, as is often erroneously said, cause the discovery of America, but it was one of the incidental causes that decreased the traffic of Genoa and the profits of its sailors and those of western Europe. This set all Europe, but Venice, hunting new routes to the East, and even the land routes north of the Black Sea across Russia and by the Danube gave interior Germany the revival which preceded the Reformation. Sulieman I conquered Egypt and turned to the Euphrates (1534) in part to secure new routes to the further East (hence the Turkey Company in London about 1600), and in part, because he was halted (1529) in his movement north by the resistance of Austria, though Buda Pesth had Turkish pashas in it for 200 years.

Turkish rule, which oppressed and despised all alike and let no one race attack another, gave the checkerboard mix of races in the region north of the Danube which equals the like mix in Turkey in Asia. Exactly as the part of the Turkish Empire, east of Asia Minor, the last conquest of the Ottoman, has never been assimilated and mastered by any one race so that Kurd, Armenian, Turk, Kizilbash (some Kurds are called this), Karabash, and several lesser races are jumbled together, not one locally in full command, so also, up to the

treaty closing the war just past was called Hungary, has Magyar-Catholic, Magyar-Protestant (2,000,000), Ruthenian, Rouman, Slovak, Slovene, Jugo-Serb, Jews, Gypsies, and lesser peoples conflated in a racial mosaic where no boundary can be drawn which does not do gross injustice to some one. All these races work amicably in the same gang in this country. They would at home, if each did not oppress the others. The Magyar did. The Rouman does. The Jugo-Slav will. Give these a fair American foreman and they would work together there, which is just what a mandatory for America would mean in Asiatic Turkey.

XXIV

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

THIS division and intermingling of races is not, however, the cause of the bankruptcy of Asia. It exists in countries like China and Persia, which are homogeneous. Political, industrial, and economic collapse is due to deeper causes and reasons. If different races are well paid, fairly treated, and prosperous, they will get along without quarrelling, however they may be intermingled. It is not, after a meal, but before it, that quarrels breeze up in the menagerie or in the family. Ill-temper and a quarrel are the by-product of an empty stomach the world over. The narrower the economical margin, the more certain is an explosion when economic stringency appears. Races and populations will emigrate when a strain comes, if the economic margin is reasonably wide. This furnishes the means for a freedom of choice. Proportionate to their number, no lands and peoples have furnished so little emigration as the Asiatic countries. The outward flow from China, India, and Turkey is minute by

the size of their population. Western Europe, most advanced and having the largest economic margin, has furnished all but a very small share of 50,000,000 or so who have emigrated in the past century. As a mere estimate, not 5 per cent. come from Asia. From Turkey, the emigration is almost wholly from the two races economically most successful, the Armenian and Syrian. Few Moslems have gone and they have suffered most in the economic declension of the Ottoman Empire.

This loss is relative and not absolute. Down to the opening of the Great War, realty had advanced for forty years in almost every Turkish city. This is notably true of seaports like Salonica—lost to Turkey in 1913—Constantinople, Smyrna, Adana, Mersine, Alexandretta, Beirut, all of Palestine and Basra.

In most of the cities of the interior realty values have advanced, more in Christian and Jew quarters than Moslem. Less in preëminently Moslem cities like Brusa and Konia than in others, but in all Turkish cities the last generation has seen a uniform increase. In Salonica, while still under Turkish rule, the appreciation of realty has been on a scale like our Western cities in a "boom" period. A reaction came in urban and farm lands after the massacres of 1895-6; but this lasted only a season. A rise followed. The aggregate value of Turkish

imports has grown, but not the per-capita consumption of articles of general use. The heavy import of railroad supplies from Germany to build the line from Scutari to Ras-el-Ain, makes comparison uncertain if aggregates are taken. Exports have not grown in the same fashion for Asiatic lands. The Chinese tea trade has been supplanted by the teas of Assam and Ceylon. The cheap wools of southeast Turkey have suffered from competition. The silk filatures have lost ground in both Turkey and China, for one cause through the more scientific handling of the silkworm in Japan, in Cyprus, and in Italy. Japan has increased product and advanced price to the loss of China both directly and indirectly in a fashion not often equalled in the history of any staple world product.

Equatorial Africa has never had any emigration except the strictly "assisted" emigration of the slave trade. The southern and temperate territory of that continent is now all included in the Anglo-Dutch Commonwealth whose prosperity demonstrates what is possible in lands which share the advance of Europe and North America, and have suffered none of the obstacles to the general advance of the world, outside of the independent states of Asia. With them must be grouped Morocco which has gone through the same loss and the same woes as the inhabitants of Asiatic

Turkey, Christian and Moslem, except in massacres.

The "Industrial Revolution," as it is called by economists, is the change which took place in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in west Europe and in the United States from "cottage" industries to the factory. This transformed the artisan, the mechanic, the knitter and spinner in the countryside and the makers of all the needs of life, outside of food, in town and city, joiner, cordwainer, tailor, smith, and tanner—each and all working for himself—to the employees of the manufacturer working his hands and, gaining both as capitalist and manager, the profits that once went to the man that laboured with his hands and was once his own master. In the end, the Western world profited by this. The army of consumers gained in cheaper goods and wares and a healthier life. The worker came to be in greater comfort and security. This only came after a long struggle not yet over. In England, this struggle narrowly escaped ending in the defeat of labour and the loss by the mass of the English peoples of any control, initiative, or choice in their daily lives. The village labourer drew near industrial serfdom. The town labourer and the skilled labourer gained. But for the safety-valve of emigration to this country and cheap land and cheap food here, English

labour might not have won. But for the struggle in England, the conflict here might have ended differently. How narrow was the English wrestle for the right of labour Disraeli has shown in "Sybil." A whole world of literature, fiction, history, economics, has grown up about this conflict now entered on the last of its three stages: first for wages and free choice of employment, second for the removal of pestilent industrial conditions and for the collective bargain, and third for the control by labour, in partnership, as an equal or as a final authority, of the management of the great industries.

This is a selfish and nearsighted world. Our libraries have whole stacks crowded with thousands of books on this conflict still shaking our social structure. To the effect and working in Asia of the "Industrial Revolution" little attention has been paid. Labour has had a panic terror over the cheap labour of Asia, China in particular, though nothing in the end is so profitless and so destructive as "cheap," ignorant, unschooled labour enslaved by its lacks. There were in the Southern States sixty years ago about 246,000 slaveholders who believed there was money, profit, power, in their social system. They chose war to protect it. They went through the most colossal bankruptcy known to the modern world, until the cur-

rent bankruptcy of Germany, after a war to protect another evil system. Russia is essentially Asiatic and one reason for the failure to understand the Russian situation is because so little is clearly known, seen, and explained as to the effect of this vast industrial change on lands which did not profit by it, but have lost all the advantages and benefits of the old system and replaced it by no efficient industrial system whatever. Their governments are left without stable revenue, credit, or power, their people lapse into civil and social disorder, security for personal and property rights is destroyed, and in the fell struggle for economic existence and for the rescue of some shreds of industrial opportunity and some small share of the necessities of life, internal conflict becomes more destructive; but too vague to take the definite form of civil war for a cause and for a purpose. Instead, there succeeds the vast shock of armies fighting in the night, slaughter bringing neither defeat nor victory. Class rises against class, race against race, religion massacres religion, men who have had no cause for quarrel but mere contiguity, as with Chinese villages and provinces, meet ignoble death in fruitless war and ineffectual conflict, the dead dying without honour and the living no fruit or laurel of victory reap.

As you read all this there sweeps across your mind

the sense of the sudden interpretation of the news you have read for thirty or forty years, battle, murder, and sudden death for millions; small nations and large springing at each other's throats and both losing more than they can win. Great nations reeling to defeat, like wrecked hulks breaking up on a lee-shore, while, on their slippery decks, pirate and mutineer grapple for spoils that belong to neither and which neither will ever enjoy or own.

The "Industrial Revolution" for the Western world is to-day in its last chapter—the fight for control. No man is wise enough to prophesy whether the peaceful evolution of the past will continue—as the overwhelming majority of Americans desire and propose to have any new order established—or whether the old will be destroyed and the crash of its pillars bring down the whole edifice of our civilization, alike on the Philistine lords of capital and the blind Samson of labour. It is because Americans at this hour are bent on justice and evolution and will not permit conflict and revolution that men and women for the first time in history, at the close of a great war, find its hero not in any one man who destroyed life but in Hoover who saved life.

The "Industrial Revolution" has brought prosperity, if not peace, in the Western world, and particularly in its industrial leaders, the two nations

foremost in its development, the British Empire and the United States. But Turkey, Persia, China have never even had the "Industrial Revolution." They are where we would be if cottage industries and town trades, weaver, spinner, joiner, cordwainer, tailor, smith, and tanner, had been put out of business and miner, farmer, and small shopkeeper had gone with them. The capital and industries of the past have been destroyed and nothing has come to take their place, imports from lands which had gone through the "Industrial Revolution" supplying their wants and preventing, by pitiless competition, the growth of a new system.

In Turkey this is the process of which I was a witness in my boyhood and from afar have seen the wreck go on from year to year. I lived in Mosul. The place gave us the name "muslin" for the fine and dainty fabrics which were still being woven from the silky staple cotton of southern Mesopotamia in dim, stone-walled cellars, where the air was cool and damp. Those looms no longer hear the soft thud of the turning beam or the rustle of the shuttle, its spools made of yellow cane, as the bare feet of the weaver shift the warps of the weft. Morocco, yellow and red, was made by tanners who trod the hides underfoot and used the dyes of a thousand years agone; but the shoes of to-day come from without. On the

floor of my study, as I write, is a Persian carpet (8 by 18 feet) for which in 1857 my father, as his account book shows, paid $40—it would cost $600 to $800 now—but the rugs of to-day are woven in great sheds and the old patterns and the old dyes grow worse year by year. I played on it as a boy of eight, and more than threescore years later it is still fresh, fair, and bettered by long and careful wear. Not so with those of to-day. The girls who wove it by a year's labour went home happy with an ample dowry. To-day, a bare wage keeps soul and body together. Old glassworkers still knew in Mosul the art of mosque lamps that sell to-day for what would then have met the wage of a lifetime. Scarce a city in the Ottoman Empire but had its special craft. The pottery of Kutaiyeh, the copper of Diarbekr, the embroidery in Kurdish harems with which the fashion of to-day winds the turban-like toque, the tiles of Erzerum, the enamels of Damascus, the brasses and lacquers of Persia. These all once made but for daily use have become the curiosities of the shop and museum, the sought of the auction room, catalogued and described.

XXV

EX-TERRITORIAL RIGHTS AND THEIR WORK

THE art and arts of the past have gone and the "Industrial Revolution" has not brought the factory in their place. A low tariff, enforced in a treaty by Western nations, England leading, gave foreign goods an advantage. In some cases the export tax was at a heavier rate than the import tax also enforced by treaty. No change could be made in this treaty tariff except with the consent of all the nations selling their goods to Turkey. The old industries of the land were destroyed. The ex-territorial privileges secured by Francis I of France nearly 400 years ago gave the foreign importer every advantage. When he sold goods to the Turkish trader, the foreign trader could collect his invoices and sales through his own consular court. The judge was his compatriot. His own tongue was used. His own law was invoked. Under treaty, Turkish officials must collect the judgment of the Consular Court. If the Turkish trader sold goods for export, he must sue in the Consular Court of the trader to whom

he had sold the goods. The domestic exporter must accept the law, the procedure, the judgment of the consul sitting as judge, and the officers of the consul, appointed to protect and promote British, French, or other trade as the case might be, sat as judge or consular judges appointed by foreign power. The system worked better than any one would expect. But the system itself was wrong. American exporters have learned in the war just over what it meant to be forced to go to a British consular authority to secure permission to send American goods in an American vessel to an American agent in a neutral port in South America, of a country at peace with all parties to the conflict, as were we. What chance would the American producer, the American exporter, and the American importer have had in the past century if our tariff had been drawn by treaty, favouring imports, if all foreign commercial suits had to be passed upon, not by our own courts, but by consular courts, and the foreign exporter and importer could be sued only in the friendly atmosphere of a consular court of his own nationality and be free from process except in that court, even for crime.

All European nations and the United States shared in this system. It began as part of the early policy of law, of practice, of policy, and of immemorial tradition under the Roman Empire

and far earlier, that every stranger in a strange land remained under the jurisdiction of his own nation and his own people and lived apart in a special area assigned to him and to his people. So Genoese and Venetian lived in Galata, so the merchants of the Hanseatic League lived in London—until, in 1597, Elizabeth ended their stay of 700 years—so the Phoenician and the Hellene lived apart in the ports of Persia and of Egypt, so still earlier, 4,000 years ago, the stranger lived in Babylon. Twenty years ago in Mogador I found that in a brief stay I could live in a house in the Moorish city and outside of the narrow quarters of the foreign settlement, only by the special permission of my consul and the special grant and favour of the Moorish governor. Nightly the gates of that foreign compound were locked and bolted, nightly a Moorish guard sat outside and a foreign guard inside and none could pass after the gates were closed. So the stranger had traded from the dawn of trade. So up to a few short years ago all foreign trade was conducted on a little shelf of land in this harbour and that, and in it the stranger could buy and sell and in that space his courts decided his rights and condemned his wrongs. All European lands freed themselves. As the Moslem world lost power, it and all Asia besides accepted the old plan.

It was no one nation's work that it began. It was no one nation's demand that it continued. Japan freed itself because it was strong. China, Persia, Turkey, and other Asiatic states are still bound. The United States proposes to end this system for Siam. The Treaty of Versailles especially continues the old system, with all its evils, but abolished it for Germans, sure to be an advantage in the end. It is well to remember these things when the economic collapse of Turkey, China, and the rest are charged up to their governments and they are brought to the bar for commercial failure and lack of development of their internal revenues. Their governments are poor, but due allowance must be made for a system which has given the foreign trader, the foreign owner of concessions for public utilities and foreign capital invested in railroads, such advantages, protection, and privileges as no independent country would permit for an instant. Down to twenty-five years ago a majority of the shares of the Pennsylvania Railroad was owned in London. What chance would the development of the State of Pennsylvania have had if this capital had been the special charge of the British Embassy of Washington, exerting "pressure" in its behalf, and the policy of the road conducted by men who could be tried either in civil or even criminal cases only before a British consular court in Philadel-

phia, with freight and passenger rates adjusted to the profits of foreign security holders?

In Turkey, these conditions were made still worse by the corruption brought about by the system itself. Honest administrators, honest financiers, and honest judges have lived in Turkey. Corruption exists in many governments. This country has had its lamentable scandals. No country and no government has been wholly free from them. At stages of development, civil, political, military, administrative, and judicial, such as the Turkish Government has passed through in the last century, nearly all countries have had like scandals. The corruption of English judges in Bacon's day, of the Long Parliament and the entire English political system in the first half of the eighteenth century, is a commonplace of history. So with the French monarchy before the Revolution. The Revolution itself and the successive governments of France, they have all had their scandals. Look at the Caillaux trial. The long negotiations extending for twenty years before the war in which the German Imperial Government protected Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1896 from the wrath of Europe and the penalties of the Berlin treaty for the first Armenian massacres, the diplomatic coercion by which the grant of the Constantinople and Bagdad railway was secured twenty years ago, the sale of its bonds

and shares at exorbitant, usurious rates by the Berlin banks and the equipment of the line sold by the Krupps, with the Kaiser and his coadjutors shareholders in the banks and in Krupps—these successive transactions all drip corruption and ooze guilt at every step.

The Versailles Treaty righteously wiped out the fruits of this conspiracy of corrupt gain through corruption on both sides. But public report and often more than report attaches the same corruption to the entire body of concessions secured from the Turkish Government by and for foreign capital, with ex-territorial privileges to help. Why was Smyrna never bombarded and taken during the war, depriving the Turkish army of a most useful base? Was it because such a step would have destroyed lucrative concessions in which allied capital was invested? Why was no open port with such concessions ever attacked until the port could be reached by land, from the rear. Every such port helped Turkey. The occupation of Alexandretta at the right moment would have cut the Turkish line of communication in two if efficiently followed up. An American of great distinction, of stainless life, public and private, and of supreme public usefulness, flatly declined to arbitrate in a great claim over a Turkish concession, though asked by both parties, because he knew and

plainly said that the whole situation in the Turkish Government at every turn was so rotten that which ever way he decided he would be believed to have been bought at the last moment by that side.

Exactly as some of the most shameless acts about our state capitals have been done by men otherwise honourable who told you that they had to do it to protect the interests of "widows and orphans" who held shares in the corporation for whom they were acting, so this long period in which all the European powers big and little were using their influence at Constantinople for all sorts of selfish national ends, land grabbing and concession seizing, has bred and trained the entire official life of Turkey to the sacrifice of everything to protect the Ottoman Empire. When men tread these paths of moral compromise for generations, they reach at last stygian depths of slaughter in the name and cause of patriotism. So a French king, three centuries ago, slew 30,000 of his subjects on St. Bartholemew's day in the name of faith and religion, and medals of commemoration were struck about it as medals were struck at Berlin over the *Lusitania*. But even that French king did not buy the privilege of slaughter by surrendering his land to a foreign master as did Talaat Pasha, Grand Vizier, and Enver Bey, Secretary

of War, to gain the privilege of doing to death by massacre and starvation at least 800,000 Armenians and from 200,000 to 300,000 Greeks. The guilt was equally divided between these men and the German Imperial Government. The wretched old man who wanders around Amerongen is the partner and backer of this crime. In his ears must sound the shrieks of women, the dying sobs of children, and the rattle of German machine-guns playing on throngs of helpless and unarmed men. If Germany seems to some to be paying a heavy price in these months of disaster, suffering, and death, the Armenian and Greek massacres would have never come if the Imperial German Government, backed by all Germany, had not shared in planning, supporting, and condoning this continuing crime from which the Armenian nation still suffers and is almost destroyed.

XXVI

WHY DID NOT TURKEY IMPROVE?

THE Turk would not have sunk to this damning offence in this our day if he had not been deprived of the moral standards of his own faith, through the policy, horrible oppression, and tradition of his empire and the evil habit of its red rule. Christianity has had its massacres in the name of a merciful Saviour. They give their proof that the moral standards and practices of religions can improve and that those of Mohammedanism also will. Mohammed began merciful, but before he died he brimmed the red trench at Medina with the blood of Jews who had surrendered on a pledge of safety. He preached mercy to those who submitted and he practised mercy. For three centuries the Turkish Empire was at least as merciful as European lands, but its mosques preached the death of unbelievers. As Turks became more civilized their Moslem preachers and teachers grew more bigoted. In the background of every Moslem mind lay the possibility of slaughter and its justification. These things rot the moral habit of thought. There are millions of Turks kindly,

merciful, better than the preaching of their faith, and seeking the better and not the worse, the early and not the later teaching of their prophet. So it befell that when, for the first time in over two centuries since the Turk recoiled beaten from the gates of Vienna, and began to tread the path of successive defeat, of power lost in every decade, of territory diminished in every generation, there came opportunity and the hour struck when the Turkish Empire might have been saved and the Christians of the empire were ready to forget the past and accept Ottoman citizenship, when the Turkish Government had but to stand aside and its future was secure. The divine judgment which breaks guilty lands like a potter's vessel and brings confusion to the councils of men brought it about that three men in power closed the open door of the future by the Armenian massacres.

This tyranny could not have come if the invention and use of weapons of precision had not put power into the hands of a weak government. At the close of the eighteenth century Turkey seemed doomed. For forty years Russia rent away province after province. The mutinous force of Janissaries, perhaps 30,000 strong, never over 70,000, dethroned one sultan after another. Dynasty, government, and people neared their end in 1827, when a Russian army headed by General Diebitsch took

Adrianople and imposed a disgraceful peace. But absolute despotism all over Asia was to have new lease of life through modern weapons and a modern army. Our American missionaries for forty years went over Turkey, hazarding all roads far more safely than they could have gone over Sicily between 1819 and 1859, the Italian peninsula, the Iberian peninsula, or north as well as south Greece, already independent. In all these lands the brigandage, of which the annals of the period are full, made the territories specified less safe to travel than was newly freed Turkey in Asia. The Balkans were less safe. If the roads were safe 1820-1870, the new powers of the Sultan were for sixty years only used for paper reforms. Civil rights were granted to all the subjects of the Sublime Porte (Hatti-Humayoun, 1839) and religious liberty assured with reference to Moslems, in official theory but not public practice (Hatti Sherif, 1856). This promise was more than was true at that date of the kingdom of the two Sicilies, the states of the Church and Spain. Autonomous organization and self-administration were granted to dissident fragments who left the reorganized religious communities (Millet) or denominations as we should say. This was not granted in the Austro-Hungarian Kingdom to the "Confessionlos" or dissenters until some dozen years ago, to

Spain still later, and Bolivia, an American state which we protect from European aggression, did not permit any but one form of faith to worship publicly until within a recent date.

Why, then, with this liberal policy and act on the part of the Sultan and the governing group at Constantinople, has Turkey fallen so far behind those it early outstripped? All expected better things. I was a growing boy when these reforms were in their rosy dawn. When my sainted father marshalled before the Lord "the means used in spreading thy Kingdom on earth," in those for whom he asked a blessing he included the Sultan of Turkey. His sight draft on the Almighty for abundant blessings on me has certainly been honoured in my case; but I cannot say as much for the Sultan he prayed for. The best prayer I ever heard on the blessings of the telegraph was pronounced by the Chief Mufti of Diarbekr when the sounder ticked out on the Morse alphabet, adapted to Turkish, in 1859, the greeting of the Sultan to his subjects and every creed in the room, some twelve in number, joined in the "Ah-meen" of the Moslem and joined with a sincere affection in the cheer for the padishah and the Oriental wish that he should live forever, the precise translation of the "Semper vivat" of the thronged circus of Constantinople when it hailed an emperor.

But it was all to fail. The fond hope, the fervent expectation, the pious prayer were all to end in the tragedy beyond words of massacre sixty years later. Why? Economic causes in great measure. This is one reason why the only effective aid to Turkey that can avail must come from the strongest nation in economic resource in the world. In spite of the effort its rulers made for half a century to introduce reforms, they wholly failed. Islam and other causes I have given. The other Mediterranean lands, not equal to Turkey once, who missed the "Industrial Revolution" in the eighteenth century and in the first half of the nineteenth century, have gained its advantages in the past sixty years. Spanish Catalonia swarms with textile factories and the Biscayan coast has developed steel and copper industries. Taking the time it has had—for up to 1870 Italy, though sharing in scientific discovery, knew almost nothing of modern industry—the Italian peninsula is a marvel of successful industrial progress and discovery. The Balkans are backward. Hungary suffered because the joint tariff admitted Austrian goods and prevented development, but Austria, in 1848, half a century behind England, became later for certain wares the manufacturing centre of the world.

Why not Turkey? The civil administration was and is corrupt. It has improved. Fair credit

is not given Turkey for its advance in education from primary schools up. The moral level of Turkey is low and Islam has a lower standard than Christianity, as was shown in dealing with the religious base of Turkey. Bad morals make bad industries. The courts of Turkey are believed to be corrupt. I do not hold a brief for the stainless judicial integrity of the Mediterranean states. Turkish criminal administration has not tolerated anything as notorious and as maleficent as the "Mafia." Even in New York it is not suppressed as it should be. Our Italian "gangs" are a ruder Mafia, more courageous. As to brigandage, I would, through the thirty years, 1880 to 1910, far rather have penetrated alone into any part of Turkey, except a region back of Smyrna, than wander on the slopes of the Thessalian Olympus—things are better now—or thread the roads of Sicily back of Palermo, let us say, or take my risk on the southern rim of Andalusia, north and south, particularly south of the Sierra Nevada. But in criminal cases Turkish courts are Asiatic, suspected of venality, capricious and cruel. The courts have greatly improved in the regions and tracts I have reluctantly cited by way of comparison. The Mediterranean states, of course, exclude France, and Turkey has also improved.

The gain in Turkey is less. Turkish judges

there are, able, better educated and trained. Many are men of courage, probity, and ability. The adoption of a code, civil, criminal, and of procedure, has mended matters, but in a country like Turkey when you get away from the capital and are in "the interior" the judge still "sits in the gate" and dispenses the rude justice of the Cadi, often vigorous, sometimes just, but not trusted and always uncertain. The Turkish code enacts that all marriage, probate and family law, in the past, for Christian and Moslem under Ecclesiastical law and jurisdiction, shall be settled by civil courts and the code. But custom (Adet) is stronger in the East than codes, courts, and authority, and the old custom in these is still strong over much of the empire. In addition, the same strengthening of the direct and effective power of the Sultan and the administration whose heads he selects through an efficient army, already noted, makes the courts more responsive to the central authority for all ends, bad and good, mostly bad, just as the French courts were far more responsive to the Crown in France in the century and a half from Louis XIII to Louis XVI than in the century from Francis of Valois to Henry of Navarre. The courts were more learned in the latter period and individually I take it the judges were better men, but the hand of authority was heavier. This hand is now wholly

absent from the courts of the republic, immeasurably better as they are than any French courts before from the days of Louis the Saint to the days of Napoleon, the Criminal and the Little. The more even-handed is democracy; the more even-handed is justice.

Why, then, did not justice improve in Turkey in the last sixty years with better codes, better men, better trained? How can any courts in any country improve or respect themselves when their own government, under duress it is true, and all other governments do not respect them but by solemn treaty agree that the Ottoman courts are not fit to try any cases in which a foreigner has an interest? What would our courts be, what would any courts be, if there were treaties saying in substance that these courts are good enough for Americans, but if an Englishman or a Frenchman or an Italian commits a crime or fails to pay a debt the only court that is good enough for him is his own consular court, appointed, paid, and kept in existence so as to be "impartial." No judicial progress is possible under these conditions. We have refused to let the system be introduced in Latin American states in a number of countries whose courts are certainly no better than in Turkey.

Still more, following the Roman law which it inherited, Ottoman jurisprudence places all mineral

deposits under the control of the state and all similar natural resources. These have not been developed because the central government will not make grants. Every such grant widens both the direct jurisdiction of consular courts and opens the door to diplomatic interference. Inevitably this system both limits the introduction of foreign capital and the development of internal resources and is and has been a direct barrier to that "Industrial Revolution" whose absence makes Turkey at once the richest and least developed of all its neighbours and contemporaries as to metals, oil, coal mines, railroads, irrigation, and all other natural and needed resources. One great reason why all Turkey has confidence in the way that the United States would execute a mandatory for Asiatic Turkey with wisdom and justice is that this country for a century has been wise enough and just enough to refuse to permit either Germany or England to impose this system on Latin American states as these powers would have been glad to do.

But backward industries and the treasures of mine, field, and stream, left unawakened and unused, are not as serious an injury to any land as the natural hatred and enmity of its citizens. This in the end has brought massacre and the hideous stream of blood that to-day divides the races of

Turkey by rapacious hate. It threatens the final fatal destruction of all before any truce can be adjusted since the one country trusted by all races, the United States, refuses to assume the task to which it is called and to which it alone is equal.

Economic law knows no escape and no postponement of the penalties of its violation by neglect or action, by a failure to develop new systems when the old pass away. Every economic injustice and denial of economic rights works its pitiless penalty on

> Oppressor with oppressed,
> And close as sin and suffering joined
> They march to fate abreast.

The laws of the just creator alike of earth and of man have no voice and their speech is not heard, but their course runs through all the world and from their judgment there is no escape. What a race soweth that also shall it reap, and no escape will it find when the measure it meted is measured to it again in due season.

XXVII

THE FRUIT OF BAD RULE AND COURTS UNFIT

THE absence of adequate courts and impartial justice in the Ottoman Empire made impossible the growth of internal industries. The smallest factory requires credit, banking, and the enforcement of contracts impartially for all suitors in a given jurisdiction. Ex-territoriality divided the uniform enforcement of contracts between Ottoman and consular courts and the foreigner was left in control of imports. Had Turkey been homogeneous in religion and race as was Spain at the other end of the Mediterranean, the Ottoman Empire would not have fallen behind the advancing march of European industry through the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. The leathers of Cordova, the steel of Toledo, the stuffs of Catalonia and the wines of southern Spain and of Portugal once commanded the markets of north Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Through the eighteenth they lost ground and in the nineteenth near lost to view. The merciless expulsion

of Jew and Moor in the opening of the seventeenth century by Philip III (reign 1598-1621) in defiance of the laws of God and man, of personal pledge and public faith, left Spain one in faith and in race. Its descent from the abounding power, prosperity, trade, and industrial position it held from the discovery of America to the loss of the Spanish Netherlands and its Italian possessions went on through the last half of the seventeenth and all the eighteenth century, went on without internal dislocation, social revolution, or political revolution. Not even the loss of its colonies at the beginning and the close of the nineteenth century brought shock or cataclysm. Spain remained the most interesting land in Europe, in every generation surprising countries which ignorantly deemed it decrepid, by the originality of its art and the freshness of its literature. So far as democracy consists in the intelligent and agreeable contact of human beings on a common level, mutually accepted, Spain leads the modern world. Nowhere else is the urbanity of the poor and labouring so apparent, nowhere is the pride of descent and title concealed with such gracious charm and courtesy.

Turkey was not homogeneous. Such virtues as it has had have brought it harm. The Spanish Jews to whom Ahmed I (reign 1603-1617) gra-

ciously gave asylum in Salonica were the brains of the secret Committee of Union and Progress which turned out Sultan Abdul Hamid and steered the Ottoman Empire to its appalling but deserved destruction. The impartial pressure of its unremitting oppression over the Balkans prevented the Hellenization of the Bulgars and the Serb, in full progress, before the Turk appeared. Both peoples rose to drive the Turk from Europe, to divide the Balkans, and make it an active laboratory for turning out small wars and great to the confusion of the world.

Divided as the Ottoman Empire is both in race and religion the effect of the Industrial Revolution on a land whose institutions, administration, and courts made modern development impossible, rent in twain the whole structure of its economics, its social organization, and its political institutions with conflict, collision, and massacre. The first and worst fault of Islam is that it teaches the Moslem to despise those of other faiths and creeds. Nothing is so fatal as contempt to the man who indulges this besetting human sin. In a mere game like golf or bridge contempt is perilous. In a real game, like poker, contempt is suicide. When contempt is made the rule of life and its principal factor, pride goeth before destruction and a haughty spirit before a fall. Where the possession

of a particular creed or a white skin or a place in a particular race is made the basis of daily life and contact, a smash is certain. The world is made that way.

The Moslem was as uncompromising about this as was the Southern slave-holder. No Christian became a judge in days only a half century distant. The Christian was doomed to dark clothing. No gay red or yellow slippers for him, no silk caftan and no red fez. Dun colours and dark for him and his women-folk, and it was held to be "offensive" to display his prosperity and ride a horse. An ass for him. The feeling in my childhood in Turkey about these things was precisely similar to that felt in a Southern city when a negro family turns out visibly owning and, still more "offensive" visibly enjoying the ownership, of a Packard or a Pierce-Arrow. It is not prohibited by law. Neither were gay clothing for the Christian in Turkish cities, but it was perilous, all the same. Where contempt is the attitude of the superior and more powerful, contempt hereditary, immemorial, constant, preventing intermarriage, social relations, and nearly all the personal contacts of life and this contempt is based on race and religion, factors practically unchangeable in the East, the prosperity of the less powerful race packs the situation with dynamite.

Prosperity and opportunity began to come to the Christian races of Turkey about a century ago. The agreement as to the status of the Jew and the Moor in Spain rested on various agreements which culminated at the surrender of Grenada, 1492. Those who wished went to Africa. Those who remained kept their property and were given civil rights in trade, residence, and courts, though at a disadvantage in the latter. They were excluded from Government service, from the universities, army and navy, their residence was confined to certain quarters, and there were restrictions on the purchase of realty. These were substantially the status of Christian populations under Turkish rule. In Spain, the Jews became the bankers and moneylenders of the kingdoms and the traffic of the realm went into the hands of Moors. In a century both were expelled. When the settlements of the Huguenots were completed, 1598, they, too, were cut off from the civil and military service of the state, its universities and the learned callings. Intermarriage was forbidden unless the children were of the ruling faith, and there were limitations on residence, domicile and property rights. They became the bankers and moneylenders of France, foreign trade with England, the Netherlands, and Protestant Germany was in their hands, and they had in these lands special advan-

tages, personal, financial, and mercantile. In a little short of one hundred years they were expelled.

The more prosperous, the better educated, the more successful was Jew or Moor or Huguenot, the stronger was public feeling against them. All experience proves that if any part of a population be excluded from the ordinary channels of official, political, social, and common activity and a special residence be assigned, the more certain it is that on some outlet like money-lending, banking, land-holding, if permitted, they will concentrate, win success, and in due course be hated, proscribed, deported, or massacred. The plain moral of all this is that if any land denies to a part of its population the general right of human beings to a share in all lawful activities and privileges, civil, political, mercantile, educational, the more certain they are to seek some field where they can win. The negro owned no land in the Southern States. Yearly he owns more. How much will he own forty-two years hence when the centennial of the emancipation of the race is celebrated?

In the Ottoman Empire the wars which began in the middle of the eighteenth century cut off much foreign trade, though in the decade of peace that preceded the French Revolution imports began. When the Napoleonic wars were over, peace restored with Russia, in 1830, foreign imports

grew on a large scale and the restrictions on the Christian populations of different faiths were legally removed, though Moslem prejudice kept many in practical operation. The trade with Christian lands represented by Christian merchants naturally went into the hands, in Turkish ports and in the interior, of local Christian agents, representatives and interpreters. This had always been more or less the case. Moslems carried on the trade to the east with Persia and beyond and the commerce which came up the Persian Gulf. This was once the gateway to China, and an Arabian geographer records the presence of 800 Chinese junks in the ninth century in Koweit the port England "protects" as part of the "trucial Arabs" and refused to Germany as the terminus of the Constantinople-Bagdad-Persian Gulf railroad.

European trade in goods from Asia coming through Turkey passed to the hands of European factors. Genoa and Venice once furnished them. France and England came later. The average conservative Moslem shrinks from travel and trade in strange Christian lands. Its atmosphere is alien. To the devout, ceremonial pollution is on every hand. To those less religious, the customs of the West, the hurrying streets, the unveiled women, the reversal of all his familiar conventions in daily life affront his sense of the fit behaviour of rational

men of the household of faith. "God be praised," said the head of Moslem learning in Mosul to the explorer, discoverer, archæologist, and diplomat Layard, "here we were born, here we live, and have no desire to quit it. Why should we wander as you do, visiting all places and content in none?" He daily walked the streets to the mosque where he taught, familiar to me in years agone, as a Moslem should walk, "neither too fast as one in haste, nor too slow as one idle; but as a man should who has a duty to perform and the time in which to do it."

This was a praiseworthy gait when Turkish ports were the open door to the East and the West bought the spices, the drugs, the balms, the coffee it could nowhere else obtain; but it is far removed from the hustle and bustle of modern trade. This same trade devastated native industries and the Christian Syrian, Armenian, and Greek were the natural agents of the new wares. Cheap, machine-made, they destroyed the wares of the land. The separation of race and religion emphasized the catastrophe. The Oriental city is divided into quarters by race and religion. Each has its small stores and the city its central bazaar. The Moslems are nearly always 80 per cent. of the population and once carried their share of the retail trade. In many cities the Moslems are 90 per cent. The workmen of the mediæval type who supplied these

Moslem retailers and the retailers themselves decade by decade lost. The centre of each city was in the middle of the last century in Moslem hands, as generally it is in white hands in the South. There is the great mosque; there are the guild-halls. There were once the bazaars devoted to each trade, occupied in common by its members, locked and guarded at night.

This Moslem control was emphasized by their ownership Wakf the "pious Trust" of Moslem law and the Moslem faith. Roman law had schooled the lands which Arab and Turk conquered in all the subtleties of perpetual trusts and self-perpetuating trusteeships. "What shall I do with my property when I come to die?" said Omar, the second caliph to Mohammed. "Leave it," said the founder of the faith, "to thy children and the poor of God." So Omar left his property to his family with a share of its revenues to be paid to mosque and charity. Over the whole was thrown the sacred and protecting mantle of the Prophet. It is a pretty story, but the details of Moslem Wakf follow too closely the principle, practice, and safeguards of the Justinian code to leave doubt of its origin. The peril of the wealthy in despotic, Oriental lands is confiscation by the sovereign who is the visible and autocratic state. Here was escape and refuge. The trustees might be named

by mosque or a school of the sacred law or fill their own vacancies or be named by successive heirs or next of kin. In any case, the "poor of God" protected the future revenue of those who were neither poor nor always of God. Many of these foundations were dedicated to pious uses, worship, education, charity, learning, public baths, the daily reading of the Koran. I have passed a season in a house where yearly I must pay those who sounded the Nfer, the long, straight brass trumpet, descended straight from the trump of the Old Testament which boomed the coming of the new moon, which ended the fast of Ramadhan, and in another house and city years later I was charged on every Friday to provide cool water as the believers passed at hot high noon. Nor will any think the worse of me I hope that when the first charge came I trebled the trumpets to the glory of the mosque and the profit of its servitors and in the other case had sweetened water ready for the few weeks in which I gave cold water to the thirsty worshipper of another but ancient and sincere creed. Two of the trumpets are in the Smithsonian today. I herewith file them as exhibits.

This system, Wakf, rested on the trade of the past. It suffered as a new trade came in carried on by the new agents of the wares which lowered the price, and decade by decade, for the pro-

cess was slowly changed by economic conditions, destroyed the local manufacture and supply of local and ancient wares. As with mediæval trusts, many abuses had come in. Rentals assessed in years long gone by were sublet at great profits. In and after the Crimean War, the government took these religious trusts and agreed to pay fixed charges and revise rentals as they fell in. It was but part of the suppression of sacred uses in our modern day which began with the Tudors and is ending with the French suppression of religious orders recently and the confiscations in Russia by a Bolshevik state.

In Turkey, a theocratic state, in which the sovereign himself is the visible head of the local faith, suppression could not come and Wakf with its trusts, holding property untouched, prevented the rebuilding and reorganization of municipalities, a step so important and so necessary that it has remodelled the centre of all the cities of Europe while in Turkey new centres arose, and these are often in Christian quarters, once squalid and shunned by Moslem.

In the briefest terms I have outlined this chain of economic causes which played upon religious and racial causes and embittered fanaticism, prejudice, and the pride and contempt bred by both. Nowhere did these work in exactly the same way.

Economic causes were not alone. Neither was fanaticism alone. Each reacted on the other. The "Industrial Revolution," as we know too well, has bred wars and fired the frenzy of the mobs, destroyed institutions, dynasties, and countries, changed the face of modern society, and brought us to the sinister and ominous struggle which makes those whose years will not leave them to see the final result feel like those who see the future "as a lion, creeping nigher, glares at one that nods and winks behind a slowly dying fire."

If all this change and conflict has taken place in lands where the "Industrial Revolution" has in the main brought prosperity and progress, raised the level of life, and opened the door of opportunity to millions, how much more certain was cataclysmic catastrophe certain to come in a land which has in many a lifetime like my own passed from mediæval calm to the strain of vast modern forces. These ignorant populations are sincere but close to the savage temper of periods like the Crusades and the wholesale massacres of the European Christian past. They see old industries perishing, the weapons which have destroyed them in the lands of those they have condemned, Moslem houses in ruins and Christian quarters rebuilt, new fortunes made by processes they do not understand or comprehend. Their banking, exchange, and the financial machin-

ery of personal, social, civil, and fiscal life have passed into the hands who represent other lands whose traders, agents, and business have a protection denied the native. So the mine was dug and packed and the machine laid for an explosion.

This neither palliates nor excuses massacre. Not a Moslem, not even the most ignorant but knew his creed, forbade cruelty and slaughter to those who accepted Moslem rule. The final responsibility rests with those at Berlin who, knowing these conditions and their explosive character, used them to glut ambition and win a world dominion. Sultan Abdul Hamid alone would never have adventured on the massacres of twenty-five years ago without the backing of Berlin and the adventurers who led the Ottoman race and empire to ruin, the triumvirs, Talaat, Enver, and Djemal, who planned and ordered massacre, had the aid, direction, and encouragement of the Kaiser and those about him who believed it possible to use the fruits of the "Industrial Revolution" in Germany to weld the Near East in one, to create a single world state from the North Sea and the Baltic to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, with Europe in the west and east subdued and the Republic of the west alone too weak to resist.

This conspiracy has failed. It is as impossible to imprison a people at hard labour as to indict it.

Turkish rule over subject races is over for all time. This does not change the bold fact which none can gainsay *that 70 to 80 per cent. of the population* of Asiatic Turkey is Mohammedan. This Moslem population is armed, resolute, warlike, and determined on self-government. In power and position the Moslem has been for centuries the governing force of the Ottoman Empire and the population speaking Turkish has held the direction and leadership of the Mohammedan population. The "Turks" are no longer a "marauding tribe from central Asia." It is extremely doubtful if they ever were such a tribe. Such evidence as there is goes to show that the small group out of which Othman forged an army in 1290 had a core or centre of those descended from nomads who entered Asia Minor two centuries before. In that time they had made the same progress and the same kind of material, not moral progress as the Franks had made in France from 500 to 700 A.D., the Visigoths had made in Spain from 500 to 700, as the Anglo-Saxons had made from Hengist and Horsa in 570 to Alfred in 900 and the same kind of advance. They had amalgamated with themselves men drawn from the races of Asia Minor.

If we had the genealogy of those whose black tents were pitched on the slopes that lead to the Sea of Marmora about Othman's herd of goats

and his tents of black goat's hair, we would find that his followers were descended from Hellene and Roman, Phrygian, Lydian, Moesian, Cappadocian, and Gaul. This would often have been true on the mother's side, near or remote, and less frequently, still often, on the male side. They had accepted Persian in verse and Islam in religion. They knew how the Byzantine army was organized and were improving on it, trusting less to armour and more to mobility. Their folk lore was no longer wholly central Asian, though they kept their touch with the primal home because all the way between were men of their name, tongue, and mingled lineage. They were already building as were the Greek architects of Constantine's city and building relatively much better than the Frank, the Visigoth, and Saxon then did. Turkish tribes who joined Othman had been the resort of all the flotsam and jetsam which followed the prodigious wreckage which the tornado of Jenghiz Khan had left as it broke on Asia Minor and Syria, slaying and despoiling. He had sacked Smyrna and east of the Pacific had left a wake, red with blood and fire. The strong men that had escaped in near Asia doubtless sought the new chief who in eight short years had driven the Byzantines out of the territory they had reoccupied in the ebb of the one-eyed, lame, short-armed Jenghiz. Of these re-

cruits of all races I am sure because this the Turks have done ever since. Run your eye down the six centuries which separate us from Othman and you will find that no group has so easily amalgamated all comers, except the Armenian, as the Turk.

Probe the genealogy of a "Turk." Here and there, rarest of all, will you find some town in a cleft of the Taurus whose families draw down for 600 years from the primitive group that rode with Othman. The overwhelming share, if they have a family tradition, draws from all the races of the Near East. So it is to-day in any group of Turkish officials. This blend of blood has made the Turk what he is. This has left him without the unconscious moralities that are bred in men of one blood, one race, one history, and one family tradition. This background of men who broke away from the smoking ruins of Greek cities and the white blood-stained walls of Syrian Arab towns, the breached 'dobe walls of Kurdish villages, the black tents of the Arab, and the brown camel's hair felted kibitkas of the great Tartar trek—men whose gay-tiled Persian homes had been whelmed in the ruin that piled pyramids of heads at every city gate of Iranistan, began a habit in the Turk of hospitable welcome for all who came to his camp, as Othman began, with his iron sword and rough-tanned leather belt. New blood has always come

in to vivify the old, and that great leading foremost authority on Asia Minor, Sir W. M. Ramsay, is right in holding that all before in that land of new conquerors from Europe and central Asia is merged in 6,000,000 Anatolian Turks who are the keystone of the Ottoman rule.

The Turk, Kurd, and nomad tribes in Asia Minor and the eastern tableland that looks on Persia, 15,000,000 to 16,000,000 strong, cannot be slaughtered wholesale and cannot be driven anywhere. They outnumber the Christian races in all but limited areas. What those areas are no one can tell until an international census has been held. No one can trust the estimates of either side. The declaration of Lloyd George, as head of the English Government, that England has no troops to send to govern the region is true. Volunteering is slow and England has abolished conscription. France has no troops. Neither Italy nor Greece or both together could furnish the force to conquer the region. To leave the matter to be fought out means the wholesale massacres of the Christian races—their extermination. The old rule of the Turk cannot be restored. The one power all these races respect is the United States of America.

Our Government is the only one which has never been moved to official massacre by the State as an instrument of State. The annals of the other lands

are stained with them. In the past they have made the wholesale murder of the helpless part of the repression of resistance. Partly because we come late to power but partly, for these crimes have also been within the century and a half of our national life, because we are better, more merciful, of higher standards and principles. This also is the reason why Moslem and Christian in Turkey would accept our rule and our protectorate as a pledge that the long tale of blood would be stayed and seen again no more forever, if our education, our training, our principles, and our ideals brooded for a season over that Valley of Decision in which lie the bones old and new of massacred men, women and children in all the centuries that are past.

China suffers as Turkey does, and no advance appears and no cure is proposed. So with Persia. The Latin American states, north of Chili and Argentine, suffer. No change for the better appears. The islands pass from disorder to disorder. The only remedy for all these regions is superintendence for a season, until education has done its work. Industrial development has begun. In due season, self-government will come. If this is not done, each country in turn will embroil the world in a long series of hideous wars. The world cannot be at peace, with great areas embroiled, embittered, certain to set the world aflame once more.

XXVIII

THE PRESENT SITUATION

THE Treaty of Versailles provided that Syria and Mesopotamia should be independent states under a mandatory now held by England and France respectively. From Syria, Palestine has been set apart, making an independent state under the protection of England; the development of these states is moving along lines already outlined. The real problem is always presented by Asia Minor.

Whenever war brings an earthquake which shatters dynasties, states, and boundaries, it has always been the case for 4,000 years that while the natural tendency of the area covered by Asiatic Turkey is to be ruled by a single sovereignty, the stress of whelming circumstances always brings about the division of this area into four parts, western Asia Minor, the plateau east of the heel of Asia Minor—"Armenia," Mesopotamia, and Syria. This has taken place since the Great War, but as has always taken place, since the days when the Hittites held Asia Minor, the tendency is

toward the creation of a stronger fighting force in this region than in any of these divisions. The present situation in this region follows in the line of the inevitable forces, often unseen of men, which make history a joint product of physical conditions and racial powers.

Whether the Greek defeat at Eski-Sheher in the last week of March and the first week of April, 1921, proves to be decisive, no one can tell. Defeated as the Greek army was at this railroad junction where the routes east and west or north and south across Asia Minor have crossed for twenty centuries, Greece is no worse defeated than in 1897 or Serbia in 1885. Eski-Sheher is the key to western Asia Minor. In that valley Cyrus defeated Crœsus (538 B. C.) and won Sardis and the Greek coast for the Persian Empire. The issue was essentially the same as now, nearly twenty-five centuries later. Crœsus and his capital were in touch with Greek learning, had Greek soldiers, letters, and trade. Cyrus had his Persians and central Asian mercenaries as Mustapha Kemal Pasha has his Kurds, closely related to Persia, his backing in Russian central Asia, the wandering tribes of Asia Minor, and the mixed races which he marshalled against the Greeks at Smyrna, the French in Cilicia, and the English in Mesopotamia as Crœsus sought to unite with

himself and his Greek backers Babylonian and Syrian forces. Here when Lysimachus defeated Antigonus (411 B. C.) the Greek world looked to Syria, Egypt, and Hellas as dividing the inheritance of Alexander's conquest. On this very battlefield Godfrey de Bouillon led the Crusaders in their final defeat (1097 A. D.) of Kilig-Arslan, the Seljuk Turk who ruled in Konia and had a force similar to that of the Turkish commander.

For all the changes of centuries, the Ottoman force which drove back the Greek army had as its backbone and fighting centre the mixed race of Asia Minor, now, as 2,500 years ago, the mixed result of the migration of Aryan races from the northwest, across the Bosphorus and Dardanelles or by sea, the local indigenous inhabitants of Asia Minor who go back to an Aryan immigration before Greeks appeared and the Kurd, earlier in all probability than all the rest. When Othman began the Turkish Empire, two centuries after the Crusaders dealt the first heavy blow to the entrance of Seljuk Turks, he came down the same road the Greek left used in its advance from Brusa and seized Eski-Sheher as the strong place armed, long a Byzantine base, to seize Angora to the northeast and Konia to the south. When Tamerlane a century later defeated Sultan Bayezid at Angora, he swept through Eski-Sheher on his

conquering way to the destruction of Smyrna, which the Greeks hold now, and the massacre of its inhabitants.

The tides of history ebb and flow, but nothing essentially alters the basic fact that the control of Asia Minor rests on the strange, complex human amalgam which has been in the past and is now the fruit of the alternate entrance of races new in name but old in character who enter from European sources or from the central Asian fount of fighting men. The Treaty of Sèvres sought to parcel the region. Lloyd George, the English premier, aware that neither England nor France had troops to send, set Greece in motion, armed in part at least from the great stock of munitions left at Salonica. The Greeks have fought with unquestioned courage, but a lack of transport. The Turkish force has drawn its munitions from Russia, from the arms sent by England to the Armenian army, betrayed, abandoned, and left to a hopeless struggle by the Allies. Italy, all reports agree, preferred the Turk to the Greek in the region they hope later to enter. France, at the critical moment, gave encouragement to the Turkish force under Mustapha Kemal Pasha. The same European divisions which have protected the Ottoman Empire for over a century protect it still. The Sultan, Mohammed VI, is practically an

English prisoner. The central administration of the late Ottoman Empire, the viziers at Constantinople, possesses no power, no revenue, no army. But as long as the Turks of Asia Minor and the Kurds of the plateau east of Asia Minor can get arms and have a competent commander, the driving force of Ottoman supremacy in the past remains in existence, constituting the permanent and effective military support of the Turkish Empire, as the world has known it for 700 years.

When the Turkish army went to pieces in headlong rout, mismanaged by the German commander, and defeated by General Sir Edmund Allenby and his Anglo-Indian army in Palestine in the summer of 1918, it was believed that the disposition of the empire made by the Allies could be carried out without delay or difficulty. Turkey lost army, munitions, and all war material. Resistance seemed impossible. Three years have passed since the crushing defeat of Turkey and a year since the Treaty of Sèvres was signed (May 11, 1920). The area covered by the Turkish and Kurdish population in this treaty was in all 199,272 square miles and 10,186,900 inhabitants, twice the size of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, the Middle States and half their population. The actual population is probably larger, perhaps

by one half. This difference from the usual estimate has thus far proved true of parts of the Turkish Empire when a census is taken.

Bigoted, ignorant, cruel even to massacre when race and religion move them, this small group, divided in races and tongues and united only by Islam, has raised its army, drawn its ammunition from many sources, found its leader, a man reported to be of Jewish descent, held Europe at bay, divided the Allies, and won at least one victory which renders some readjustment in dividing Turkey whose character only the future can prove. This group in Asia Minor has done like work for the Turkish Empire over all the span of time which separates us from Magna Charta. Its forces reorganized Asia Minor when all civilization was destroyed, bent before Tamerlane, but closed up behind him, held back Persian invasion in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, when Persia was equal to the conquest of Delhi and northwest India, stayed the Russian advance southwest in Asia in the last century, and has shown a strength which Marshal Foch publicly declared can only be met by 300,000 men.

But for Islam Asia Minor would have assimilated the civilization of Europe. Its youth individually have shown themselves equal to every demand of university, technical, and military educa-

tion. The American men's colleges in Harpoot, Marash, Marsovan, Aintab, Tokat, Smyrna, Constantinople, and Beirut are attended by Moslems and will be flooded with them when settled peace comes. In the American College for Girls at Constantinople all races are represented. The Turkish young women are numerous and its Turkish alumnæ have won distinguished success and been of wide service. Halideh Hanum, a graduate of this college, has been Minister of Education in the government organized by Mustapha Kemal Pasha. No country has given a like cabinet post to a woman, and the most that has been done for a woman in the general administration of education in the United States has been once or twice to make her superintendent in a large city. This fighting population, able, masterful, and stained with atrocities—though no more than the Russian populations—still has a future before it.

There is no place the world over where American wealth can do more to make the future of southeastern Asia less bloodstained than the past, than by gifts and contributions to these American colleges and particularly the American College for Girls at Constantinople. The medical training it offers to women is the only one in Mohammedan Asia and its graduates will transform and civilize the women of Turkey and Persia and the zenanas of India.

American missions have founded these colleges. Their support has come from those who support missions. One would not exist without the other. For a century American missionaries have been in the Ottoman Empire. They have placed the Bible in circulation. They have awakened the older churches. Not one is as it was. All have advanced. The American missionaries have brought hospitals to every city. They have introduced the potato and changed the food of the Armenian plateau. They have opened high schools, they have exposed cruelty, massacre, injustice, and oppression. They have furnished literature and science in every leading tongue. They have preached the gospel in every language. They have associated the American name and flag with healing, mercy, bread for the starving, books and education for the ignorant. Never has such a work been done by any land. The American missionaries, men and women, have faced pestilence and massacre. They have given the United States a place of influence, confidence, love, and respect, never held in one country by another.

Judging from the centuries that are just passed, this population (for it is not a people) from the existing Armenia west to the Ægean will hold the region it has defended and eventually lay the

foundations of a new order. All experience shows that the future will be more peaceful, more secure, and make a swifter advance, if the Greeks, the Armenians, and other Christian populations are set apart in their own territory. This will be an intricate and perilous task; but separate quarters in each city for each race and faith, between Christian sects as well as between Moslem and Christian has been the only way in which anything like safety and order can be maintained. For centuries, this has been so. Men do not change in a day. Even in our cities, segregation has not diminished, perhaps increases.

Greeks have just right and desire to free those of their race and tongue in Asia Minor, but the leaders of Greek opinion desire also to extend their rule over regions large or small with Mohammedans in the majority. This is to propose to use a can of T N T as a corner-stone of the future. The Moslem population is equally determined to give their co-religionists all the rights and the evil supremacy of the past. The European powers are after "concessions." The luckless railroad which is being destroyed by its use in war was built by capital raised by Turkish bonds, peddled by German banks, and equipped by German works, now belongs to the Allies and when all is over will be nothing but two streaks of rust on a cordu-

roy road laid on a railroad embankment. Here is a long vista of financial conflict whose battlefields will be in stock exchanges and bourses. Italy will not give up Adalia in the southwestern corner of Asia Minor, and Greek public opinion believes Italy furnished the Turks with arms and that France withdrew its troops from Cilicia so as to leave the opposing Turkish army free to cut Greek communications to the southwest of Eski Sheher as the details of the battle show. Not otherwise could a force operating with its base at Angora have been able so soon to occupy Afiun-Kara-Hissar, the junction necessary to cover the Greek retreat to Smyrna. Whether these things are true or false, they have arrayed both parties in Greece against France and Italy and for England, in the east.

England's rule and possession of Cyprus had estranged Greece. The ruthless seizure of Salonica by the English fleet was bitterly resented. Greek ship-owners had ninety steamers in the trade of the Levant at the opening of the war. This large Greek interest equally resented the German submarine and English seizure of their steamers for military purposes. Italy, by concessions on the south Albanian frontier, could have gained Greek support. It opposed Hellenic claims, where they could not affect Italian interests. It opposed the

Greek occupation of Smyrna, and advanced its own occupation in Adalia so as to shut Greek merchants from important opium areas. France has even more openly aided the reorganization of the Turkish army under Mustapha Kemal Pasha. Whether a Greek lives in Greece or in the parts of the old Ottoman dominion which hold half as many Hellenes as there are in the Kingdom of Greece, whether he supports Venizelos or King Constantine, he cannot forget that it was the English premier, Lloyd George, who personally and on his own responsibility sent the Greek troops to Smyrna, has used the English navy to command the coast from Smyrna to Scutari for their benefit, and brought the boundaries of the Hellenic kingdom in Thrace almost within sight of the minarets of Constantinople.

England has in this way secured not only an ally, but can employ Greece and the Greek army as a convenient screen for her own operations and interests. Nor has England needlessly estranged the old Turkish Government at Constantinople or Mustapha Kemal Pasha in the field. The traditional policy of England has sought trade and not concessions. English policy in Egypt has strengthened England in all the Near East. The frank and open extension of self-government on the Nile has brought the whole Arab east near

Great Britain. France and Italy have suffered by comparison with their policy and lost ground in their Arab possessions. A mosque in Paris or the energetic pursuit of Arab studies in Italy will not count for much against the denial of political rights to their Moslem colonies. The French have been in Algeria since 1830. Algeria is by law part of France. It sends to Paris three senators and six deputies, in each case 1 per cent. of the Chamber. Its population is one eighth, 12 per cent., that of France. Eight ninths of the inhabitants of Algeria are denied a vote. This is restricted to French citizens and to Jews, a ninth of the total population. The Moslem population which has been just short of a century under the French flag are not "citizens" but "subjects," a classification bitterly resented. The prospect of some similar treatment is equally resented in Syria and Cilicia, the parts of Turkey now held by France.

England in India, under more difficult circumstances, has made a wider extension of the suffrage and given the Anglo-Indian Empire a far wider measure of self-government than has Algeria. This French colony has a homogeneous population, not divided, as is India, between scores of tongues, races, and religions, but of one faith held by two closely related races, among whom one language is commonly spoken, with an

ancient literature and a vital current life. This denial of the right of self-government to Moslems in Algeria is not lessened because Moslems can, by a cumbrous process, become "citizens," a privilege sought by few.

England, through the Arab east, has taken a different course and undoubtedly strengthened itself through the Mohammedan population of the world. In Arabia the Hejaz holds the sacrosanct cities of Mecca, the shrine of the Moslem faith, and Medina, where Mohammed lived and lies buried. To Mecca every Moslem turns in prayer. Every devout and serious Mohammedan hopes to visit it once in his lifetime. Turkish rule kept the roads to the sacred cities safe, built a railroad, and very greatly improved sanitary conditions and public order, but it was irritating, in manner and attitude, rather than by authority and oppression. Men can forgive each other when they hate each other's bad qualities; but they can never be reconciled when they hate the best in each. The Turk despises the poise, the suavity, the philosophic dignity, the proud fervour of the Arab whom good fortune cannot heat or ill fate depress. The Arab abhors the precise routine, the endless pains and papers in details, the vigorous authority of the Turk, passing by the indifference or dislike of the ineffective many and relentlessly crushing the few

who may give trouble. Nowhere was the Turk more hated and despised than in Mecca. To the chiefs of the Koreish clan to which Mohammed belonged, whose ancestry goes back without a flaw to 500 and something A. D., the Sultan of Turkey, whose pedigree only goes back to a paltry 1290, or 630 years, seems a wealthy parvenu of yesterday.

He has nothing on them. He will go. They, the chiefs of the Koreish clan, remain, and have for 1,400 years. The first four caliphs came and went, but they were all Koreish and ruled from Medina and from Mecca. The rest are but a passing show. The Ommawiyah caliphs came and went in Syria and in Spain and the Abasside in Bagdad and in Cairo. The Fatimite caliphs in north Africa had their brief day of 263 years (908–1171 A. D.) and are gone. Kings and Commanders of the Faithful, sultans, shahs, and padishahs have had their briefer hour; but in the enclosure where Mohammed walked and Abraham sacrificed, the same group of families, repeating the same names, generation by generation still perform the same simple rites and say the same prayers in the same tongue. One sovereign and another has ruled and asked recognition and submission of this ancient line; but now under the English "Raj" a King of the Hejas rules in security and independence. You

may be sure that English policy will have the backing and support of this august pontificate whose line is only equalled at the tomb of Confucius in China where a like family succession has revered his name for over a thousand years longer than the worshippers at Mecca.

They come from all the Moslem world. Our Moslem Nationals in the Sulu Islands are already preparing to be at Mecca next August. So are those who live in the twilight of north Siberia and in the extreme end of Africa or the utmost verge of the greater Atlas. Every other college of the Doctors of the Law is in the hands of the infidel. Here, at last, is a Moslem king of the descent of the Prophet, where Moslem law was first taught, an independent sovereign, and, here, too, are peace, security, and independence. The influence teachers sent from Mecca had on our Sulus I have already noted. The position in which England now stands toward Mecca gives the British Empire a position in the Moslem world never before enjoyed by any European power.

Mecca is in many ways the power-house of Islam. There come pilgrims not alone for the Haj or pilgrimage, but to study, to establish friendly relationships with men powerful in this ecclesiastical hereditary aristocracy or primacy. Wealthy and highly placed pilgrims of the great

families of one part of the Moslem world or another marry the daughters of Koreish families whose descent from Mohammed is established by the best evidence known, the mosque records of Mecca and Medina. Younger sons of these Koreish families go to some distant land to marry the daughter of a princely house, of a ruling caste or family or of some new man who has won his place and standing. This starts a line of descent in distant lands. The annals of Islam are dotted with these marriages in the past, and I have known several such alliances of their offspring. For the internal peace and development of the Mohammedan world the Kingdom of Hejaz will be a factor important now and very probably of value and moment in generations to come. Arabia in the past century since the Moslem reform movement, called Wahabi, puritanism in Islam, has been rent by internecine war. By establishing the ruling houses, through pensions and judicious and well-directed gifts of arms and munitions, England has assured peace over the peninsula with its area of 1,000,000 square miles with small isolated realms where the soil can be cultivated. Bahrein, from which the world's pearls come, and the "Trucial" Arabs along the Persian Gulf who made a truce of piracy a century ago, have enjoyed peace under English pensions and the occasional supervision

of a gunboat. To these the vast interior has been added. The emirate of Nejd and Hada, 20,000 population; the emirate of Jebel Shammar, 120,000 population; the principate of Asir on the Red Sea, 1,500,000 population; the imaumate of Yemen, 40,000 population, whence Mocha coffee once came; the sultanate of Oman, 500,000 population; the sultanate of Koweit, 50,000 population; the eventual terminus of the Constantinople-Bagdad railroad, are not all entered now in the English "Statesman's Year Book" whose happy office for three years has been to publish new additions to the territory of the British Empire, to its protectorates, and to its subsidized states in its "sphere of influence." Small are these states, but their pacification is a great advance in the peace of the Near East, in the development of Arabia and the increase of its trade. Unobtrusive statesmanship of the first order is apparent here of which the world at large is hardly aware. English policy is shown at its best in work like this. Except the east coast on the Persian Gulf, Oman and Aden, Turkey claimed all Arabia, harried and worried it. In Arabia the Turkish Empire lost troops and treasure innumerable in the past seventy years and accomplished naught but to add to human misery and the annals of small wars, costly and useless.

What the final disposition of Asia Minor will be no one can predict; but any arrangement which forgets that the fighting race which inhabits it has in the end swayed the region and lands about forgets the lessons of history for centuries.

THE END

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